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Paper Considers Choices for New UN Head

91UF1073A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Aug 91 Union Edition pp 1, 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA's New York correspondent A. Shalnev: "The United Nations: Who Will the New Secretary General Be?"]

[Text] **"Experienced manager, fluent communicator and versed in politics, required to head cumbersome multinational enterprise. Pay $192,000 per annum. Plus extras in the form of a private residence in an upscale area of New York and travel and entertainment expenses. Will have to handle a board of directors prone to dispute and 150 demanding shareholders."**

With this semi-ironic ad THE NEW YORK TIMES once began an editorial article in which it spoke of the need for a serious and comprehensive search for candidates for the office of UN secretary general.

Quite little time indeed remains: The term of the present secretary general, Peruvian Perez de Cuellar, expires at the end of the year. It was being said at one time that having been in this office 10 years, he would stay for a further year or 18 months to two years, for which France and the Soviet Union, in particular, were calling in backstage contacts, but which did not enrapture the United States and Great Britain.

But now, by all accounts, Perez de Cuellar, who is already 70, has made his choice: He will retire on the last day of December.

This means the inevitability of a serious struggle between various groupings of those "demanding shareholders" about whom THE NEW YORK TIMES spoke and by which it meant, naturally, the members of the international community.

Severe clashes surrounding the candidates for the highest international office are nothing new. Five closed sessions of the Security Council and 17 rounds of voting by ballot were required in 1981 before the Security Council could agree on the candidacy of Perez de Cuellar, having rejected a multitude of others and operating mainly in accordance with the principle: "If you do not like my man, I will cut down yours."

China, for example, blocked the election—for a further term—of Kurt Waldheim, and the United States vetoed Tanzanian Salim Ahmed Salim, on whom Beijing was gambling. We, on the other hand, availed ourselves of our right of veto against Sadruddin Aga Khan, who relied to a certain extent on the support of Washington. Perez de Cuellar was a compromise candidate: Time was pressing; just two weeks remained before the expiration of Waldheim's term. We abstained during the deciding vote.

It does not seem to me that on this occasion either the process of election of the secretary general will be marked by clashes between the permanent members of the Security Council. The situation in the world and, consequently, in the Security Council has changed appreciably in the past decade, and the principle of "if you are for, I am against" is no longer absolute in relations in the Big Five.

But it is obvious that there will be clashes—in qualitatively different areas from before, it is true. African states have already made it known that as of 1 January next year they wish to see none other than an African as secretary general. A geographical principle should be observed, they declare: Since there have been secretaries general from Europe—three times, what is more—from Asia and from South America, it is now Africa's turn.

There are no references to the need for "geographical consistency" in the UN Charter. The UN Charter is the soul of brevity as far as the secretary general is concerned. "The secretary general," it says, "is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council." And not a word about either geography or length of term or, for example, the fact that a representative of a permanent member of the Security Council may not be secretary general. All these and many other requirements and limitations are the result of gentlemen's agreements reached behind the scenes and in secret and in documents which are open and accessible to the public but which have not been recorded.

A surprising thing results: The process of electing the highest leader of an organization of which a most important purpose is to contribute to the establishment everywhere in the world of fundamental rights and liberties is, if one looks into it, an undemocratic process. What are the pluses and minuses of this candidate or the other; out of what considerations was he supported or "blackballed"; which members of the Security Council—permanent or nonpermanent—voted how. All this is a secret. In collecting material for these notes I attempted to familiarize myself with stenographic reports of meetings of the Security Council 10 years back. No, I was courteously told, this is not for general consumption; it is classified information. Why? I obtained no answer to this question. But I can deduce it: "It is more convenient."

I stress: The UN Charter contains no provision specifying elections of the secretary general behind closed doors. Nor, come to that, is there any mention there of what the procedure of the nomination of candidates is,

and consequently, as a senior employee explained to me, any individual—or organization—has the right to send a letter or fax to the chairman of the Security Council containing the name of his "nominee": Either way, it is said, we consider him worthy of being secretary general.

This is, of course, an extreme case, but the mystery surrounding the election of the secretary general also seems to be an extreme. This was tolerable to some extent earlier when the secretaries general—except, perhaps, only for Dag Hammarskjoeld—were ordinary—to call things by their name—albeit splendidly paid executants of other people's decisions, and their own leeway for initiative was, in fact, zero and was in no way encouraged. "In a situation where the United Nations was tied hand and foot by East-West conflicts," Jessica Matthews, vice president of the World Resources Institute, believes, "who would be elected secretary general was of little significance. This was an office which only very few thinking, energetic, and ambitious people would seek.... Preference was in this office accorded those who were considered passive, although dexterous, administrators."

But the role of the United Nations is beginning to change conspicuously. The United Nations is becoming an activist organization, and not simply administrative competence but a capacity for vision, independence, and breadth of judgment and excellent training in economic matters, which have now clearly moved to the forefront in the list of global priorities, should be required of its leaders. The future secretary general should be characterized by a readiness to seek out-of-the-ordinary solutions and an ability to bring these solutions to the point of practical realization. He should be a person to whom, as the same Jessica Matthews observes, "governments are prepared to entrust a leading role in the settlement of crises (which the United States, for example, was unable to entrust to Perez de Cuellar in the Persian crisis) and in the settlement of disputes before they grow into a crisis."

Finally he should be a man of courage inasmuch as the problems he will inevitably encounter will include that of "removing excess fat"; in other words, bringing back to the norm the bureaucratic machinery, which, specialists estimate, has become exceptionally swollen and which is swallowing up immense and far from always prudently spent resources.

Among the ideas being expressed in the lobbies, I happened to hear that of a reorganization of the top UN echelons whereby the role of some deputy secretaries general—and there are currently, if I am not mistaken, almost 15—would be assumed by former authoritative statesmen who have considerable clout in the international arena and who would be capable by their initiatives of intelligently supplementing the enterprise and mobility of the secretary general. I was told that Jimmy Carter, former president of the United States, for example, who since leaving the White House has shown himself to be a skilled mediator in the settlement of regional conflicts, would be admirably suited to this position. The names of Margaret Thatcher and Eduard Shevardnadze are also being mentioned.

Understandably, the chances of success of these people, who enjoy indisputable authority and have connections all over the world, would be incomparably greater than those of gifted and skillful government officials who are, albeit international, nonetheless officials accustomed to precisely drawn plans and who are little known outside the UN system. I learned with astonishment, incidentally, that when the secretary general is away there is no deputy who officially stands in for him, and that the secretary general does not make a practice of holding "planning sessions" and "briefings" with the participation of all or a majority of his deputies. "Neither on a daily nor monthly nor even, I would say, an annual basis," a high-ranking official observed in conversation; "everyone is involved in his own business, frequently not knowing what another is doing, and frequently duplicating one another as a consequence."

If the role of the United Nations is, indeed, growing—and there is no doubt on this score—there should also be a change in personnel policy, and all these gentlemen's agreements which were acceptable in the past, but which have evidently had their day, should be revised, too.

There are, I repeat, a multitude of understandings: from linguistic—the French, for example, demand that the secretary general necessarily know French in addition, naturally, to English—through the agreement that the office of deputy secretary general of the Security Council be held by a Soviet, for the General Assembly by an American, and for peacekeeping operations by a Briton.

And if all the places were changed around or, fairer still, if instead of a Briton, an African, say, were installed, and instead of a Soviet, an Australian—would it all collapse?

The tacit principle of geographical division should, it seems to me, give way to the principle of indisputable quality: It is immaterial where one comes from; what is important is that one be more suitable for this work than anyone else. This should be a principal criterion at the time of the selection of the secretary general also.

Here I return to the question posed in the title. I do not know who the next secretary general will be. I doubt that a precise answer could be given at this time, although no time at all remains before Perez de Cuellar's retirement. Six or seven candidates have been officially nominated; they are all Africans. B. Ghali, deputy prime minister of Egypt, stands apart: Africans from Black Africa do not consider him an African and he does not fall within the "Africa's turn" principle, but he is being actively pushed by Egyptian President Mubarak, who has already had repeated comprehensive discussions with President Bush on this score.

Active, albeit backstage, discussions are underway concerning the candidacy of Sadruddin Aga Khan, who was for many years UN high commissioner for refugees and who is considered a close friend of the family of the current U.S. President. We vetoed Aga Khan in 1981 and considered him close to the West. Such an argument is probably now no longer valid, but observers do not rule out Aga Khan's not "making it" to the ballot: THE WASHINGTON POST emphasizes that from the viewpoint of many specialists "he is inadequate as an administrator and, in addition, has managed to amass many enemies in previous positions."

The names of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Norwegian Premier Gro Harlem Brundtland, top Finish foreign policy official Martti Ahtisaari, the Japanese woman Sakado Ogata, the present high commissioner for refugees, who is considered, as the journal DIPLOMATIC WORLD emphasizes, one of the brightest stars in the UN firmament, are being mentioned.

Many people are being mentioned, but no Big Five country has so much as even hinted at whom it would prefer, although I am sure secret, backstage wor[illegible] is under way to the utmost extent.

United States & Canada

TASS Reports U.S. Nuclear Test in Nevada

LD1508204791 Moscow TASS in English 2015 GMT 15 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Kolesnichenko]

[Text] New York August 15 TASS—The United States on Thursday carried out a planned under-ground nuclear test in Nevada.

The test of a nuclear device with a yield under 20 kilotons proceeded successfully, Jim Boyer, U.S. Ministry [as received] of Energy official, said.

This is the fourth nuclear test officially announced by the United States this year and the 711th since the beginning of testing in Nevada in January 1951.

Correspondent Questions U.S. SDI Program

OW1508183991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1554 GMT 15 Aug 91

["Diplomatic Panorama" feature by diplomatic correspondent Petr Vasilieyev: "The U.S. 'Space Shield': What Does It Hide?"; item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Recently the Soviet press has published several articles on the U.S. Space Defence Initiative (Star Wars). In particular, the Army newspaper, "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA", (15.08.91) has restated its opinion that the SDI programme will come to be a new and thoroughly destructive phase of the arms race.

It is no secret that in the USA itself opinions differ widely on the SDI programme. "DP" [Diplomatic Panorama] produces below material received at first hand—directly from the programme's developers in the United States.

When in 1983 former U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced the beginning of work to develop SDI, the Strategic Defence Initiative, the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States was in full swing. What has changed now that, eight years later, the two countries have reached agreement and signed a treaty on conventional weapons and are ready to conclude the next agreement on strategic strike weapons? After all, the SDI programme was initially conceived as a "space shield" in the event of a massive Soviet nuclear attack on the United States.

The fact that the programme has already undergone certain modifications speaks volumes. But has it been essentially changed? And moreover, should the programme actually be seen as the nuclear sword that the Soviet Union has long claimed it to be?

Henry Cooper, the director of the agency developing the SDI programme, said in a conversation with the author of this article that attitudes to the SDI programme are changing in the USA for a whole range of reasons. The main reasons behind the changes in the character and content of the "star wars" programme, or, more properly, the "space shield" programme, are the changes in the Soviet Union and in the political landscape of Eastern Europe and also the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

It is true that initially SDI was conceived as a deterrent factor and a reflection of the Soviet nuclear threat. It was thought capable of destroying a large proportion of the several thousand warheads in Soviet ballistic missiles which might be used in a nuclear strike against America. then it was calculated that the remaining missiles (about one third of the overall total) would cause such serious damage and devastation to the United States anyway that the expenditure on SDI was unjustifiable.

At present the majority of American politicians think that nuclear war with the Soviet Union is not a realistic possibility. But at the same time, domestic instability within the Soviet Union, a situation which many prominent politicians, including the Soviet President himself, have assessed as a threat that could lead the country to anarchy and chaos, forces the Americans to bear in mind the at times unpredictable course of events and take the appropriate measures.

Another argument used by the supporters of SDI is that more and more countries are now coming into possession of nuclear weapons. According to CIA figures, by the year 2000 15 developing countries will be able to begin systematic production of ballistic missiles or acquire them by other means.

Correspondingly, the main adjustment to the SDI programme, to its current conception, was made so that it can ward off a missile released by accident, or a single unit released from it. U.S. strategies no longer foresee massive nuclear attacks. The maximum number of warheads expected in any attack is now estimated at 200 units. According to the American strategists they would be completely destroyed by the Space Shield.

Another vital change in the programme is the function to cover not only the United States with the Space Shield but to create a global strategic defence system. The changing world situation allows the United States to make the fairly optimistic suggestions that some countries might be keen to cooperate within the framework of the renewed SDI programme, and that it is already possible to speak of the creation of regional strategic programmes.

Since 1985, when the memorandum on the participation of five countries in the joint development of SDI was signed, Great Britain, Germany, Israel, Italy and Japan have participated in the programme. Other countries, including particularly Belgium, Canada, France and the Netherlands, have expressed the desire to join the development of the project. The United States' SDI partners have signed 236 contracts to an overall value of 447 million dollars. Paul Wulfowitz, assistant to the U.S.

Secretary of State for Defence remarked that "we are keen to encourage other countries, especially our allies, to participate in the SDI programme. It will enable them to better understand the significance of the programme and us to take advantage of the advanced technology of our allies in joint development projects". Cooper believes that the Soviet Union can join the programme at some point. "It is actually up to the Soviet Union," he said, adding that, if the Soviet Union did take such a decision, the United States would have no secrets from it. He said serious negotiations should be started with the Soviet Union in order to make it a full-fledged participant of the programme. But he admitted that there are various opinions on the score in the United States, in particular one hears diametrically opposite points of view expressed in the Senate. Cooper regrets this, for it means that the Soviet Union will continue viewing the Space Shield programme with mistrust.

The entire antimissile defence system has two basic aspects: countering theatre ballistic missiles and strategic missiles. But the main task of the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) is defence against any strike by any number of warheads ranging from 10 to 200 launched from any part of the globe and aimed at any target. One of the elements of the Space Shield is a field defence system against theatre ballistic missiles. This will make use of Patriot missile systems, which proved their effectiveness in the Gulf War and which will naturally be modified and improved, as well as Arrow and Ace missiles and THAAD, a high-altitude antimissile system.

The basic elements of GPALS are to be mobile strategic defence systems deployed in space, on the ground and at sea. Sea- and ground-based elements are to be quickly transferrable to any part of the world. In some "hot spots", the American military believe, they should stay permanently.

A system including a satellite sensor called Brilliant Eyes and ground control stations is to be one of the main components of the space shield. The satellite will spot a missile when the booster is detached. In addition, The ground-based architecture will comprise two types of interceptors, the number of which will be 50 percent of what was originally planned. Both types are being developed simultaneously. One of them, E21 (Exo-Endoatmospheric Interceptor) is to be used for targets in the upper layers of the atmosphere. The other type, GBI (Ground-Based Interceptor), is to be used for the destruction of missiles or warheads before they have entered the atmosphere. In the fiscal year 1988, expenditures on the Brilliant Eyes programme amounted to $22 billion.

Another element of GPALS is the space-based interceptor portion called Brilliant Pebbles. Each Pebble is an autonomous interceptor which can act either entirely on its own or simultaneously with other similar systems. But, in any case, there is mutual exchange of information, all the neighbouring systems analysing the situation and deciding whether their support is needed. During the battle, each such system acts quite independently and is not controlled by a centralised battle management system, although it must be authorised to enter the battle. The autonomous mode of operation of these systems ensures their considerable survivability: even if many of them are destroyed, the remaining ones will still be operative.

Each Pebble will cost between one and one and a half million dollars. Research, development, testing and deployment of the Brilliant Pebbles cost more than $10 billion in the fiscal year 1988 alone.

The tasks of GPALS can be summed up as follows:

protection against limited strikes, rather than deterrence of a massive attack;

global strategic defence, rather than defence of the United States alone;

limited deployment of the three basic elements of the Space Shield system on the ground, at sea and in space, rather than large- scale deployment of SDI systems in space and on the ground.

Today funding is the main problem. This year, Space Shield expenditures have been cut down to an extent which, according to Henry Cooper, makes it impossible to complete the work on it in this century. The pace of research and development is slower than it was in 1985.

Soviet Reporter 'Simply Disappeared' in Canada

PM1508132791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Aug 91 p 1

[I. Kadulin report: "He Left and Never Returned"]

[Text] The USSR Gosteleradio [State Television and Radio Broadcasting] Company's correspondent in Canada—Fotinov—did not show up for work. A search was conducted. The USSR Embassy sent a telegram to the Gosteleradio Company leadership reporting the event. So far, nobody knows what actually happened. The Gosteleradio Company is awaiting an official response from the Canadian authorities. They suggest that Fotinov—who, incidentally, is a former party worker—simply disappeared. His belongings remain untouched in his apartment.

Northeast Asia

No 'Secret Aspects' Seen in Silayev Visit

OW1508115591 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1055 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] It has been confirmed that a delegation of the Russian Federation led by Prime-Minister Ivan Silayev will visit Japan between August 21 and 28. The Russian

Foreign Hinistry views the visit as the first step to the establishment of direct relations between the Federation and Japan.

The delegation hopes to discuss primarily trade and economic cooperation. Russian diplomats think that the infrastructure, communications and conversion of the defence industry are the most probable spheres of interaction.

It was stressed at the Foreign Ministry that Silayev is not going to Japan to beg for credits. The principled approach of the Russian government is to create conditions for foreign investments. The two sides can discuss the possibility of large-scale economic projects in the territory of Russia, primarily in the Far East.

Like Silayev the ministry denied reports about the secret aspects the visit might have, specifically concessions to Japan on the question of northern territories. One of the diplomats said the delegation does not intend to hold talks behind the scenes in Japan. Russia sees the solution of the question in signing a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty with Russian participation.

Moscow Radio Comments on Kaifu's China Visit

OW1508175291 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin 1000 GMT 13 Aug 91

[Commentary by station observer Viktorov; from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu's formal visit to China has become an important event in world politics. Station observer Viktorov has commented on this event, writing:

Both China and Japan are playing remarkable roles not only in the Asian and Pacific region, but also in the contemporary world as a whole. Thus, the conclusion we will naturally draw from this is that the development of Japan-China relations can only be based on the positive trend of the recent international developments. In this sense, Japan has set an example for the other members of the G-7, the seven developed capitalist countries. After the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the seven countries adopted sanctions against China and limited official bilateral contacts with it. Just as Sun Pinghua, president of the China-Japan Friendship Association, pointed out, personalities in Tokyo correctly think that isolating China has not only brought no gains to the Western countries, but also no benefits to the consolidation of peace and stability in Asia or throughout the entire world.

Indeed, the principle of mutual benefit and cooperation has a far greater future than the principle of paying attention to differences of opinion. Evidently, personalities in both Tokyo and in Beijing think so. It is precisely from this viewpoint that many observers are assessing a whole set of ecnomic and trade agreements signed during Kaifu's visit to China. All signs have shown that it is particularly possible that personages in the industrial sphere in Japan will come to develop the vast market in China.

China will also be able to reach its goal of more closely integrating itself with all other countries in the Asia and Pacific region. Experts justifiably think the Asia and Pacific region is the most active place in the world, and that the dialogue concerning international issues is also fruitful. For instance, both Japan and China have recognized the wishes to solve the Cambodia conflict and the intensifying nature of the question of the situation on the Korea peninsula, reiterated their proposal to have a constructive dialogue and considered it a way to solve the existing issues, and voiced their willingness to cooperate in this respect. We cannot help but welcome Chinese Premier Li Peng's affirmation that China will in principle participate in the nuclear nonproliferation treaty already signed by 118 nations. The Japanese prime minister called this an epoch-making step and an example of actual cooperation in building a new world order and strengthening international security.

Experience has proven on more than one occasion that the lofty goal of reducing the danger of war in all parts of the world can be reached through disarmament. Therefore, it is quite natural that personalities in all countries in the Asia and Pacific region satisfactorily welcome the following statement Kaifu made during his visit to China: Kaifu stated that Japan would never become a militaristic country threatening its neighbors.

IZVESTIYA Reports Kaifu Remarks in Beijing

PM1508120391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 91 Union Edition p 4

[A. Anichkin report: "China Accedes to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] China has announced its decision to sign the international Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. PRC State Council Premier Li Peng announced this basic intention Saturday to Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, who has arrived on a visit to Beijing.

This step by the Chinese leadership means that all five permanent members of the UN Security Council are now parties to the treaty, which was opened for signing back in 1968 and came into force in 1970. For a long time Beijing objected to the very idea of introducing the concept of nuclear weapons nonproliferation, believing that it only strengthens the "nuclear monopoly of the superpowers." International commentators are attributing Li Peng's unexpected statement to the extremely important events of the week, and in Japan it has brought forth a particularly emotional response because it has coincided with the latest anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Prime Minister Kaifu welcomed Beijing's decision, calling it "a step of epoch-making significance." It has provoked the same reaction in the United States. A White House statement

has stressed that the United States welcomes this development and hopes that China will ratify the treaty as soon as possible.

The newspaper MAINICHI reports that the Japanese Foreign Ministry believes that the decision to accede to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the result of Tokyo's "strong influence." It is clear, however, that this radical turnaround in Chinese policy has been prompted by the overall development of the disarmament process, primarily by the progress at the Soviet-U.S. strategic weapons talks and the signing of the first ever treaty to reduce them. Following the PRC's joining the nonproliferation treaty, it is obvious that it will also join the nuclear disarmament talks, with participation by all the nuclear powers—not just the USSR and the United States—becoming necessary at their new stage. This development, incidentally, was also envisaged by the provisions of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The Chinese decision in Beijing, which is important in its own right, seems to be linked with hopes for a favorable political result. Over the two years since the bloody drama in Tiananmen Square, when speeches supporting democracy were suppressed, China has encountered condemnation of its human rights policy backed up by Western economic sanctions. The Japanese prime minister's visit is the first visit to China by the leader of one of the "G-7" leading Western countries. China hopes that Kaifu's visit will help to restore a favorable climate in relations with countries that are able to make major investments in the Chinese economy. Ending the boycott on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which aroused suspicions that Beijing is assisting the nuclear programs of certain developing countries, may restore Western confidence. As the Japanese newspaper YOMIURI has noted, China hopes that this will help extend its most favored nation trading status with the United States, an issue which has been blocked in Congress.

Beijing, however, having somewhat toned down its rebuttal of Western criticism—which it rejected as inadmissible interference in its internal affairs—is still as sensitive as ever about anything that touches on the events in Tiananmen Square—even indirect reminders. An AP correspondent bore witness to the fact that the Chinese audience listening to Kaifu's speech on Sunday in Beijing's Center for Chinese and Japanese Youth welcomed with stormy applause his statement about Japan's resolve to continue assisting economic reforms and political openness in China. There was complete silence in the hall, however, when the prime minister spoke about the need to respect human rights, though he carefully avoided mentioning the events of 1989.

In both Beijing and Tokyo, the current visit by the Japanese prime minister has been seen as evidence of a return to normal relations between the two countries. As far as Japan is concerned, Kaifu said in Beijing, its trading and economic contacts with China are very valuable because, by investing capital in the PRC economy, it is thus investing in the cause of peace in the region and throughout the world. According to him, the progressive development of relations between the two countries is ultimately leading to the gradual involvement of China in the world's most dynamic economic complex, that of the Asia-Pacific region. China has been granted Japanese credits worth $6 million until 1995, and the normalization of relations with China will help Japanese businessmen to reserve key positions in this country with its rich natural resources and relatively cheap labor force.

China, which needs Western support for its reform program, is only welcoming Japanese activity at a time when, for example, the United States is still debating the question of further steps to be taken toward Beijing.

The trend toward Chinese and Japanese cooperation in a number of international problems was also outlined at the Beijing talks. Judging by news agency reports, Kaifu, who participated in the recent G-7 conference in London, agreed in Beijing with the viewpoint of the Chinese leadership, who reject the global monopoly of "a small number of powers." This is understandable, however, because China primarily has in mind an increase of the UN role in international affairs. This line traditionally enjoys support in Tokyo as well. Coordination was also planned regarding Tokyo's and Beijing's approaches to the future settlement of the situation in Cambodia and the Korean Peninsula.

Near East & South Asia

Gulf War Seen Giving 'Impetus' to Peace Quest

PM1508134591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Aug 91 Second Edition p 4

[Correspondent Andrey Stepanov "Viewpoint": "One Year Later: Impetus Given"]

[Text] Beirut—The anniversary of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait passed unnoticed in the Arab world, as interest was focused on the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting and the prospects of convening a Near East peace conference. But the effects of the Gulf War are nonetheless making themselves felt. There have been serious changes in the arrangement of regional forces, and a new political situation is consequently developing in the region. To what extent will it contribute to the search for peace?

The extreme radical wing of pan-Arab nationalism—in the form of President Husayn's Baghdad regime, the Palestinian resistance movement which supported him, and the broad strata of the population in Arab countries which sympathize with him—has suffered a serious defeat. The Palestinians are among those who have suffered the most, and this is particularly evident in Kuwait. More than 400,000 Palestinians worked there before the war, but there are now fewer than 100,000 left. Approximately 200,000 fled from the Iraqi occupation,

but some cooperated with the Iraqis, thereby arousing hatred among the indigenous Kuwaitis. This same phenomenon—admittedly not in such an acute form—can be seen in all the Arab Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia. They have stopped giving financial aid to the PLO, and hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been forced to seek a safe haven in Jordan.

Trying to recover from its moral and political defeat, realistically reviewing its strategy and tactics, and reassessing its relations with Arab countries, the PLO is now seeking its place at the upcoming Near East conference. It wants to represent the population of the occupied territories, including the Arab part of Jerusalem, and a good half of the Palestinian people who live outside their homeland—and not of their own volition.

The Baghdad regime is in a very difficult position. Apart from losing almost 200,000 men in the war, its military machine has taken a real hammering, and its industrial potential has been destroyed. It had difficulty in suppressing the Shiite uprising in the south and sitting down at the negotiating table with Kurdish rebels in the north to discuss granting autonomy to Kurdistan. The economic blockade of Iraq is still in place. Its population is threatened with starvation and epidemics. The regime has announced a democratization which aims to retain power for the ruling Ba'th Party—but in a different package.

Judging by UN experts' statements, the Baghdad regime is making all kinds of maneuvers in an attempt to conceal its programs to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. But when it is found out, it is forced to submit.

You also hear it said, however, that Iraq undoubtedly won a victory on a historical level, even if not in military respects. I personally have encountered this logic in Baghdad more than once. "Surely it must be a victory," ordinary Iraqis have said to me, "if more than 20 states, including the United States, Britain, and France, waged war against Iraq, using 21st century arsenals, but were still unable to overthrow the regime headed by the 'leader and people's hero' Saddam Husayn?" They claim that, if it had not been for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the question of democratic transformations would not have become so urgent in Kuwait itself and other conservative, oil-producing Arab states, and the effort to settle the Near East problem would still have been at a standstill. The most noteworthy feature of this argument is that it is believed by a great many people—not only in Iraq but in other Arab countries as well.

With regard to the victim of the attack and subsequent annexation, Kuwait, it is once again an independent, sovereign state—thanks to collective efforts. With considerable difficulty, it is rebuilding its economy, returning to a normal life, and combating the hundreds of burning oil wells left as a "parting gift" by the retreating Iraqi troops. There is growing pressure on the ruling family to fundamentally democratize the country, although the authorities are preferring to bide their time and get away with making what are essentially vague promises.

An important outcome of the Gulf War is that the Arab triangle linking Cairo, Damascus, and Riyadh has grown stronger. Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were all directly or indirectly involved in the operations against Iraq and now take a moderate, realistic stand. They have essentially been joined by Jordan's King Husayn, who, under pressure from public opinion, was previously inclined toward Iraq. The fact that the sides involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict have accepted the U.S. peace initiative to convene a Near East peace conference has given the go-ahead for the peace process in the region.

It is rightly said that wars do not solve old problems but merely add new ones. In this respect, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the resulting Gulf War are no exception. For the sake of objectivity, however, it must be admitted that, aside from the will of its initiators and participants, it has provided the impetus to seek a comprehensive Near East settlement.

Border Commander Denies Afghan Mojahedin Accord

LD1508195191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] The Chief of Staff of Soviet border guards, Major General Viktor Zemtsov, has turned down a French news agency report that the Command of Soviet border guards and the Afghan opposition Islamic Society Party, actively operating in the north of Afghanistan, have reached agreement under which the Mojaheds pledge not to cross into the territories of neighboring Soviet republics. The general said that the command of the border troops has not concluded any official agreements with Afghan opposition groups. He stressed that border guards do not sign any treaties independently because such questions are solely within the competence of the central Soviet Government and the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

Foreign Ministry: No Date for Israeli Relations

LD1508124491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1139 GMT 15 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Konstantin Voytsekhovich]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Aug (TASS)—A USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry representative today denied the INTERFAX agency report transmitted on 14 August as to when diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel will be restored. The statement, referring to a high-ranking staff member of the Near East and North African Countries Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, confirmed in particular that diplomatic relations between the two countries could possibly be restored as early as in September of this year.

A USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman elaborated in a conversation with the TASS correspondent, that "in the conversation to which INTERFAX refers there was no mention of any time frame." It only repeated the well-known Soviet position that was set out in a USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement published in the Soviet press on 8 August, the diplomat noted. The document stressed that the question of diplomatic relations can only be finally resolved within the context of the negotiating process on settling the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that, obviously, both will coincide in time. The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said: "It only remains to be regretted that the INTERFAX correspondent took liberties in his approach to this very important matter."

Air Link Between Leningrad, Tel Aviv Detailed

OW1508131891 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1055 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Israeli Transport Minister Moshe Qatzav is arriving in Leningrad in the course of his visit to the USSR. According to the press center of the City Council, during his talks with the city authorities an agreement is expected to be signed on regular charter flights between Leningrad and Tel Aviv that should begin in October.

Yazov Receives Indian Minister Kumar 13 Aug

PM1608082891 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Aug 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Meeting in Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] On 13 August Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, received K. Kumar, the Republic of India's minister of state for defense, who is in the USSR on a working visit. Questions of mutual interest were discussed. The meeting took place in a warm and friendly atmosphere.

Yanayev Receives Libyan Petroleum Secretary

LD1508180291 Tripoli Great Jamahiriyah Radio Network in Arabic 1230 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] Soviet Vice President Yanayev has received the [Libyan] brother secretary of the people's committee for petroleum, who is visiting Moscow. He handed him the brother leader of the revolution's invitation to President Mikhail Gorbachev to attend the great celebration on the occasion of the arrival of the great man-made river in Ban Ghazi on 22 August. During the meeting bilateral relations and issues of mutual interest were discussed.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Nikolayenko Gives Gorbachev Invitation to Mandela

PM1608081291 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 91 Union Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Message to N. Mandela"]

[Text] A meeting has been held in Johannesburg between USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.D. Nikolayenko and Nelson Mandela, president of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. On instructions from the USSR president, he was given a verbal message from M.S. Gorbachev confirming the invitation to the ANC leader to visit the Soviet Union. Mandela was grateful to receive the message and stressed that he very much values the Soviet Union's traditional support for the just cause of the South African people and that he would personally like to express his gratitude to President Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet people during his upcoming visit to Moscow.

During the friendly conversation, there was an exchange of opinions about the processes that are taking place in the Soviet Union and South Africa. Here the mutual opinion was expressed that there is no reasonable alternative to a political settlement in South Africa, and that in order to achieve it, it is necessary to end violence and pursue a policy designed to eliminate apartheid completely. Mandela reaffirmed the ANC's readiness to resume talks.

Nikolayenko Interviewed on South Africa Visit

LD1508201291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1530 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Interview from the "Television News Service" program with Valeriy Nikolayenko, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, by Television News Service announcer Viktor Lyubovtsev; place and date not given; first paragraph is announcer introduction—recorded]

[Text] The Soviet press and many foreign press organs are currently giving considerable attention to the visit paid to South Africa by Valeriy Nikolayenko, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, and the talks he held while there. He gave us the details during our interview:

[Lyubovtsev] Valeriy Dmitriyevich, you have just returned from the Republic of South Africa, where you spent five days. One could say this was the first official contact between our countries at such a governmental level.

[Nikolayenko] We had certain contacts before this, but regarding this visit that has been the object of such broad publicity, this was generally considered the first such contact in recent years. This contact can primarily be attributed to the changes taking place in South Africa—changes that we cannot ignore.

[Lyubovtsev] What are your impressions of these changes, Valeriy Dmitriyevich? What was your opinion of the state which we labelled the bastion of racialism, apartheid, and so on, for so long?

[Nikolayenko] By and large, I sensed that there really are changes taking place, and when you see it for yourself, you are more and more convinced of that. The apartheid laws that have already been revoked do not practically function any more, and you can see blacks and whites together in various public places, and so on.

[Lyubovtsev] Even two years ago, this was punishable under criminal law.

[Nikolayenko] Yes, restrictions have now been lifted on the settlement of the population in different areas according to racial criteria. At any rate, for all the prosperity in Pretoria—where the majority of the population is white—when you arrive in Johannesburg you can sense not just a racial stratification, but also a social one. That applies particularly to the settlements located around Pretoria, and above all the well-known area of Soweto—there are many other such areas inhabited by the black population—where you can feel that the issue for the future is of course not just to eliminate apartheid. But the process has already begun, and is evidently becoming more and more irreversible.

[Lyubovtsev] Valeriy Dmitriyevich, I now pose a natural question about Soviet-South African relations. What did you discuss at your talks with the South African minister of foreign affairs?

[Nikolayenko] I am bound to say that we went over there above all to meet with Nelson Mandela, an outstanding figure of the contemporary world, who enjoys vast authority not only in South Africa, but also throughout the world. We conveyed, or rather confirmed, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's invitation to visit the Soviet Union. Of course, the African National Congress is the leading democratic antiapartheid organization in South Africa. We naturally took the opportunity—particularly as the South African authorities were very well-disposed toward us—to meet with the minister of foreign affairs and other South African figures—members of the government, representatives of the public, as it were. We also discussed matters to do with the political processes in South Africa.

We are of course concerned by the fact that the negotiating process has not yet been resumed, that there is mistrust between the sides. But there are also signs of a desire to resume the process, and to pursue it fairly successfully and rapidly. Therefore, we are on the whole following this process very attentively. Naturally, we will arrange our links in relation to the advances along the path of the negotiating process. Of course, we have no reason to hide the fact that we have our own completely obvious interest. On the whole, it is in the Soviet Union's national interests to have good relations with all states, especially with states such as, if I can put it like this, regional powers that have great influence in this region.

[Lyubovtsev] It is said that one swallow does not make a summer. Your trip was to some degree one swallow in the sense of official contacts at a political level with the South African authorities and of course with the African National Ccongress leadership. Well, in conclusion I would like to ask you a nondiplomatic question. When can we expect relations between Moscow and Pretoria to be normalized with the establishment—or to be more precise—the restoration of first consular and then full diplomatic relations?

[Nikolayenko] I think that this will be a step-by-step, gradual process. If we are to talk about full relations then, of course, full diplomatic relations can be established when all these questions are solved, that is, when apartheid is completely eliminated and the country turns into a democratic nonracial state. I think that there are appropriate intervening stages, and links between businessmen have already begun...

[Lyubovtsev interrupts] In some of the press the date 1992 has appeared as the beginning of, if not full then in any event broad, relations between South Africa and the Soviet Union. I understand that it is difficult to make forecasts in politics, but perhaps this is a more or less a realistic date?

[Nikolayenko] I think that if the processes continue at the same pace as just now, a fairly fast pace, I think that our relations will take on new aspects in 1992.

[Lyubovtsev] Thank you for the conversation.

[Nikolayenko] You're welcome.

Soviets Considering Cape Town Antarctic Base

LD1508224391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1210 GMT 15 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Prosvetov]

[Excerpt] Windhoek, 15 Aug (TASS)—[passage omitted] Talks are being conducted at present on establishing a permanent support base for Soviet Antarctic expeditions in Cape town. Hans Merke, representing the interests of the Leningrad Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute, revealed in an interview given over the telephone from Cape Town that this would be of great advantage to the Soviets. Cape Town has a developed infrastructure, the foodstuffs are cheaper than, say, in Montivedeo and the distance to the Antarctic is less.

Further on Sierra Leone Delegation Meeting

PM1508153191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Aug 91 Union Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Meeting With Delegation"]

[Text] USSR Vice President G.I. Yanayev received 12 August a delegation from the Republic of Sierra Leone House of Representatives (parliament), headed by

Speaker of the House William Miaka Stephen Conteh, which is in Moscow on an official visit.

G.I. Yanayev told delegation members about the reforms being implemented in the country's economic and sociopolitical life, the Soviet Union's domestic policy, and its approach to a number of international and regional problems. In this context, special interest was shown in the situation in Africa and the activation of political dialogue with African countries on every level.

During the talks, which took place in an atmosphere of openness and goodwill, both sides expressed satisfaction at the favorable development of Soviet-Sierra Leonean cooperation and the mutual desire to improve it in line with present-day demands.

O.W. Harding, Republic of Sierra Leone ambassador to the USSR, took part in the talks.

East Europe

Soviet Naval Detachment Visits Romanian Port

LD1508202891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1141 GMT 15 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Timofeyev]

[Excerpt] Constanta, 15 Aug—The traditional national salute greeted a detachment of Soviet naval craft on Wednesday at the Romanian port of Constanta when they arrived here on a visit. The detachment is headed by Vice Admiral Georgiy Gurinov, chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, and includes the large antisubmarine ship, "Azov," and the escort ship, "Bezukoriznennyy." [passage omitted]

Bessmertnykh Sends Support Message to Yugoslavia

LD1508105391 Moscow TASS in English 1903 GMT 14 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Boris Zubko]

[Text] Belgrade August 14 TASS—Yugoslavian Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Budimir Loncar received here today Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia Vadim Loginov, who passed him a message of Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh.

The message said that the Soviet leadership supports the decision of the Yugoslavian presidium to cease fire in Croatia as an important step, which, alongside the comprehensive program of the Yugoslavian Government, will provide for the achievement of an acceptable stable solution to the current crisis, the TANJUG news agency reports.

The message also expressed the assurance that Yugoslavs are able to find the way out of the current situation and preserve the integrity of their state by their own and through a democratic dialogue.

West Europe

OMON To Guard Finnish Consulate in Leningrad

PM1508122591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Aug 91 p 1

[INTERFAX report: "OMON Guarding Finns"]

[Text] Markus Lyra, Finnish consul general in Leningrad, has announced that the consulate general will henceforth be guarded by a group from the Leningrad OMON [special purpose militia detachment]. In his words, the consulate general has resorted to OMON help "because of impulsive attacks by Soviet citizens trying to obtain Finnish visas."

Markus Lyra noted that for the last 18 months he has been trying to acquire additional premises for the visa department from city leaders. It proved easier, however, for the city leadership to allocate an OMON subdivision to guard the consulate general than to offer it another building.

Pollution From Kola Smelteries Increasing

LD1508210191 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 1500 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] [Announcer] The sulphur emissions from the Kola smelteries have continued to increase at the same time that the Finns have had talks with the Soviets on modernizing the smelteries. According to Soviet scientists currently visiting Lapland, the sulphur emissions from the Monchegorsk production plants rose during last year by as much as 40,000 tonnes. The scientists think that the emissions from the production plants have at least remained at the previous level. Marjatta Rautio reports:

[Begin recording] [Rautio] Finns have during the past couple of years been engaged in intensive talks with the Soviets on the modernization of the Kola nickel smelteries. Hopes for a speedy reduction in the massive sulphur emissions, which are causing concern in both Finland and Norway, have already run into the sand in the course of the slowly-progressing talks. At the same time as mutual understanding has been sought on the modernization of smelteries, the sulphur emissions in the Kola area have increased further. What amounts of sulphur do the Kola plants now emit into the air? This is how (Igor Baraketchov), assistant director of research of the Lapland protection area, situated near the town of Monchegorsk, describes the situation in the town.

[Baraketchov] According to the forecasts derived from the data provided by our supervisory bodies, it will be 250,000 - 260,000 tonnes.

[Rautio] According to (Baraketchov), the Monchegorsk sulphur emissions already rose to this level last year. The emissions have thus risen from the levels of the late

1980's by as much as 40,000 tonnes. The Soviet scientists currently visiting Lapland do not have exact information about the sulphur emissions of Pechenganikel, situated further north, but the direction at Pechenganikel, too, is clear. This is what (Vladimir Zolutukhin), director of the Lapland protection area, says:

[Zolotukhin] Nothing is decreasing there. Not a single one of our enterprises has reduced emissions.

[Rautio] The poor economic situation of the Soviet Union has, according to the scientists, meant that the outdated factories, creaking at the joints, are now processing low quality ore in an attempt to achieve even greater productivity. Scientists also blame the plants for deliberate negligence. The scientists, who are concerned over the situation, recently publicly demanded a reduction in output so that the sulphur emissions could be reduced. The factory directors were, however, totally negative toward the demands. The Severonikel combine has even been threatened with a fine of 11 million rubles unless it reduces emissions.

Because of the increasing emissions, berry picking and mushroom gathering has been banned in the surroundings of the town of Monchegorsk this autumn. A ban was imposed for the first time two years ago. The centralized buying of berries and mushrooms has ended, but the scientists say that it is difficult to convince individual people of the seriousness of the situation. [end recording]

[Announcer] The increased sulphur emissions in the Monchegorsk area have raised the total sulphur emissions in the Kola area to over 60,000 tonnes [as heard] per year.

Swedish Expedition To Study Polar Radioactivity

PM1508132191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Aug 91 Union Edition p 5

[Correspondent M. Zubko report: "International Expedition Aboard the Icebreaker Oden. Are There Traces of Radioactivity in the Arctic?"]

[Text] Stockholm—The modern Swedish icebreaker Oden set sail for the extreme northern latitudes of the Arctic a few days ago. The ship is carrying an international expedition of scientists which will study this region, especially the presence of radioactive fallout there.

Swedish journalists aboard the icebreaker confirm that the Oden will sail through the waters of the Barents and Laptev Seas and then try to break through the ice as close to the North Pole as possible. The crew and scientists hope that they will be able to go beyond those latitudes, once visited by the legendary Nansen aboard his famous ship, Fram.

They are not certain that they will be lucky enough to repeat the achievement of the Soviet icebreaker which reached the North Pole, but the expedition's objective is not to conquer the "roof" of the world but to carry out systematic scientific research.

One of the main tasks is to ascertain whether radioactive fallout has occurred in the Arctic and, if so, in what amounts, from where, and whether it has any substantial effect on the environment.

The international expedition will try obtain an answer to the question of whether the radioactive clouds containing discharges from the Chernobyl nuclear power station have reached the extreme northern region—but their work is by no means limited to that issue. The scientists have set themselves the goal of detecting traces of radioactive discharges produced in Britain and France, determining the presence of "traces" left by nuclear submarines after they have blown their tanks, and ascertaining what consequences the atomic and hydrogen weapons tests in the fifties and sixties, as well as in our own time, including those carried out in Novaya Zemlya, have had for the region.

But how is this to be done?—the reader will certainly ask. Elis Holm, leader of the expedition and representative of Lund University in Sweden, answers:

"Different radioactive discharges have their own specific features. We will be able to distinguish, for example, the fallout that has occurred since the Chernobyl accident from the indicators of atomic submarines. It will be interesting to find out what has happened to those 'traces' and what impact they have had on the environment...."

A distinctive feature of the extreme northern region, according to Elis Holm, is that the sea and ocean currents drag ice floes with them along their routes. If radioactive fallout is present on the ice, that fallout can eventually end up very far from where it occurred. When the ice begins to melt, however, the fallout "disappears" into the water wherever the currents have brought it.

Throughout the voyage, which is planned to last three months, the Oden expedition will be taking samples of air, water, and ice. In December 1991, these samples will be compared with data obtained by scientists who have carried out scientific research from German and U.S. vessels.

But that is not all. The Oden expedition members plan to put all the information obtained on computer. The scientists hope that these data held in computer memory banks will help forecast the consequences of catastrophes that may occur in the future.

Political & Social

Further on Daily's Critique of CPSU Finances

Excerpts of Kruchina Budget Memorandum

914B0302C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Aug 91 p 5

[Memorandum signed by N. Kruchina, CPSU Central Committee Administrator of Affairs: "On the Implementation of the 1990 CPSU Budget and the CPSU Budget for 1991;" classifications as published]

[Text] *For Official Use Only*

...The 1990 party budget was implemented in the amount of 2,284.8 million rubles [R] on the revenue side, or R75.6 million less than the amount planned, and on the expenditure side in the amount of R1.9941 billion, with savings of R111.9 million. In addition, pursuant to a decision of the 28th CPSU Congress, R500 million were transferred from the cash stocks of the party to implement curative measures for children residing in contaminated territories in the accident zone of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. Therefore, in 1990, total expenditures in the amount of R2.4941 billion were made from the party budget. The budget deficit in the amount of R209.3 million was covered from the CPSU reserve fund.

...On the whole, the budgets of the communist parties of all Union republics were implemented in 1990 with a deficit of R441.6 million, which amounts to 28.1 percent of their expenditures.

The CPSU budget took in R1.2458 billion, or R31.2 million less than planned. A decline of the CPSU size by 2.4 million people in the course of the year influenced the result.

Poorer discipline and organizational work on the execution of party decisions and on strict compliance by Communists with the requirements of the CPSU Statute was a factor in the reduction of party proceeds from the collection of membership dues. Numerous and often mass cases of refusals to pay, or the suspension of the payment of dues by Communists occurred in many party organizations.

...Out of the profits of party publishing houses, R971 million were transferred to the budget of the CPSU, or R72.3 million less than was planned. The failure to meet the profit plan for publishing operations was caused by the dropping circulation of newspapers and magazines in the course of the year and higher outlays for newsprint. The combined circulation of newspapers amounted to 99.3 percent of that planned, and the circulation of magazines to 96.5 percent. The book publishing plan was 90.6 percent fulfilled. Compared to 1989, the combined circulation of newspapers dropped by 4 million, and that of magazines by 6.7 million.

Other proceeds came to R68 million and increased compared to the previous period by R47.4 million. The growth of other proceeds of the budget was ensured due to the expansion of production and economic operations by party committees after the 28th CPSU Congress, mainly by virtue of using material facilities under their current management.

...In 1990, 52 facilities which party organs leased, including the entire buildings of the Rostov and Turgay Oblast Committees, a segment of the building occupied by the staff of the Lipetsk Oblast Committee, and the premises of 39 city and rayon committees of the party, with a residual value of R9 million, were acquired or bought from other organizations with funds for capital construction.

Four thousand, nine hundred and thirty-five apartments, or 3,400 apartments fewer than in 1989, were built with the funds of the party budget within the framework of contributory participation for the employees of the party organs and party publishing houses, resorts, and facilities of the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs.

...The payment of membership dues by Communists based on less than their full earnings was discovered in virtually one in two of the party organizations inspected. The amount of the detected underpayment came to R2.3 million, out of which R1.8 million were paid in the course of the inspection. In 62 primary party organizations, cases of misappropriation of party membership dues in the amount of R41,100 were uncovered, out of which R38,600 were refunded to the party cash stocks.

...Membership dues, which account for 66.5 percent in the structure of the proceeds of the party budget, remain the main source of budget revenue. According to calculations, R927.2 million in dues may be taken in. Compared to the previous year, the proceeds of the budget from membership dues are reduced this year by R318.6 million, or 25.6 percent, due to reducing the maximum rate of payment of party dues from three percent to two percent and the decreasing size of the CPSU.

The intake of dues by the budgets of the party organizations of the communist parties of the Union republics is envisaged in the amount of R764.3 million, which will amount to 68 percent of the level of last year.

Dues amounting to R120.5 million rubles, i.e., approximately as much as in 1990, will be received from party organizations in the USSR Armed Forces. In addition, political organs contributed to the CPSU budget, through a designated transfer, the transferable balances of party membership dues from previous years in the amount of R36.5 million.

Between 2.5 and 3.0 million foreign-exchange rubles may be taken in by the budget from Communists working in Soviet establishments abroad, taking into account changes in the rate of payment of membership dues and their partial use for the needs of primary party

organizations. The draft 1991 budget provides for taking in 5.8 million foreign-exchange rubles. The above amount includes the arrears of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in mutual settlements for the party membership dues collected in 1989 and 1990 in the amount of R3.2 million, which were transferred to the account of the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs this year. Beginning in 1991, the membership dues of Communists working abroad are included in the party budget in foreign currency.

...As of 1 April of this year, there were arrears in the payment of membership dues by 1.25 million people, or 8.8 percent of those on the rolls. In the Communist Party of Moldova, 12.8 percent of the Communists failed to pay membership dues, and in the Communist Party of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], 11 percent. Arrears in the payment of dues as of this date ranged in the communist parties of other Union republics between 1.5 percent in the party organizations of Turkmenia and 6.9 percent in the party organizations of the Ukraine.

If the situation with the payment of dues is not stabilized successfully the revenue side of the budget with regard to this source of proceeds will fall short by between R30 and R35 million, which will put some party organizations in a grave financial situation.

Withholdings for the CPSU budget from the profits of party publishing houses will be reduced by a factor of almost 3.5 compared to the actual 1990 proceeds, and will come to R286.7 million, out of which R176 million will be contributed by the central party publishing houses.

...The circulation of party publications declined substantially. In 1991, the publishing houses of party organs will issue 326 central and local newspapers with an overall combined circulation of 63.6 million, and 185 magazines with an overall combined circulation of 53.5 million, which will amount to 62 and 45 percent of the 1990 levels respectively.

Proceeds from production and economic operations are planned to amount to R180 million, out of which R147 million will be generated directly by the operations of the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs and the enterprises reporting to it. Expenditures for the CPSU Central Committee apparatus and economic support for its operations, for holding organizational events and maintaining CPSU interparty contacts, maintaining medical and curative establishments, facilities, and organizations reporting to the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs, and developing their material facilities will be financed in full from these moneys.

...[signed] Administrator of Affairs of the CPSU Central Committee N. Kruchina

CPSU Projected Budget for 1991

914B0302E Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Aug 91 p 5

[CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs documents on implementation of the 1990 budget and projected 1991 budget; no headline as published]

[Text] *Secret*

Budget of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for 1991 Profit and Expenditure Items

	Adopted in the 1990 CPSU Budget	Planned for 1991
I. The revenue side of the CPSU budget		
1. Party membership dues	1,277,000.0	927,200.0
2. Withholdings from the profits of party publishing houses	1,043,360.0	286,780.0
3. Profits from production and economic operations and other proceeds	40,000.0	180,020.0
Total profits	2,360,360.0	1,394,000.0
II. The expenditure side of the CPSU budget		
1. Expenditures to finance the operation of party committees and offices of the communist parties of Union republics and development of their facilities	1,515,640.0	1,292,760.0
2. Expenditures to finance the operation of the primary party organizations of the Union-republic communist parties	372,260.0	482,180.0
3. Subsidies for the publication of okrug, city, and rayon committee newspapers	—	193,000.0
Total expenditures for the budgets of the communist parties of Union republics	1,887,900.0	1,967,940.0
4. Expenditures to finance the operation of party committees and primary party organizations in the USSR Armed Forces	10,883.0	120,525.0
5. Expenditures to finance the operation of central party establishments	28,700.0	27,700.0
6. Expenditures for the CPSU Central Committee apparatus	22,105.0	32,560.0

Budget of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for 1991 Profit and Expenditure Items (Continued)

	Adopted in the 1990 CPSU Budget	Planned for 1991
7. Expenditures for holding plenums and meetings of the CPSU Central Committee permanent commissions conferences and other all-party events, and economic support for the operation of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus	18,395.0	23,800.0
8. Expenditures for maintaining medical and curative facilities and establishments reporting to the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs	12,000.0	26,300.0
9. Capital investment in developing and upgrading the facilities of central party publishing houses, central party offices, and medical and curative establishments and facilities reporting to the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs	73,500.0	133,300.0
10. Expenditures to finance organizational functions, sociological surveys, and CPSU interparty contacts	18,150.0	24,000.0
11. Expenditures for acquiring computers and new models of office equipment, development of technical specifications, and programming	20,200.0	28,000.0
12. Expenditures for financing the operation of the CPSU Central Control Commission	—	4,300.0
13. Reserves (for unexpected outlays due to growing prices for material and technical resources, communications services, and so on)	25,000.0	105,575.0
Total expenditures	2,105,950.0	2,494,000.0
III. Moneys from CPSU reserve fund used to cover the deficit of the party budget	—	1,100,000.0

(*) Note: No item of expenditure for financing the operation of political organs in the USSR Armed Forces was included in CPSU for previous years. The above expenditures were made from the membership dues of the military party organizations, the total of which was subtracted from their transfer to the party budget.

Secret

Report on the Implementation of the 1990 CPSU Budget

Profit and Expenditure Items	Adopted,as ammended	Implemented	Results	
			R1,000	percent
I. The revenue side of the CPSU budget				
1.Party membership dues	1,227,000.0	1,245,835.9	-31,164.1	-2.4
2. Withholdings from the profits of party publishing houses	1,043,360.0	971,019.5	-72,340.5	-6.9
3. Other proceeds	40,000.0	67,944.9	+27,944.9	+69.9
Total	2,360,360.0	2,284,800.3	-75,559.7	-3.2
II. The expenditure side of the CPSU budget				
1. Expenditures to finance the operation of local party organs and establishments	1,210,340.0	1,137,819.3	-72,520.7	-6.0
2. Expenditures to finance the operation of the primary party organizations of the communist parties of Union republics	372,260.0	370,359.8	-1,900.2	-0.5
3. Expenditures to finance the maintenance of central party establishments	28,700.0	27,368.5	-1,331.5	-4.6
4. Expenditures for the CPSU Central Committee apparatus	22,305.0	18,617.2	-3,687.8	-16.5
5. Expenditures for economic support for CPSU Central Committee operations and holding all-party events	18,195.0	15,984.5	-2,210.5	-12.1
6. Expenditures for maintaining resort facilities and establishments reporting to the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs	12,000.0	11,505.2	-494.8	-4.1
7. Expenditures for acquiring computers and new models of office equipment, development of technical specifications, and programming	20,200.0	21,209.0	+1,009.0	+5.0
8. Expenditures to erect and repair buildings of party organs, offices, and publishing houses	378,800.0	364,570.4	-14,229.6	-3.8

Report on the Implementation of the 1990 CPSU Budget (Continued)

Profit and Expenditure Items	Adopted,as ammended	Implemented	Results	
			R1,000	percent
9. Expenditures to finance organizational functions, sociological surveys, and CPSU interparty contacts	18,150.0	14,368.6	-3,781.4	-20.8
10. Reserve	25,000.0	12,267.5	-12,732.5	-50.9
Total	2,105,950.0	1,994,070.0	-111,880.0	-5.3
Amount by which profits exceed expenditures to finance the operation of party committees and offices and to develop their facilities	254,410.0	290,730.3	+36,320.0	+14.3
Expenditures by decision of the 28th CPSU Congress Transferred from CPSU moneys for curative measures for children residing in contaminated areas in the accident zone of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station	500,000.0	—	—	—
Total of the expenditure side of the CPSU budget	2,494,070.0	—	—	—
The amount by which expenditures exceed profits covered from the CPSU reserve fund	-209,269.7	-209,269.7	—	-9.2

Moves To Expel Yakovlev From CPSU Reported

LD1508112691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1100 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] TASS has transmitted a report of the CPSU Central Control Commission about the public pronouncements and activities of Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the CPSU, which are incompatible with the rules of the CPSU.

Of late, the report says, Yakovlev—a former member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee—has made a number of statements aimed at a split in the CPSU and alienating it from the political arena. In connection with this, there have been demands from communists, party organizations, and control bodies to the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Control Commission for a party appraisal to be given of the public statements and activities of CPSU member Yakovlev.

The bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Control Commission, having examined this question today, has decreed: For activities that run counter to the rules of the CPSU and aimed at a split in the Party, to consider as incompatible the continuation of CPSU member Yakovlev in the ranks of the Communist Party. A proposal on this question has been sent to the primary party organization.

CPSU Ties With Workers Movement Examined

PM1508103591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Aug 91 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "On the CPSU's Position in the Country's Workers Movement"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Politburo has discussed the question "On the CPSU's Position in the Country's Workers Movement." A resolution was adopted on the results of the discussion.

The resolution notes that the headlong growth of the workers movement, developing along the general tracks of society's renewal, reflects the contradictions of the transitional stage toward the market economy and society's state of crisis. Despite the working class' interest in the implementation of pressing economic and political transformation, its de facto alienation from ownership and power has not been successfully overcome during the years of perestroyka. The representation of workers in state and party structures has declined. Instability in society, interethnic conflicts, falling living standards, the crime wave, the expansion of the shadow economy, and the decline of order and discipline have all influenced the deterioration of the working people's social self-confidence. All this has led to mass demonstrations by working people in defense of their vital interests.

The workers movement's influence—which materializes in the activity of trade unions, workers (strike) committees, labor collective councils, and sociopolitical and other workers' associations—on the processes taking place in society is multifaceted and contradictory. On the one hand, this influence promotes the implementation of reforms and protects the interests of the working people, while on the other hand it often engenders unconstitutional actions which inflict losses on the economy and disrupt stability within the state.

The resolution notes that the party's leading organs and the majority of party organizations have proved politically and organizationally unprepared for the new phenomena in the workers movement. Many party committees are not giving sufficient assistance to the introduction of progressive reforms, the course toward which was developed by the 28th CPSU Congress, and have retreated from the solution of pressing questions of socioeconomic policy and from expressing the interests of labor collectives; they are showing passivity and are

not exercising a mobilizing influence on Communists in leadership positions as regards the prompt solution of acute problems.

Public opinion polls show that, in the conditions of profound economic and political reforms, many workers do not always perceive the party's true aims and tasks, and are doubtful of its readiness and ability to uphold their interests. The party's sphere of influence in production collectives is contracting. Some workers have started leaving the CPSU, and the influx of young workers into the party's ranks is extremely small.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo has noted that the CPSU, in declaring its commitment to the social protection of working people, must play this role primarily by implementing truly democratic reforms, without which an extrication from the crisis is impossible. The prevailing situation calls for immediate, energetic, and at the same time considered actions aimed at restoring and strengthening the natural interrelations that exist between the CPSU and the workers. The scale and complexity of this task require the whole party to concentrate its efforts on its solution. The CPSU's position toward the working class must be abundantly reflected in the new party program. It was deemed expedient to examine questions concerning the workers movement at a CPSU Central Committee plenum.

Party organizations are instructed to draw practical conclusions from the current state of the workers movement and its development trends. They should actively mold the mood of working people in labor collectives in support of the progressive transformations being implemented in the country and react in a principled and prompt fashion to pressing problems. They should focus Communists' attention on the implementation of working people's initiatives aimed at enhancing their role in production management and the solution of specific problems of labor collectives' life: Working conditions, fair pay, strengthening law and order, and building housing, schools, hospitals, and children's preschool institutions. They should also protect the interests of working people as consumers of goods and services, seeking improvements in the quality of production, consumer services, trade, public catering, and the work of transport and communications.

It is necessary to support workers' leaders capable of upholding the true interests of working people, and to assist the creation of workers' clubs and other forms of realizing the political activeness of the working class. They should visit workers' committees and other new associations of working people, overcome the distrust toward Communists by some workers and trade union organizations, establish collaboration with them, and engage in frank dialogues.

Party committees have been instructed to organize economic and legal studies for the working people, with the aim of furnishing them with the necessary knowledge, primarily that connected with transition to the market economy. It is recommended that they actively make use of the party's material and technical base for this purpose and apply different study forms, including organizing workers' faculties at scientific and educational party institutions and workers' clubs.

Party organizations are instructed to improve the practice of collaboration with trade unions.

Party committees should seek wide representation for the working class and expression for its interests in soviets of people's deputies and other elective organs. Acting through the deputies groups (factions) of Communists in the soviets, they should seek the adoption of legal and normative acts protecting the vital interests of the working class and the working people in the conditions of the market. Questions of destatization in favor of collective forms of ownership, the regulation of employment, the protection of low-income strata of the population, and working people's participation in enterprise management should be considered matters of priority.

With the aim of systematically studying the problems of the workers movement, it was decided to form appropriately designated subdivisions in central and regional party scientific institutions.

Specific instructions have been given to the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and to CPSU Central Committee departments.

Kravchenko Views Central Television Programming

LD1508124591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1840 GMT 14 Aug 91

[The "Direct Conversation" program with Leonid Kravchenko, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, and Viktor Oskolkov, director general of Central Television programs, chaired by Presenter Sergey Lomakin in the studio—live]

[Excerpts] [Lomakin] Good evening. The latest "Direct Conversation" program is on the air. The heads of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company will be replying to your telephone calls. They are Leonid Petrovich Kravchenko, its chairman, who hasn't yet received a new appointment, and hasn't left to be our ambassador to Portugal, despite what people say, and Viktor Ivanovich Oskolkov, recently appointed director-general of Central Television programs. As it happens, Viktor Ivanovich isn't new to television. For several years he was deputy editor-in-chief of the editorial office for youth programs. I'll remind you of the numbers of the telephones installed in the studio—217-45-43. We are waiting for your questions. I hope that all your tough and frank questions will get equally frank answers.

A word of warning: We intended in today's program to deal exclusively with Central Television programs, and

even more with future Central Television programs which you can see from September onward. But the telephones have been in operation in the studio since 1000 in the morning. By evening, I already had quite an impressively sizeable bundle of questions, and they made us think that it was perhaps worth going back to all our past programs, particularly since six months have passed since our first program went out on air. You may recall that in the first program Leonid Petrovich set out and defended his concept of television broadcasting, the gist of which, briefly, was that feature films, drama, and news programs should be increased by reducing political programs and that an attempt should be made to get rid of confrontation on the air. That is of course a very rough outline, and Leonid Petrovich may wish to correct me. As I remember, in fact, it was for the idea of entertainment on television that you were criticized particularly harshly. In a word, we have decided today to talk about the way your promises, Leonid Petrovich, are being fulfilled. To begin with that, here is the first question, from our viewer Shumakov, who rang in before the program. By the way, many people share the same views. This is what he says: Regrettably television has become uninteresting to watch. On the First Program, the Second Program, the Moscow Channel, and the Leningrad Channel, particularly in the evening, there are unending political discussions. It's not television any more, but radio. So that's what you call less politics!" I think that is a criticism of your blueprint, of your promises regarding television.

[Kravchenko] Good evening. It is indeed time for us to give an account of how we've fulfilled our promises, and we have a lot to say tonight. But, all the same, let me recall that early in the year, in various interviews and in our first meetings on Direct Conversation, I stressed that I was not thinking up anything particularly new, but in the very complex and extremely politicized circumstances that exist in our society today, when political confrontation and intolerance and nonacceptance of other people's views and other people's standpoints have become almost a sort of norm, it would be very dangerous if television, with its vast influence and enormous capacity for affecting public opinion, suddenly began to adopt specific extreme positions, to support specific political centers and destructive forces.

I know from certain past studies—I have constantly found myself researching problems, and I even wrote a small book about television—that Western theoreticians have asserted that in all countries, even in less politicized ones than ours, if television loses proper control then one can basically force the resignation of any government—if you'll pardon the crude expression—in a month and a half. Such is the influence of television. It is increasing, and I think I won't be wrong in saying that it is increasing against the backdrop of a certain decline of interest in the press. In this situation, it was intended that without avoiding coverage of controversial problems, without avoiding assessments in political and news programs, we should at the same time ensure a certain balance of interests, ensure that it continues to be interesting to watch programs; we should improve feature films and drama, and give priority to feature films and drama, and this priority should above all be determined quantitatively.

The other day Viktor Ivanovich [Oskolkov] and I were watching and analyzing the way that the correlation and proportionate share of socio-political broadcasting, feature films, and drama have evolved last year and this. It had in fact proved possible to increase the volume of feature films and drama by almost eight percent. That is a big improvement. To deal with the promises: I promised that there would be a feature film before the Vremya programme.

[Unidentified voice] Every day.

[Kravchenko] Yes, every day. I sometimes thought we wouldn't make it. We did make it, apart from a number of instances when because of certain major political events we had to put on live relays. We promised, I promised, that we would bring theater back to television—Television productions and theatrical performances brought from the stages of various theaters, and we brought back plays. We show them on Mondays. More than that, we made a very crucial decision that our television theatre is also to be brought back in a literal sense. We want to set up premises for a television theater in which television performances would be put on. The company decided to pursue a certain sponsorship of the newly created "Teleteatr" creative association, and it is allocating a million [currency not specified—presumably rubles] a year to produce plays and to increase production fees in order to provide material incentives for script writers, authors, directors, artists, and producers. It is a whole school.

[Kravchenko] We promised to increase the number of musical and entertainment programs—this is what we were being criticized for most. We promised to get rid of vulgarity, bad taste, and—what we were mostly sharply reproached for—I mean violence, eroticism, pornography. We have not been able to keep all of these promises and in self-criticism we must today say that yes, despite even administrative measures, we have got rid of many vulgar video clips and video shots, but musical programs still do not always meet today's requirements. Today it will be possible to answer—I have already seen a large number of questions which sharply say that we have such a bias toward music, especially musical stagings, a bias towards foreign music, that you can only be amazed—that's fair.

So I must honestly say today that for a number of reasons—one of them is that we have restructured on the move, and we are restructuring on the move. Gosteleradio has been reorganized. It no longer exists. A company has been created. There were 90,000 people, now there are 27,000 people. A new structure has had to

be created, everybody transferred from one set of structures to another, a creative association created, equipment improved, the circumstances created. In general there have been a mass of legal documents. Of course this distracted strength. Of course we do not have enough equipment today. We do not have enough real experts in television—directors, producers, editors. We helped the Russian State Television Broadcasting Company to begin broadcasting. However, if someone were to say that they then ran away from you there, it would be true to say that we transferred the majority of people, understanding that it could not be otherwise, particularly engineering and technical people. In general there are a lot of other reasons which are worth talking about today, but it is not that which I am repenting; I simply want to stress that there really is much ground for saying that not everything has been carried out, but we are full of decisiveness. We have a plan—and we will talk about this today—to adopt new measures, take new steps to improve the quality of television broadcasts.

[Lomakin] Well Viktor Ivanovich, maybe you can add something?

[Oskolkov] In principle everything has been said. I think that during the conversation we will return again to what we haven't done yet.

[Kravchenko] Sergey Leonidovich, please excuse me, one theme still particularly hurts me from the recent past; you remember the television boycott. I have several questions today about the television boycott, and these are questions about the showing of films, cultural programs, about composers, musicians, filmmakers; well, this was all a little naive, I'll be frank. In a previous program I talked about how those esteemed famous maestros of culture have declared a boycott, and at the same time they appear here in television programs, their films are shown, musical programs, and we are grateful to them that indeed they have not become embroiled in a real boycott. This was really a political action. Today everything has returned to normal. This is also an optimistic event which lets us look into the near future with open eyes. [passage omitted]

[Kravchenko] Incidentally, coming back to the subject of correlation between television programs and processes taking place in society, I would like to recall, Viktor Ivanovich, that all these sociological studies of various strata and groups of the population are linked with the primary need for us to know society's sores, especially now when the transition to market relations holds a threat of not only unemployment but also, frankly speaking, of the impoverishment of certain categories of working people caused by rapid price rises—they include pensioners, invalids, young people, students, and many others. We carried out these studies in order to create new socio-political and information programs which would perform the function of social protection. So I think, Sergey Leonidovich, since there are several questions to me, too, one should mention that now, within the new grid, some 15 new programs and rubrics have been proposed devoted precisely to social protection, and targeted precisely at the most vulnerable groups of population.

Therefore, it is our concern to care about people with impared hearing, or deaf and dumb, too. There was a proposal to remove the Vremya program from the second channel. But it is targeted at 15-17 million viewers who, regrettably, cannot hear. It is a whole state within our country. These are programs for women, the family, pensioners, for young people, of course, for workers, for peasants, and so on and so forth; programs explaining terminology and clarifying what a market in today's world is, and what kind of market we can have; programs about business and commerce, but made from such viewpoints as to illuminate and prepare people for running the economy successfully.

As regards the structure of the information sphere, I have several questions referring to the Vremya and TSN—TSN often coincides with relevant radio programs . Every three hours [there are] information programs filled with socio-economic topics. This is very important. [passage omitted]

[Lomakin] There are a lot of questions about Nevzorov. Bedyagin, Rozhkova, Nikiforova, Moisyuk, and so on, ask why, contrary to what has been printed, the program "600 Seconds" is not on the air, why Nevzorov is not on the screen, and who banned that program: Nevzorov said goodbye to us until 12 August, but it's now two days since that date and he isn't here any more. Where has Nevzorov got to?

[Kravchenko] I visited Leningrad very recently and met Nevzorov and his group. It is re-forming itself. As you know, some of the people, Nevzorov's colleagues, have left him and the program. We are helping to ensure that there is a modern technical base, or at least one that is good enough to enable these programs to continue, but it is a complicated business. All the same, in conditions where a significant number of Nevzorov's colleagues have left him and the team has broken up, it is not easy to recreate the team and to carry on making the programs, but they will do it. Nevzorov believes it, and so do I. [passage omitted]

[Lomakin] Thank you, esteemed colleagues, I would ask you to be more laconic, keeping in mind, incidentally, Viktor Ivanovich's words to the effect that television should be more dynamic. So I would like to go over to a whole bloc of questions concerning information programs, since they have been strongly criticized. Kuzyayev from Nizhniy Novgorod: Why does our television fail to show hot spots in our country and gives verbal accounts instead? After all, we receive video reports from Western countries. There are very many questions on our information programs in general. The TSN program is becoming increasingly worse. It lasts 15 minutes but all information can be compressed in three to four minutes, something you have just said. Is there

really so little to say about our Soviet toilers? Correspondents should travel more to our remote villages and show life in the provinces. This was a question from Zhdanov in Vitebsk. The Vremya program has become difficult to watch. Nearly every minute a bright flash appears when frames change; one cannot close one's eyes quickly enough. This is a hallmark of your program. I was indignant about the Vremya program on 30 June. Immediately after covering the tragic events with casualties at a mine, a reportage about farmers with dance and music followed. This was a question from Ilyin, Moscow. Why does the Vesti program, shown at 2000, and the Vremya at 2100, differ so much on information about Karabakh, for instance?

Continuing the subject of parallels between the Russian Information Service and the All-Union Information Service, here is the following question: What is your view of the Vesti program? How objective is it? Recently there have been fairly frequent denials of reports in this program.

[Kravchenko] Well, as you can see there are many complaints, and there are justified complaints among them. True, it is far from always that we manage to give video information from certain important points on events in the country. Well, if it is better from abroad, it is because we receive it from numerous television services of the world, and in our country we receive it from our correspondents, and our channels often do not make it possible to ensure a prompt dispatch. For verbal reports we use the services of information agencies, including TASS and other agencies. There are a number of even more acute problems. We have set up a studio of information programs which includes a structure for the Vremya program, a separate structure for the Utro program, both with their own managements, also TSN and an international information program. These are independent structures and we hope that after strengthening the cadres—and this reinforcement has already taken place—we will manage the informative coefficient of these programs .

It is not very correct, perhaps, to evaluate the Vesti program but this is unavoidable. It is not very correct because, in principle, we have agreed with the Russian Television Broadcasting Company to avoid confrontation, so to speak, since we operate in the same building and use the same equipment. But maybe, taking into account the remarks—I have several questions and notes with complaints about the Vesti program. I can address only one wish to my colleagues which reflects these complaints; later we will pass them on to our colleagues. It is a question of the Vesti being excessively politicized. There is a biased selection of facts, something of which the Vremya program and TSN used to be accused of, and, perhaps, can be accused of today, too. Completely different versions result from this: say, in a report from Lithuania on those tragic events the Vesti program quite promptly announces who is the true culprit—the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment], or the KGB—whereas there are about five or six suspects. Well, there seem to be certain likings. The same is true regarding Stepanakert. In the last few days I have found out that all presenters are talking about students' movement, about the creation of some kind of strike committees, about the upcoming picketing of the Supreme Soviet, which is to examine a law on army service, and so on. So a bias is in evidence. I think our colleagues will draw conclusions; we are drawing conclusions, too. I would like that we provide a true political pluralism of views, especially in information programs.

[Lomakin] You know, on the whole there are quite a lot of questions which are constantly being repeated concerning information broadcasts—public-political ones, cultural ones, people on television. I would link this theme with one though:—independent television. Comrade Kretov writes: The majority at least maintain that Union television is not independent, in that it carries out the orders of Gorbachev or the partocracy. Russian television can allow itself a different opinion from the official one, therefore it is independent. What can you say about this?

[Kravchenko] I can confirm fairly categorically, you will forgive me this categoricalness, that state television cannot be completely independent. It would be naive to think this. Neither our company nor the Russian one is independent. This is obvious from the programs. Yes, we are a government, to a certain extent, president's company and must be independent in the sense that we defend state interests, at least as they are declared by governmental decisions, the most important documents, including presidential decrees. I can, could, prove if we had more time, that the same considerations guide, let's say Kurkova's The Fifth Wheel and Tsvetov's fairly tough programs on Russian Television, and a number of other programs. This begins with the selection of cadres. This is a certain sharing of views, even uniformity of views, when people come and know that they will work. But there is nothing unexpected here. I would say that this is natural, because it is possible to quote dozens of foreign examples. Recently in STOLITSA magazine there was an interview with the head of the Russian service of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, and he said absolutely correctly: We respect the U.S. Constitution, we respect the decisions which are made by the Government, the State Department, the President, and we do not have the right [as heard], and we edit with respect in a very open form. I can quote the BBC as an example, and several others. But state television must be free in order to have not only the right but the duty to allow various points of view to be expressed. But we encounter these various points of view in order to discover the truth, and we must stand on this path in political broadcasts, and not only in political ones.

[Lomakin] Quite a Lot of questions here are about personalities in television. Let's begin with the television personalities and finish with the personality of the head of television. For Kravchenko: Comrade Sharochayev from the Ukraine writes: I would like you to explain why people like Molchanov, Pozner, and Sagalayev have left

television. Portnoy from Tula: In the United States commentators and presenters are selected because they have a positive bio-field. Does that kind of selection exist in our country? Is Molchanov trying to get back into Central Television? Kishinev,(?Lyuda): where is Maya Sidorova? Umonyagina Moscow: Why did the Before and After Midnight program cease to exist? Baburina: television has started to lull—there's literally nothing to watch. There's no Before and After Midnight, there's no Vzglyad, TSN's awful. They show old films in place of Before and After Midnight and Vzglyad. Then the following interesting observation: Why are the talented people leaving Central Television? The main quality of the leader is to attract clever and professional people around him. This isn't happening with you, hence you are a bad leader. That is the viewer's conclusion.

[Kravchenko] An offensive assessment, one might say, but one that is very strongly exaggerated. As far as the departure of some of the stars is concerned—and a great deal has already been written about this in the press—each of them had his own problems and his own reasons. Pozner, for example, left for a very good contract. He is going to be working with Donohue from the United States, but he is continuing to present the Meetings with Vladimir Pozner programs on the [local] Moscow channel. Molchanov left, as far as I know, to join some organization based on the Progress publishing house where he will be working on television, although he has told the press that not everything is to his liking, including the political concept at the television service where he has been working. I regret very much that Molchanov left, and attempts to convince him that he should not leave were not crowned with success. Several journalists left to join Russian Television, including some capable ones. Vladimir Tsvetov left. That was no surprise for me. I believe that it was a political choice. As far as the departure of some others is concerned—Kiselev, Rostov, and Gurnov, who are talked about as stars—they weren't stars here and they haven't become stars there either, but in political confrontations this is being used vigorosly in order to blame Kravchenko on each occasion, who's supposedly driven someone away.

In MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS yesterday I read that Maslachenko had left us too almost as a mark of protest. That is a complete fabrication. Maslachenko did not leave as a mark of protest. He left, as I understand it, for a very favorable commercial business and with a desire to cooperate with us.

Yes, people do ask me where is Central Television announcer—no, presenter—Mitkova: Is she not in Russian Television? Apparently not, but quite honestly I do not know where she is. How can one hold on to people? You can hold on to people by different means. You can hold on to them by pay; you can hold on to them on the grounds of commitment; you can hold on to them by giving them interesting and creative things to do. But we came up against an absolutely new situation in which—incidentally it's not just here in television that this is taking place, it's happening in radio and in all the mass media and it's a sacred right— journalists have begun to separate out according to their political likes and dislikes. What they've begun to do is not leave Kravchenko, say, but they've begun to leave specifically to join Yeltsin, let's put it like that, to join Sobchak; I could give a lot of different names but this is openly under discussion here and we do not draw any tragic conclusions from this.

These are different political choices. Different views and political convictions. Many—I don't know just how many—have left the party. Molchanov has left the party. Pozner left the party before he left here. Everything here is interconnected. You cannot make such simple assessments.

In connection with the Vzglyad program which is being mentioned—I thought that that problem had been resolved—I also have a question, one that was very unexpected and unpleasant for me—I am asked this question by Malvina Mikheyevna Malmyga from Moscow. Issue No.7 of the magazine SOVERSHENNO SEKRETNO had an article by Yevgeniy Dodyrev entitled: "Chronicle of a ban." It was about Vzglyad. It asserts that you are one of the causes of the death of Aleksandr Lyubimov's mother. How do you personally regard this assertion? I have to admit that I have rarely looked into and read this publication SOVERSHENNO SEKRETNO which appears once a month. But in the July issue I do indeed find here a very strange statement in connection with the fact that Sasha Lyubimov's mother died in February, and at the funeral wake on 11 February one of her stage comrades—Yekaterina Pavlovna was an actress at the Gogol Theater—burst out loud quite categorically with something that many people merely clenched their teeth and thought: The badgering of her son played its part in the crisis that the mother's heart was incapable of coping with.

The name of Kravchenko was mentioned in this connection at the funeral table. It wasn't just mentioned. And so on. I call these blasphemous statements, [words indistinct] because if I had to give the details on this I could say with absolute honesty that I have never made any public attack anywhere in any publication against Aleksandr Lyubimov, and I remember how great was the sympathy of all of us for him when his mother died. But something else that is bad is the fact that about 500 articles made their appearance in the central press and in various overseas publications in connection with Vzglyad containing slanderous attacks against me. It was a campaign. It began to be accompanied with the creation of an enemy image. There were a number of stages in this campaign, with exclusion from the Union of Journalists, with direct threats. I have some letters here—I don't want to read them out—in which they sentence me to death. Specific letters, signed, saying who's given me the death sentence and in which towns. There is that kind of thing. Unfortunately, checking of these threats by the competent bodies has confirmed that these are not simply threats. What saddens me very much—it does sadden me very much, and incidentally I too have a

mother, I have a wife and a family who have suffered and who do suffer very much about this—is how we journalists contrive to create this image of an enemy in the person of another journalist. This is strange, it is dreadful, I would say, the way in which we are drawn into this, and we ourselves become the propagandists and proponents of extremism. [passage omitted]

[Lomakin] I would just like to say that there are as many opinions as there are people, and they are all different. But there is one question raised in these messages—why are such people attacking television?

[Kravchenko] Perhaps it is not convenient for me to speak of this again, but the way it has worked out is that I had hardly started working at State television and Radio—there were eight days between the President's decree appointing me and my being presented by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov—but in that time, I had a dozen and a half articles about me, quite harsh, negative ones, and then the campaign that one can sadly speak of today began. In general, the sniping has become something of a model. I could give a further series of names: what is happening at IZVESTIYA, the sniping at Yefimov, the sniping at Sevruk—this whole campaign has been developed.

I could name a whole series of publications which occupy certain positions—GLASNOST and the sniping at [?Izyumov]; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and the sniping at Chikin; and so on and so forth. But there are also examples of the opposite, so to speak, where leading figures of other publications, from the other camp, are also not left without attention. I think that all we journalists—after all, we occupy certain positions—all of us should rise above this. I still hold to my own concepts and my main stance, that we must rise above extremism, and not provide a bad example by heating up passions and confrontation. When they start pressurizing any specific personality, regardless of whether this concerns me or anyone else, when they start hitting out—after all, there have been something over 1,200 articles about me, it's crazy, I remember an issue of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA which had nine articles about me in that one issue, and the MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS was publishing two or three articles every day. I telephoned them, saying: Give it a rest, lads; surely you have better things to write about. Well, wasn't this a campaign?

[Lomakin] I have the suspicion that there will be more articles after this program.

[Kravchenko] Obviously, the matter concerns views and standpoints which they don't like, and then rumors are put into circulation about reshuffles, about appointments: I have already been made ambassador in eight countries, I have been given a number of other jobs. In general, this is all preposterous, it is flimsy, and sometimes it's disgusting, and you don't even want to talk about it.

[Lomakin] Well, let's drop this topic, then. [passage omitted]

[Lomakin] Petrov, Moscow: Do you plan to implement Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's decree on departyization of USSR Gosteleradio? And Nikitin: Have you any nonparty members? Channel One is the Communist Party apparatus.

[Kravchenko] We have many nonparty members and I have already said that we also have people who have managed to get out of the party. As regards departization, after the Committee for Supervision of the Constitution has had its word a definite decision will be adopted here including at the Gosteleradio party committee. I think in this case this is a question not only for the director but even more so for the heads of the party committees. [passage omitted]

[Lomakin] What is the fate of Leningrad TV? I read in a letter from Lensovet that the Supreme Court decided its property, Leningrad TV, should be returned to it.

[Kravchenko] Recently I met with the collective of Leningrad TV and Radio Broadcasting. The conversation turned on this subject too. The question is posed in this way: It is all very well to say return its property but Leningrad TV and Radio Center never was its property, it was the property of Gosteleradio, it was a part of the structure of Central TV. The Leningrad Channel is an All-Union Channel and it will continue to develop as an All-Union Channel. And in keeping with the decree of the President and the provision on our company, Leningrad TV and Radio Broadcasting Company is one of the main structural links of our company, with considerable creative, economic, and other liberties. And as I understand is the opinion and standpoint of the collective they are not against belonging. As regards taking into account the interests of the local authorities including Lensovet, the Mayor of the city, the Oblast Soviet, this problem is also being resolved. First, I know they have a plan to set up their own municipal TV and Radio—this is justified and we shall help them with this. And second we calculate that as is being done today the heads of the local authorities can appear unimpeded whenever they like on TV and radio in that company today.

[Lomakin] Thank you, we have not much time but there is one subject which we simply cannot pass over in silence. The subject is quite interesting, it is economic. Can you say what the present TV budget is like? From where do its contributions come? Taking into account the Union treaty how will be TV Budget be made up? Taking into account that all the republics will contribute their share to the budget of the Union TV Company, how will they be represented on the Union screen? How is this planned, how will the national outlying areas be represented?

[Kravchenko] The budget is not usually divulged but there is nothing secret in it. The state allocates annually more than R2 billion in funds. Of this, more than 70 percent goes in payment for the channels to the Ministry of Communications. So we would say not so very much

is left for maintaining our company We are ourselves earning without concealing it, we have advantageous conditions for two years at least so that we keep everything we earn. We do not pay tax either in rubles or in foreign currency. That is all for the purpose of reducing pressure from the budget, or rather on the budget. So it is to be hoped that some time in the future, Viktor Ivanovich, we can dream of being able to earn so much on our programs by selling them, and by carrying advertisements. We have many other commercial projects so that we can really pay for ourselves. That is what we are dreaming of.

[Lomakin] For that you need to make good programs and sell them abroad.

[Kravchenko] Yes. The second part of the question concerning national hues on the Union screen. The All-Union company is indeed obliged to take into account this problem and therefore we have envisaged a concept of development of our company and its broadcasting taking into account the fact that we are the only ones who must, firstly, relay via the Central TV channels the best program of the republican TV and radio committees—or some of them are called companies—give out via the "Sodruzhestvo" program, that is, programs like the ones that are on now but in addition to this folk art competitions as well....

[Lomakin interrupts] National theater.

[Kravchenko] ...national theater and much else. We have looked at about 20 new programs which will be exclusively connected with taking into account the interests of the national republics and national autonomous entities, including having them in national languages too.

[Lomakin] There is quite a large number of questions in this connection. I don't want simply to enumerate them all, because there are quite a large number of them, which I would divide into two categories. The first concerns Russian Television. People are severely critical of Russian Television, there is a charge of hatred, as people write, because they are not shaking the state.

The other section of viewers asks the question why the Second Channel has still not been given over fully to Russian Television?

[Kravchuk] You know, it would take a lot of time to answer that question. I know that once again Ivan Stepanovich Silayev has come out with a proposal that the Second Channel should be given over entirely to the Russian company. We have a letter from the managers of the Russian company itself, but we are replying at our level at least negatively, for a very simple reason.

Today all children's broadcasting and the popular science channel is on this channel and uses the facilities which it is being proposed should be given over to the Russian company—I mean the Shabolovka [TV studios]. That is where our All-Union center is—the institute for improving qualifications serving the whole country. We reckoned that we would have to dismiss a minimum of 6,000-7,000 people at a stroke. From the point of view of the economic claim, this has no substance, because over the last eight to 10 years approximately 60-70 percent of all the appropriations received by Gosteleradio has been allocated for the development of the Russian television and radio committees, while Russia itself gives approximately 45 percent in all branches of the national economy.

To a considerable extent the construction of the All-Union Television Center was thanks to appropriations from other Union republics, but they built the television center with their own money, yet they are not claiming that something be split up.

I think that the main approach here, the fundamentally correct approach, is not to destroy anything, but to create something new, to create one's own television center and meanwhile we should find a common language and provide the technical means and conditions for making our own programs. [passage omitted]

[Lomakin] There is another question which I must have an answer to—Vilnius. People from Central Television are working at the captured television center in Vilnius. What is your attitude to that? Thousands of their hosts at this television center have been left without jobs.

[Kravchenko] There is an untruth here. Workers from our television center—engineering and technical staff—have been working there. They have been working there since this tragedy happened. I have to state frankly that the technical facilities were to a considerable extent wrecked. Some was, I will say it frankly, looted and therefore our technical specialists had to take facilities there and restore to operational status, restore the viability of, this television center, even if only for the relay transmitters for the First and Second All-Union channels, which is what our specialists were working on.

Not a single producer, editor, commentator, or any of the people who make programs was sent there. That was ruled out. [passage omitted]

Fedorov Commentary on Union Treaty

PM1608112691 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Aug 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by N.Fedorov, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] justice minister and USSR people's deputy; "The Union Treaty: Approaching the Homestretch"]

[Text] The militarist terminology which actively functioned in our country throughout the years of socialist building, far from going out of use nowadays, is actually increasing: "Ideological confrontation" has been joined by the "war of the laws" and the "parade of sovereignties." But the participants in the Novo-Ogarevo process have sought to transform "implacable confrontation" into mutually acceptable compromises.

The bulk of the provisions of the draft new Union treaty are a compromise. Take, for example, the very idea of the "renewed Union." The "old" Union no longer suits anyone, but far from everyone agrees to its complete dismantling. They have agreed to a renewed one. Furthermore, it is again not altogether clear what kind of "Union" this is. A confederation? No, that is unacceptable to many. Others, however, feel constrained within a federal framework. The upshot is that the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics is a sovereign federal state. Are such compromises (and only the very obvious ones, the ones that stare you in the face have been listed) viable? Time will tell. Now they are necessary.

Of course, ideally the integration of independent republics should be the final (rather than the first or intermediate) stage of their progression toward sovereignty. But how is this to be conceived? If you understand state sovereignty as the result of an impulsive, unilateral, and, in that sense, arbitrary act—a statement by the organs of power of a particular republic—then it has already happened, the "parade of sovereignties" and the "disintegration of empire" have taken place. If, however, you work on the basis of the civilized, law-based concept of achieving sovereignty (and it alone is acceptable in modern conditions), then this process is a long and painful one. A process of legitimation (the recognition and support of the majority of citizens) and constitutional legalization of the course of state independence. A process of talks, agreeing of positions, and mutual concessions to settle political, economic, and territorial problems. A process of achieving bilateral and multilateral agreements, strictly monitoring their observance, and, finally, seeking international legal recognition of your independence. And after all this, you have to initiate the path to the new Union—whether a federation, confederation, association, or other economic and political amalgamation. The bases, the forms, and the spheres of integration of republics may be diverse, but integration as such is irreversible.

But do we today have the time and resources for this process lasting many years? A rhetorical question. The movement toward the sovereignty of republics is now proceeding in parallel with their integration, and simlutaneously with the polarization and consolidation of various political forces.

Who will sign the Union treaty? Naturally, the republics which are party to it. But the "renewed" Union is not emerging within a vacuum. It is not simply a few independent states negotiating. The USSR (the "old" Union) exists. It is recognized both by the world community and by the "Contracting Parties" themselves. Hence it is essential (some compromise!) to ensure the continuity of the renewed Union. How? By a degree of participation by the supreme organs of state power of the USSR (the "old" Union) in the institutionalization of the new Union.

It is intended that the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Congress of USSR People's Deputies will discuss the draft Union Treaty and elect a delegation to sign it. True, it is stipulated that its signature will not be legally equivalent to the signatures of the republic delegations. (A concession of sorts to commonsense. Otherwise, it turns out that the "old" Union joins the new. An absurdity!) The center's delegation, by signing the Union treaty, will merely express its assent to its contents. And if it does not? And with whom actually are the republics negotiating: among themselves or with the center? I fear that in the event the "renewed Union" will not break too much new ground. It is not the center that has to agree to a particular version of the treaty, but the republics which have to agree to a center (and its powers) which suits them.

Is there an acceptable legal form for the center's participation in forming the new Union? The role of **depository of the Union treaty** is seen as such. Under international law the depository is understood as the custodian of the original of a multilateral treaty and all related documents. The state on whose territory the treaty is concluded or the international organizations within which it was adopted usually become the depository.

The depository is a considerable and respected figure in the firmament of international law. In entrusting the custody of the treaty to it the parties thereby express great trust and unite, as it were, around the depository. At the same time "custody" itself is unuerstood far more widely than its everyday sense allows. On the one hand, the depository has a responsible mission—it is the **guarantor of the inviolability**, the sacredness, if you will, of the text of the treaty. No force is capable of making changes in the treaty other than through the depository, which impartially adheres to the preestablished procedure. On the other hand, the depository itself can **actively influence the treaty** and initiate changes in it if it finds this useful for its principals. It is granted the right to convene a conference to revise individual provisions of the treaty or the text as a whole. And the convening can take place both on the demand of the parties to the treaty and on the initiative of the depository itself.

The functions of depository are not, of course, limited to this. Its duties include, for example, preparing and distributing certified copies of the treaty and informing the parties to the treaty about acts of ratification and denunciation of and accession to the treaty and also about reservations recorded during the signing and ratification of the treaty.

The depository is usually determined by the participant states in the actual treaty and its functions specified at the same time. I consider it expedient for the republics, on concluding the Union treaty, to vest the duties of depository in the USSR Supreme Soviet. First, someone will have to exercise these duties anyway, otherwise the normal functioning of the treaty is impossible. Second, this ensures the participation of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the process of concluding the new Union treaty and thereby the continuity of the "old" and "new" Union. And, finally, under the norms of international

law, the depository should act impartially and its functions are purely administrative and executive in character and it has no political or other power.

The sovereignty of the republics on signing the Union treaty will thus be fully ensured. Henceforth the duties of depository will transfer to the newly elected Supreme Soviet of the new USSR.

After the entry into force of the new Union treaty it will be necessary to form the central organs envisaged by it. How is this to be done? Who will exercise their functions during the "interregnum"? All these questions have to be resolved in the actual Union treaty, for which it is necessary to include in it a special "Transitional Provisions" section (the title is, of course, provisional). The opinion is expressed in the press that the "old" central structures will operate until the election of new union organs. In particular, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies should adopt the new USSR Constitution and a law on elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet. And only with the election of the new USSR Supreme Soviet will the present Congress and Supreme Soviet relinquish their powers. All other options are said to be unconstitutional. It is for the republics to decide how expedient such a "prolongation of life" of today's union structures is from the political standpoint, but the purely legal arguments of its proponents are demagogic. It is impossible to reform the Union without coming into conflict with the existing USSR Constitution. After all, the actual Union Treaty is first and foremost "unconstitutional," given that it lays down the foundations of the new constitutional system. The adoption of both the Union treaty and the new USSR Constitution must be sanctified by a single will, one honed by the very difficult search to find consensus, accord, and concessions and dovetail the sovereignties of the republics.

TASS Reviews Soviet Central Press for 16 Aug

LD1608072591 Moscow TASS in English 0654 GMT 16 Aug 91

["Soviet Press Review"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—Today's newspapers SELSKAYA ZHIZN, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA and TRUD feature the text of a treaty on the Union of Sovereign States. Other newspapers printed the text of the treaty on Thursday.

Press commentaries on the treaty describe it as the all-important document that largely defines the country's future. Vladimir Rodyushkin, Soviet deputy finance minister who heads the main state tax inspectorate, comments in PRAVDA on the situation that has formed around Article 9 of the treaty, which reflects the position of the central government and republics towards the taxation policy. He points out that Article 9 will work effectively only when it actually starts to define the taxation system as mandatory for the entire country and on condition that a single state tax inspectorate of the USSR is formed.

Under the headline "The Situation Calls for Endurance and Restraint" the newspapers PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIAYA publish a report by the press centre of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee about a meeting of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee focusing on the work of the Russian Communist Party organisations in conditions of the operation of the Russian Federation president's decree of July 20, 1991.

Newspapers inform readers that the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation mapped out several priority measures to stabilise the operation and the development of the timber industry and forestry in the Russian Federation.

PRAVDA's correspondent reports from Tashkent that a meeting of the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the prime minister of Azerbaijan ended in that city. The republican leaders discussed specific problems relating to the fulfillment of the decisions made at the previous meeting in Alma-Ata, the Union Treaty and tasks to stabilise the socio-political situation in the region.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA prints the text the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] law "On Applying the USSR Law on the Income Tax Levied on the USSR Citizens, Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons on the Territory of the Russian Federation in 1991." The same newspaper published the RSFSR law "On Amendments and Supplements to the RSFSR Law on Applying the USSR Law on the Income Tax Levied on the USSR Citizens, Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons on the Territory of the Russian Federation in 1991."

The press carries a report by the CPSU Central Control Commission "on public speeches and actions by Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, a member of the CPSU, which are incompatible with the CPSU's charter." The Presidium's Bureau decided to "consider Yakovlev's further membership in the CPSU as impossible in view of the actions running counter to the CPSU's charter and aimed at splitting the Party."

Under the headline "War against Lithuania" PRAVDa re-prints from the Lithuanian newspaper LETUVOS AIDAS of August 6, 1991 the speech by Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis, in which he gives a political assessment of the gruesome crime in Medininkai where unidentified persons shot dead point-blank eight customs officers. In its editorial commentary PRAVDA writes: Let the reader see for himself whom the Kremlin deals with, what is the level of reasoning and the thinking pattern of the head of one of the USSR's "wilful" republics.

An interview with Colonel-General Igor Sergeyev, deputy commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, concentrates on how the problem of supplying highly efficient training equipment to the troops is being solved.

Sergeyev noted, in part, the need to set up the Army's own science and production association, which, in his view, could handle a whole range of issues.

In the rubric "Harvest-91: Concerns and Worries" SELSKAYA ZHIZN reports that the harvest is now being taken in on the second half of the crop area and that grain was threshed on 48.3 million hectares. The Press Centre of the USSR Ministry of Agricultural Production reports that there are 19 percent less storage batteries for power-entensive machinery than the country needs. The figure for the Ukraine is 30 per cent and for Kazakhstan—35 per cent.

A dispatch from the Penza and Ulyanov regions published in SELSKAYA ZHIZN draws attention to unusual slugishness and tardiness in the work to reap the harvest. "Previously, it was said that bread was a matter of the party. Whose concern is it now?" the newspaper queries.

Under the title "The Shot Generals" RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA prints materials of the case of General Dmitriy Pavlov, who was the commander of the western front before July, 1941, and other generals. These materials were de-classified recently.

Economist K. Ovchinnikov reflects on economic integration in PRAVDA. He argues that if the USSR does not have its own state strategy of foreign economic relations and if a mechanism for integrating the USSR into the world economy is not created at the level of the international community, no integration will take place even if there is profuse talk about it. Neither a Union market nor a strong economy will be created.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carries an interview with Yevgeniy Yasin, an author of the 500-day programme.

The Warsaw Pact was dissolved. NATO rallies its ranks. In the article "The Act of Good Will Left Without a Response" published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA B. Poklad, Dr of science (history), emphasises that the development of the situation in the world and Europe and the tasks of ensuring the Soviet Union's security and internal political restructuring call for our country to pursue a purposeful and well-considered foreign policy line.

The press comments on the situation in Yugoslavia and other events in the world. PRAVDA's Warsaw correspondent Anatoliy Starukhin writes in the article "The Warmth of the Polish Home:" "The children of Chernobyl and Poland have a particular connection and unusually broad contacts. This is, finally, a significant experience of various forms of aid to people from the neighbouring country that suffered from the harrowing catastrophe."

Economic

Jan-Jul Economic Performance Reviewed

PM1508143191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Aug 91 Union Edition p 1

["Statistics and Our Commentary" article by V. Romanyuk: "The Economy in July: The Slump Has Ended but Growth Is Not Expected"]

[Text] Results in the last few months implanted if not the firm belief, then at any rate the hope, that the fall in production has ended. And the latest results? Operational data from the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] testify to the fact that July did not bring any significant changes to the situation that has prevailed in the national economy over recent months.

However, jumping ahead, let us note that signs of a certain stabilization in the raw material sectors emerged in July. Thus, average daily oil extraction in July remained at the June level. The fall in the production of motor vehicles and mainline freight cars has has at least slowed down. And, finally, last year's level of output of household units—refrigerators, washing machines, and household electronic articles—has been exceeded. However, as USSR Goskomstat Deputy Chairman V. Tolkushkin noted, July can in no way be considered the starting point of an upturn in production. A fresh fall can be observed in the chemical industry and timber complex—both for raw material components and for finished articles (fertilizers, chemical fibers and yarns).

Let us note yet another fact: We had an extra working day compared to July 1990. But we did not manage to make use of the additional working day, and as a result the 6.2 percent fall over the first seven months was identical to the 6.2 percent fall registered during the first six months.

Here is how the situation has developed over the seven months in individual complexes. In the fuel and energy complex there was a 4.3 percent fall in the volume of production measured against the corresponding period last year. In the coal sector the spring strikes were still having an effect: Coal output was 11 percent down and coking coal output was 20 percent down on last year; gas extraction remained at last year's level, while oil extraction was down 10 percent, although the rate of decrease itself dropped. Metallurgists produced 12 percent (7.7 million tonnes) less finished rolled ferrous metal products. And here is the situation in the machine building complex: 3-6 percent less metal-cutting machine tools and forging and pressing machines than the previous year were produced; the fall in production of mainline diesel locomotives by 26 percent, of tractors and trucks by 13 percent, and of combine harvesters by 10 percent was more significant.

In the chemical industry and timber complex there are breakdowns in every link of the chain: Output of sulfuric acid, calcinated soda, and caustic soda was down 9, 15,

and 6 percent respectively; the ensuing drop in output was 9 percent for mineral fertilizers and 17 percent for chemical fibers and yarns. (In this respect July can be considered an utter failure: A fall of 12 percent in mineral fertilizers and of 22 percent in chemical fibers and yarns).

True, if we delve deeply into the problems of the chemical industry and timber complex we have to note the numerous stoppages demanded by the public, aiming to get ecologically harmful production facilities closed down. Many of them have resumed work but around 40 major production facilities in the chemical industry, metallurgy, and other sectors—monopolists in a very narrow sphere—are awaiting implementation of environmental protection measures.

The statistics note a partial restoration of economic ties, and this can be attributed to the successes of the Novo-Ogarevo process, the implementation of the Nine plus One agreement, and the adoption of a whole series of interrepublic agreements. All this is fine! Nevertheless, July "added" 2.8 billion rubles [R] to the value of unfulfilled commitments to deliver industrial output; over the seven months the indebtedness has reached a total of R20.7 billion. This is 1.5 times greater than it was at the same date last year. On the whole, approximately one enterprise in five has failed to cope with output delivery commitments, while the figure in the fuel and energy complex is 35 percent, in the machine building complex it is 45 percent, and in the chemical industry and timber complex it is 51 percent.

Some 800 enterprises experienced major stoppages owing to the lack of material and technical resources; for this reason in July alone industrial output worth R400 million was not produced and idle time totaled 1.4 million man-days. The largest delivery shortfalls—if the specific range of products ordered is included—were perpetrated by metallurgists. Industry as a wholefailed to deliver 2.3 percent of the volume of production, the figure in metallurgy being 5.3 percent and in the chemical industry and timber complex 4.5 percent.

And now about the situation in the consumer market. The additional working day in enterprises operating a noncontinuous production cycle did not provide any extra goods on store counters. Over the seven months 10 percent less textiles and footwear and 12 percent less knitted articles than the previous year were manufactured. Output of refrigerators and freezers remained at last year's level, and there was even a slight increase in the output of vacuum cleaners, tape recorders, and washing machines.

The situation regarding output of essential articles remains complex. Output of household and toilet soap and synthetic detergents was down 17-20 percent, output of galvanic elements and batteries fell 6 percent, output of tape cassettes fell 21 percent, and output of stainless steel razor blades fell 5 percent. The tobacco shortage continues to cause turmoil in the trade network: There was another 12 percent fall in July (the number of papirosy [traditional cigarettes] and cigarettes produced was 1.5 billion less than in July 1990).

Likewise there were no particular changes at food counters. Last year's bumper harvest of grain crops continues to provide a top-up: Production of flour from state resources was up 2 percent, production of pasta articles was up 6 percent, but production of meat and butter was down again—by 13 percent, and production of whole milk and edible fish products was down 9 percent.

Finally, about price dynamics. In industry as a whole wholesale prices in July increased 8-10 percent compared with June this year. This includes an increase of 7 percent in metallurgy, 5 percent in machine building, and 3 percent in the timber, woodworking, and pulp and paper industry and in construction materials. The introduction on 1 July of free purchase prices for wool caused an immediate 50 percent increase in prices in the wool scouring sector, and a 4 percent increase in light industry as a whole. In total, prices in the first seven months increased by a factor of 2.1 against the corresponding period last year.

So, July was not gratifying in terms of special achievements by virtue of its being a vacation month. But August is also a vacation month. In addition, it will be one working day shorter than August 1990. Let us hope that there is no serious slump in the results for the third quarter.

Commentary Views Privatization Law Provisions

PM1508091591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Aug 91 Union Edition p 1

[Article by I. Zhagel "You Do Not Get Property for Nothing. What the Law on Privatization Promises Our Economy"]

[Text] The USSR Law "On the Basic Principles of Destatization and Privatization of Enterprises" published in IZVESTIYA today indicates that our country has at last really embarked on creating a mixed economy in which all types of ownership will exist. It is hard to overestimate this document's importance, just as it is impossible to overlook the serious problems which may arise when the program to privatize state property is implemented.

But it is first and foremost worth figuring out once more: Do we need an all-Union law on privatization at all? This is not an idle question. After all, a number of republics are still debating to this day whether everything connected with destatization of state property situated on their territory should be carried out by them themselves. And in several places decisions have even been adopted which conflict with all-Union normative acts.

But it is nevertheless possible to say unequivocally that we do need a law establishing general principles for the destatization of property throughout the Union's territory. There is no other way, given the unified money and credit system which demands the creation of uniform principles for determining the enterprises' values and uniform conditions for obtaining bank loans to buy out various properties. Ultimately, general rules are necessary if only so that individuals and legal entities in one republic can freely acquire property in other republics' territories. Numerous attempts are actually made to limit this process within the bounds of separate regions.

This is exactly how one could appraise the decisions by several republics—Russia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania—to implement destatization by handing out privatization checks for a certain sum or opening investment accounts. Indeed, if privatization checks for a sum equal to the state property's value are distributed among a given republic's inhabitants, no one from outside will be able to get near that property any longer. Here we are talking not only about representatives of other republics but also about foreign investors. It is astonishing that no one thought about this.

In general the desire to implement privatization quickly and, so to speak, on a per capita basis, smacks of Sharikov-like behavior. Do you recall what this hero of Bulgakov's works said: "What is there to think about—we should take it all and share it out." There can be no doubts that many millions of people will be duped as the result of a sharing-out process whose aim is to achieve complete social justice.

As a matter of fact, employees of the ministries, main administrations, and other such organizations will be able to use their privatization checks to acquire the best enterprises, while other people will have to make do with impoverished factories which, in the market conditions, will simply be closed down. In this way an ordinary person could only buy "funny" property for "funny" money—privatization checks. No, you do not get property for nothing.

By the way, while on the subject of "funny" money. When adopting a decision to carry out privatization by handing out certain sums or checks to their citizens, the republics somehow did not think that by so doing they would undermine our financial system, cause a sharp rise in the money supply, and boost inflation. It is no accident that, compared to the draft USSR Law "On the Basic Principles of Destatization and Privatization of Enterprises" which was published earlier, one significant detail was introduced into its final version.

Namely, Article 18 Point 4 says that "a republic's state debt is increased and the USSR domestic state debt is correspondingly decreased by the amount of special instruments of payment redeemed by citizens to buy out enterprises in all-Union ownership and under joint USSR and republic jurisdiction."

I think that this situation will put off many radical privatizers. The promises to provide each person with property, and without having to pay for it at that, were good while the election campaign lasted, but are totally incompatible with the economic realities.

It can of course be said that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary also made decisions to provide their citizens with certain sums of money to buy state property. But here is an interesting point: To this day this has not been carried out in practice in any of these countries. Property is being sold for real money—personal funds or money borrowed from the bank—at actual sales and auctions which are easily monitored.

It is time that we stopped reinventing the wheel and set about systematically working together on the basis of the adopted Union law. Incidentally, according to S. Assekritov, chairman of the USSR State Property Fund, to this day we have not succeeded in organizing this organ's joint work with the corresponding union republics' authorized organs. Each of them attempts to act autonomously, and by so doing creates a multitude of problems and failures of coordination.

Scientific

Chernobyl AES Contaminated by Radioactive Water

LD1508210891 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] We have just received a report that technological premises at one of the three functioning generating sets of the Chernobyl AES [Atomic Energy Station] have been flooded by water contaminated with radionucleides. This is regarded as a minor accident and on the international scale corresponds to the second degree of danger.

Antarctic Rescue Vessel Arrives in Cape Town

LD1508130191 Moscow TASS in English 1235 GMT 15 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Kulik]

[Text] Pretoria August 15 TASS—The Soviet research vessel Professor Vize entered the harbour of Cape Town, South Africa, on Wednesday. Soviet vessels still do not call at South African ports very often. The circumstances which forced Moscow to request Pretoria's permission for the Professor Vize to call at Cape Town were of an extraordinary nature. Its crew will take part in the evacuation of Soviet polar workers from Antarctica, in which a difficult ice situation formed.

Those developments evoked a lively interest of the local press. Many articles were published over the past two days on plans of the transportation of 163 polar workers from the Mikhail Somov vessel, squeezed by the ice near the Molodezhnaya polar station, to Cape Town.

Contact was established with the Professor Vize from Pretoria with the help of Radio Cape Town. The captain said during a short conversation that the IL-76 plane, which is to transport the polar workers from Molodezhnaya to Cape Town by two flights, would come from Moscow not late this week, as many South African newspapers predicted, but on August 15. Fifty three polar workers will be taken home by the Professor Vize. The rest will be transported to Moscow by the plane on August 26.

The necessity to evacuate Soviet polar workers emerged as a result of an extraordinary situation. According to Captain Richard Stephen, press secretary of the South African Navy, the hydrometeorological situation was extremely difficult in Antarctica this winter. The ice created such a serious threat for the Mikhail Somov that scientists from the Molodezhnaya station and the crew had to move urgently to the station.

Fred Gaum, a spokesman for the South African Environmental Protection Department, said that the weather could make serious corrections in the schedule of the evacuation of Soviet polar workers.

TASS Describes Meteor-3 Orbital Parameters

LD1508161091 Moscow TASS in English 1552 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—The Soviet Union today launched a meteorological satellite, Meteor-3.

Blasted off by a Tsiklon (Cyclone) booster from the Plesetsk space port, the probe is to gather hydrometeorological information, and help upgrade the system of weather-forecasting observations from space and master measuring and optico-mechanical scanning television and radiometry equipment, geophysical research instruments and methods for the remote-sensing of the atmosphere and surface of the earth in the interest of various Soviet economic sectors and science.

In keeping with the Soviet-U.S. Agreement on cooperation in the exploration and uses of space for peaceful purposes of April 15, 1987, and with the July 25, 1990, agreement between the Soviet Hydrometeorology Committee and the U.S. National Aerospace Administration, the satellite also carries U.S. equipment for mapping the condition of the ozone layer.

The satellite was delivered to an orbit with the following parameters:

Initial period of revolution—109.4 minutes,

Maximum distance from earth—1,219 kilometers,

Minimum distance—1,196 kilometers,

Inclination—82.6 degrees.

The launch of the Soviet meteorological satellite with U.S. equipment is a joint contribution by the USSR and the United States to resolving the problem of protecting the ozone layer and to carrying out activities that are connected with observing 1992 as the international year of outer space.

Baltics To Seek Independence At CSCE Conference

OW1508120491 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1055 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] There will be a one-day meeting of the heads and representatives of Foreign Ministries of the three Baltic states in Riga on Friday. The main item on the agenda is the September conference in Moscow on the human dimension in the framework of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE].

According to our diplomatic correspondent, the USSR Foreign Minister Aleksander Bessmertnykh has sent letters to his Baltic counterparts inviting them to attend the Moscow conference as members of a united Soviet delegation. There have been no replies to these letters.

However, according to officials from the Estonian Foreign Ministry, the Baltic states do not intend to join the delegation.

Considering the experience of the recent Berlin meeting of CSCE foreign ministers where Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were present as non-voting guests of several foreign delegations, they want to work for a compromise—an acceptable status for their participation in the Moscow conference.

The USSR Foreign Ministry made it clear that it would not give consent to independent Baltic participation.

Observers are generally doubtful about Moscow's agreement to any independent participation of the three states in the Moscow conference, because this would amount to their official recognition as subjects of international law and independent states which is categorically denied by the Central Government.

Estonia

Ministry Reports Savisaar Assassination Plot

LD1608111391 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0600 GMT 16 Aug 91

[Text] The Internal Affairs Ministry before lunch yesterday officially reported to ETA that a Muscovite preparing to assassinate Edgar Savisaar was detained in Tallinn and that information on any progress will come only from official Internal Affairs Ministry statements. However, several journalists have tried to obtain additional information.

Toomas Sildam writes that 37-year-old Muscovite Aleksey S. did not intend to attack the government leader himself but, rather, was tasked with drawing up an assassination plan. This would indicate he was not working alone. The would-be terrorist has not yet produced any motive for Savisaar's assassination. Deputy Internal Affairs Minister Arved Jaaska told the Baltic news service that the person detained is a mentally ill individual and that the attempted assassination can be taken about as seriously as a mentally ill person. However, Moscow told the police department that Aleksey S. is not registered in any psychoneurological hospital there. Estonian doctors will evidently express their opinion at the beginning of next week.

Toomas Sildam concludes that, even if the doctors agree with Jaaska's diagnosis, one cannot view the whole story with too much irony. Bodyguards are hired to protect Savisaar and Ruutel not only from plots but also from unbalanced individuals.

USSR State Bank, Mafia Connections Suggested

LD1608114891 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0600 GMT 16 Aug 91

[Report on PAEVALEHT article; from the press review]

[Text] A cash crisis has spread in an unprecedented manner, and it seems the time is not far away when salaries will go unpaid because of the cash shortage. Estonian Bank President Rein Otsason met journalists yesterday afternoon to explain the situation. The Estonian Bank received a letter from the USSR State Bank's Estonian republican branch which says that, in connection with a cash shortage, this bank nor any others will any longer provide cash to commercial banks for hard currency purchases. The Estonian Bank can either go without the cash or altogether stop buying and selling hard currency. To a certain degree, this corresponds with the USSR State Bank's position whereby all banks either stop buying and selling hard currency or do so only according to USSR State Bank rules. The hard currency market in Tallinn would, in that case, be in the mafia's hands. Has the USSR State Bank started to cooperate with the mafia? Common interests are, in any case, obvious here, notes (Helve Laasik) in today's PAEVALEHT.

Republic Delegation Member on Moscow Talks

LD1508190491 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1200 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Interview with Estonian delegation member Lippmaa by correspondent Jaan Raudsepp in Moscow on 15 August—live or recorded]

[Text] [Raudsepp] Expert groups of both the republic's and the Union's official delegations are working today at the republic's mission in Moscow. Mr. Lippmaa, what is on the agenda? What are you discussing?

[Lippmaa] At the moment we are dealing with historical legal issues, with four items. The first is the peace treaty concluded between the Russian Federation and Estonia on 2 February 1920, that is, the peace of Tartu. The second is an analysis of the treaties and agreements concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941. The third is an analysis of relations between Estonia and the Soviet Union from

1939 to 1991. And the final item is an examination and analysis of measures to alleviate the state of tension, of its causes, and of ways to resolve it.

Now the discussions between the delegations are intense. We are examining possibilities of how to discuss all issues of interest to us, and wherever possible to find joint positions, even though they are few and far between at the moment.

[Raudsepp] But, Mr. Lippmaa, it is precisely this kind of a historical assessment of those events that has constantly been the stumbling block during the talks. Is it at all possible to predict how tomorrow's talks will go?

[Lippmaa] At this moment in time I cannot even predict how today's talks will go. But I can say that we have exchanged very useful information. Our session is taking place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and will continue for an unlimited period of time. We are ready to sit here for a very long time indeed, because the problems are complex.

Further on Talks With Soviets

OW1508165991 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1315 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Within the framework of Soviet-Estonian talks, experts from the two countries are discussing in Moscow on Thursday the historical and juridical aspects of the 1939-40 events. The Estonian delegation, led by Endel Lippmaa, has suggested the following topics for discussion:

—The Tartu peace treaty concluded between the Estonian Republic and the Russian Federation on February 2, 1920.
—The treaties and protocols concluded by the USSR and Germany in 1939-40;
—Soviet-Estonian relations in 1939-91;
—Political tension and ways of overcoming it.

E. Lippmaa has told BF's [BALTFAX] reporter that the discussion has been "rather tense," and he is not sure the parties will be able to reach agreement.

He drew attention to the fact that the Estonian delegation would insist that the full-fledged bilateral negotiations opening in Moscow on August 16 should cover the historical and legal aspects of the 1939-40 treaties as well as various economic issues.

Bilateral Trade Prices Slated for Discussion

OW1508135591 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1315 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Soviet and Estonian government delegations led by the premiers Valentin Pavlov and Edgar Savisaar will meet in Moscow on August 19 to conclude a trade and economic agreement for 1992. The crucial problem is at what prices the two countries will trade with each other.

Leonhard Tammevali, Deputy Economy Minister of Estonia, has told BF [BALTFAX] that his republic will be pressing for the treaty to be based on the formula "negotiated prices," rather than "world prices." Other options should be discussed too. L. Tammevali favors a stage-by-stage transition to world prices in Estonia's trade with the Soviet Union.

Lembit Viilup, head of the Economic Relations Department of Estonia's Economy Ministry, told BF that his republic's trade with Russia would be based on a system of "state barter." The Estonian Government earlier pledged to provide the republican economy with 12 major categories of goods, including fuel, grain, vegetable oil, sugar, etc. To purchase these goods on a barter basis from the USSR, Estonia would maintain a commodities reserve where it would channel up to 20

of the goods put out by its state sector.

According to L. Viilup, Estonia may face considerable problems in shifting to world prices in trade, since "the world prices of products to be supplied by the USSR (such as oil, gas, etc.) are more or less stable, unlike those of the goods manufactured by Estonia. This may complicate the transition to world prices," L. Viilup said.

As BF has already reported, Estonia's Premier E. Savisaar did not rule out after his visit to Moscow earlier this week that Russia's government might raise the prices of fuel in the near future.

Ruutel Stresses Need for Baltic Independence

LD1508131291 Moscow TASS in English 1100 GMT 15 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[Text] Tallinn August 15 TASS—The Estonian press today published a statement by Arnold Ruutel, president of the republic Parliament, which said, in part:

"Nearly all states that lost sovereignty during the Second World War have since restored their independence. A democratic state order exists in the overwhelming majority of these states.

"One cannot talk about a new world order and the total elimination of the consequences of the Second World War with regard to the Baltic states until the independence of the former equal members of the League of Nations--the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Latvia—is restored.

"We are convinced that the restoration of the Baltic states' independence is possible only with active involvement of the international community."

Republic Coalition Government in 'Near Future'

OW1608014691 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1850 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Estonian newspaper POSTIMEES has reported that the republic will have a new government in the near future. It will be a coalition government that will most likely involve representatives of the centrist and social democratic factions that have emerged out of the Popular Front, the Russian-speaking factions SOTRUDNICHESTVO (Cooperation) and VIRUMAA, as well as the Green party and the Centrist Agrarian party factions.

BF's [BALTFAX) correspondent says the Estonian Justice Minister Yuri Raidla announced the planned government reform at a recent news conference in Tallinn, drawing attention to the "need for the government of specialists to reform into a government of politicians."

Latvia

Bisers Receives No Reply From Soviet Delegation

LD1508153191 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 0430 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] It is not known whether the talks with Moscow will be resumed. As the deputy chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers, Ilmars Bisers, reports, at the end of last week he sent an official telegram to the authorized leader of the USSR delegation for consultations with Latvia, Vladimir Velichko, who was asked to specify the USSR attitude to the abandoned consultations, and inform him whether these consultations will continue at all, as well as specifying the actual time frame. No reply has been received to this telegram and invitation.

Ilmars Bisers also acknowledges that it has become known from official sources that no talks with the USSR will occur earlier than the end of September. The reason mentioned for such vagueness is complications with the signing of the new Union treaty.

Latvian, Lithuanian Finance Ministers Meet in Riga

OW1608014991 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1850 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Latvian Finance Minister Elmars Silins met with his Lithuanian colleague Elvira Kunaviciene in Riga on Thursday. The meeting was originally planned as a two-day conference of the finance ministers of the three Baltic republics, but the Estonian minister failed to arrive.

The parties focused largely on their republics' budgets for 1992. They also discussed the opportunities for getting action on specific projects suggested by the Baltic Finance Foundation to which each of the three republics is to transfer a share of its budget.

Tyumen Commodity Exchange To Have Riga Office

OW1508045091 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1930 GMT 14 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On August 13 Latvian businessmen met the administration of the Tyumen Commodity Exchange (TCE) at the Latvian Council of Ministers building in Riga. President of the TCE Sergey Denisov said that the TCE is interested in entering the Latvian market and plans to set up its branch in Riga. A BF [BALTFAX] correspondent reports that TCE representatives displayed "particular interest in Latvia's ports".

After the meeting G. Piladzis, the Latvian Government's adviser, said that "Latvia would like to receive necessary raw materials from Tyumen".

Further on Agreement With Tyumen

LD1508162791 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 0430 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] A direct inter-republican agreement has been signed. The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia and Latvian entrepreneurs have met with the leaders of the Tyumen commodity exchange. The Tyumen commodity exchange is interested in direct access to the Latvian market. It is even possible that a Tyumen exchange enterprise will be set up in Riga. The Tyumen representatives have emphasized that they are interested mainly in Latvia's ports and favorable geographical position. We remind you that Tyumen, in distant Siberia, is one of the richest regions in the USSR for petroluem and gas.

Republic Promotes Minority Language Teaching

LD1308173691 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 0529 GMT 13 Aug 91

[Text] The LETA agency reports: Coordinated by the Ministry of Education, national cultural societies, and local administrations, a resolution has been passed on opening new schools for minorities living in the republic. With the opening of the new educational year in Latvia, a school for Polish children will start functioning in Riga, with two pre-school groups and four primary school classes, as well as Polish schools in Daugavpils and Kraslava. Altogether 60,000 Poles live in Latvia. Great assistance in starting the schools will be coming from Torun University in Poland. Last year pedagogues from Poland started working in Latvia. This year their number will increase. Such teaching institutions for Poles according to the Latvian model are also starting up in other places, for example, Kazakhstan and Russia.

Some 92,000 Ukrainians are also living in Latvia. Therefore, from the base of Evening School no. 25 in Riga, a

Ukrainian school is starting up. Nor will the 34,000 Lithuanians in Latvia be aggrieved either, because in Liepaja, from 1 September, a Lithuanian class is to open. A Lithuanian school might possibly also open in Riga. At the moment there are in Latvia, together with the Estonian and Jewish schools, altogether six schools for minority nationalities functioning, and more than 20 Sunday schools for minorities.

Lithuania

Landsbergis' Article Reprinted, Criticized

PM1508202291 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Aug 91 First Edition p 3

[Reprint of article by Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Chairman V. Landsbergis published in LIETUVOS AIDAS 6 August 1991, followed by PRAVDA commentary—first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction: "War on Lithuania"]

[Text] The Lithuanian newspaper LIETUVOS AIDAS published on 6 August 1991 an article by Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Chairman V. Landsbergis, giving a political assessment of the terrible crime at Medininkai, where eight customs officials were shot at point-blank range by unidentified butchers. We have decided to reprint this article unabridged, reserving the right to add a short commentary.

V. Landsbergis' View of Events at Medininkai....

Once again seven men have been killed at their posts, while executing their duties—Lithuanian officials.

Mourned over, they now rest beneath a mound of white sand, after receiving the farewells of their relatives and of Lithuania itself. The sand is clean, but the men fell in a dirty war of the Soviets against Lithuania. Since January this year we have already experienced, as it gradually comes to light, the totalitarian nature of this war: the killing of unarmed civilians and the unprecedented propaganda campaign, in which a dose of every conceivable kind of lies was prepared for virtually everyone—for the punctilious Western diplomat, sincerely concerned to avoid having to censure Mr. Gorbachev, and for the half-witted Soviet zombie who greets with hatred anyone who is worthier, cleverer, or simply different.

The Soviets' totalitarian war is now just like the Nazis' war, a combination of violence and lies.

Nobody has yet been called to account for the killing of unarmed civilians in January, we have only heard about rewards. The depths to which a state can sink are plumbed by the "findings" of the general prosecutor of the Soviet Union. Facts, hard evidence, the accounts of many witnesses from different countries—these do not matter. If the party gives the order to find that the killers from the KGB special subunits are not to blame, then the Soviets' general prosecutor obediently fulfills that order. A rule-of-law state where the general "law" is decreed by the CPSU and the KGB. And if you suggest that this kind of law and order should be depoliticized, a universal cry goes up from the devoted party members.

That is how things are over there, in that country whose bloodstained tentacles have once again left their mark on Lithuania.

Medininkai shows us a new level of unlimited baseness, because prisoners with their hands up were killed.

Maybe the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] troopers, who are still on the rampage to this day, had taught our boys a rule: Surrender, and you'll be humiliated and robbed, but you'll stay alive.

Now new rules are emerging: If you resist you get a lot of bullets, if you don't resist—you just get one. In the manner of the NKVD and the Gestapo, following the method popular among fascists of every hue, those who offer no resistance are shot in the head.

In a more or less decent world, the slaughter of prisoners is severely condemned and ruthlessly punished. But in Soviet-land there have not been as many changes as people in the West sometimes think. Some Western politician or other would doubtless invite into the common European home even the killers of unarmed citizens, the murderers of captured officials, and the protectors of these criminals, and so there is no need for the Soviets to answer for their crimes or to make any substantial changes in their morality. Especially when at times they can be quite successful in ramming home in Western minds the message: Save Soviet-land!

If that country really does change, it will not be by "decree" of the Kremlin, but through the will of the democratic forces of Russia, the Ukraine, and other peoples. Lithuania set the example, and therefore it is particularly hateful to the former, while holding out great hope to the latter.

The U.S. President, while in Moscow, spoke about the aspirations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia: to remove and destroy "one of the darkest legacies of the era of Stalinism." He also said: "Indeed, men and women of intelligence and good will can find a way for the Baltic peoples to gain freedom." With the help of vague diplomatic formulas imported from Washington, U.S. policy on the Baltic countries is already taking on a more concrete shape, the Kremlin is getting used to the idea, and step by step progress is being made. Russia has overtaken America: It took a far more significant step along the path of discarding the past and clearing the way, of legal and democratic self-determination, by signing a treaty with Lithuania on 29 July. And then—30 July—Bush spoke. And on 31 July there came an even more significant step—bloody retaliation. Caught unawares and ill-informed, the U.S. President echoed M. Gorbachev's words about a border incident, mentioned Lithuania and Belorussia, and uttered not a word about the Soviets' policy of violence, which he is well aware of; and so he continued to appear to be in agreement. If the

Soviets planned all this, deliberately timing the strike to coincide with G. Bush's visit, you have to credit them with the genius of F. Dostoyevskiy's fiendish heroes.

The crime was properly assessed, according to B. Yeltsin's statement, by the new democratic Russia; and, in the words of Deputy W. von Stetten, who spoke at the cemetery on behalf of the Bundestag, by the new Germany. Both those countries are in favor of Lithuania's independence. Official condolences were sent and protest statements made by the United States, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Denmark, Latvia, Estonia, and by Lithuanians throughout the world.

We are not alone, but it is we who must withstand the new wave of bloody terror.

We are well enough schooled to detect hypocrisy a mile off: be it the so-called condolences from Pugo and his protege Makutynovich, or the KGB's attempts to cover the traces, or the whining of the collaborators who demand to know why people point the finger at them first. The Baltic Military District, which, as you know, brazenly declared itself to be a "local political force," also complains of attempts to put people in a "negative" frame of mind against it. No indeed, not against every individual officer of the Soviets or every conscript, although back in summer 1989 more than 1.5 million people in Lithuania signed their names and home addresses on a demand for the occupying forces to leave. This is an unchanging political demand which has nothing to do with love or hate for the generals and admirals who threaten us. In Lithuania today everyone will say to the Soviets' Army: If you want us to love you, first go away. And take the OMON with you. The rabid wolves are doomed in any case, but it was your country that raised them and infected them, so you had better take them with you to somewhere outside our borders.

We are now reminded of the January attack by the distortions and assessments in the Soviet media, which expose their longed-for and constantly planned ventures.

The "border incident," which is what they tried to call it, is supposed to bring to mind some kind of a "clash," whereupon Lithuania and Belorussia are mentioned. TASS immediately declared that there was "great tension" in Lithuania, and Burokevicius spoke of civil war. Luckily he is not yet announcing the seizure of power, this time he is more careful.

But the KGB incautiously accused the Lithuanian Republic, because it wants to get rid of a poisonous foreign body, accused it bluntly of "totalitarianism," thereby revealing where the slander is coming from and who is insinuating it by every possible means. Someone, somewhere in Moscow apparently made a telephone call and stated that the blame for the carnage at Medininkai is claimed by an unknown organization for the "defense of Russians"; and that is immediately disseminated throughout the world.

But we, who have been through it all, see both the political aims of this rumor, and, at the same time, its authors. In the West it will remind people of the OAS [Secret Army Organization], those once-famous terrorists and masters of coups who proclaimed themselves the defenders of the interests and rights of former French colonialists in Algeria. The West will retain a tarnished impression of Russians in Lithuania and an improved one of that nice President Gorbachev, who certainly does not commit such terrible deeds. The KGB will be out of it entirely, especially since Gorbachev is instructing it to "investigate" the crime. And in Lithuania too, it may be possible in this way to provoke certain suspicions or feelings against Russians in general. In that case the feeble slogans uttered by isolated provocateurs, such as "Lithuania for the Lithuanians!" and so forth, which they are so fond of exploiting in the attempt to squeeze out some kind of percentage of "nationalism," will maybe help to provoke normal people too, who have hitherto had nothing against the Russian people and the new Russia. Maybe it will be possible to lead astray a certain proportion of unenlightened Russians in Lithuania—look, the defenders have declared themselves! This is not your Yeltsin with his treaty and his guarantees of civil liberties, this is people defending the great Russian "state" in reality!

And maybe it would have been possible to provoke more atrocities and thereby create difficulties as regards the ratification of the Lithuanian-Russian treaty?

In that event, instead of getting a "Volga" each, they would have got their general's stars.

You see, brothers, Lithuanian brothers of all nationalities, what kind of a fiendish enemy we are up against. We are armed with openness, truth, and right. They are armed with lies, hypocrisy, and murder.

They have already shown us that they will kill again, and how they will kill.

And they will act with the help of the cunning science of evil—how to sow discord. How to find all kinds of chinks: between Lithuanians and non-Lithuanians, between believers and nonbelievers, between people of different religions, between the authorities and those who are dissatisfied with the authorities' decisions or simply dissatisfied that they themselves are not the authorities, between oppositions and positions, between workers and idlers, between those who understand differences in value and those who mix everything up, between the afflicted and the well-to-do, between those who love Lithuania and those who insult it, between the militia—unforgotten in some people's plans—and the new police, between the police and the territorial defense department, between the Supreme Soviet and the government, between parliamentary factions and political parties....

All the time they dart in and out, seeking, finding, prompting, inciting, widening every crack they find, so that the Lithuanian edifice that we raised with such

effort and such sacrifices crumbles from within before it is even finished—just as it crumbled in 1940, and not only because of foreign aggression.

We can repeat to them what we said before, during our recent trials: Yes, you can kill us, but you can do no more. But they still hope to achieve more. Therefore it is not enough for us to rely solely on the love for our homeland that burns in our hearts—though not yet in all of them!—we also need great perspicacity, the ability to explain things in a comradely fashion to those who are led astray, and an exceptional sense of responsibility for Lithuania.

The new grave mounds in Vilnius make this incumbent on all of us. [Landsbergis article ends]

...And an Essential Comment on It

You will agree that the first impression of this text is disturbing. Many readers of the article "War on Lithuania" have said this. Disturbing because of the avalanche of abusive words—irrespective of whether the author is right or not, although this too is a fundamental question. Incidentally, we should be getting used to the mystical-romantic style of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet chairman's utterances. In a verbal struggle with his political opponents he almost always attempts to use emotions and exotic images to make up for his lack of arguments. Both local opposition figures and even representatives of much-revered Western diplomacy have alluded to his far from diplomatic conduct in "interstate" contacts.

This is the reason we published the article: So the reader can see for himself just who the Kremlin has to deal with and what level of "argument" and mode of thinking is employed by the head of one of the USSR's "recalcitrant" republics.

As is known, the crime in Medininkai is being investigated, and even the leaders of the republic's law enforcement agencies had to appeal to the public to stop spreading stories in order to avoid stirring things up and influencing the investigation. These appeals came, incidentally, right after the publication of V. Landsbergis' article....

But can those much-vaunted 1.5 million signatures against the Soviet Army (not to mention the fact that they were collected randomly, without supervision, and that even children appended their signatures) really serve as an argument?! Again this is something out of the realm of emotion. Questions of this kind cannot be resolved by shouting. Only by conducting serious discussions, taking account of the realities, between the leaders of the republic and the Union. The same, incidentally, applies to any other serious questions. But the worrying question is: Is a man who spends every minute abusing either the head of "the neighboring state," or Western politicians, or a great country, is such a man capable of businesslike discussions? We know from history, including our own tragic history, that vocabulary of this kind is a characteristic feature of regimes that are far removed from democracy. A serious politician—which, you would think, the head of any parliament should be—would hardly allow himself to devote page after page to imprecations designed solely to stir up emotions.

...But maybe we are underestimating Mr. Landsbergis, and this is in fact the objective he is deliberately pursuing. In that case we should pay tribute to his prowess, and at the same time ponder just what recipe lies concealed in this brew of emotions seasoned with abuse....

Bush Response to Vagnorius on Killings Noted

LD1408220991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2130 GMT 14 Aug 91

[Text] The Lithuanian prime minister, Gediminas Vagnorius, has received George Bush's response to his letter of 31 July.

After expressing his feeling of sadness over the senseless act of violence at the Medininkai customs control post, George Bush goes on to say: Soviet authorities including President Gorbachev have expressed their commitment to assisting the Lithuanian Government in investigating this crime and bringing the perpetrators to justice.

As I have stated previously, a situation has been created in the Baltic states that itself leads to violence, and that situation must be changed. We will continue to press the Soviet Government to excercise control over the actions of its forces in the Baltic states and to make clear our belief that Moscow is ultimately responsible for acts committed by its personnel.

We will also continue to encourage the Soviet Government to engage in good (?states') dialogue without preconditions with the three democratically elected Baltic Governments.

During my recent summit meetings with President Gorbachev in Moscow I made these points to President Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders. I also made it clear that the U.S. attaches great importance to progress toward freedom for the Baltic states and that our support for the people of the Baltic states will remain constant.

Sincerely,
George Bush.

More on Bush Reply to Vagnorius

OW1508114691 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1055 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President George Bush has assured the Lithuanian leadership that the United States "will continue to press the Soviet Government to exercise control over the actions of its forces in the Baltic states."

In a letter to Prime-Minister Vagnorius the American President expresses regret over the bloody attack on the

Lithuanian customs check-point in Medininkai and says that such actions can suspend the peaceful dialogue which is the only way to make the dreams of the Lithuanian people come true.

The US President thinks that the present situation in the Baltic states itself provokes violence. He said that "Moscow is ultimately responsible for acts comitted by its personnel." However, he noted that the Soviet leadership had voiced intentions to help the Lithuanian Government investigate the crime and bring the criminals into the dock.

Attempts To 'Deprive' Republic of Nuclear Power

LD1608001491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2130 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] The daily LIETUVOS RYTAS informs its readers about an attempt of the Soviet Union to deprive Lithuania of electricity generated by the Ignalina nuclear power station.

The Ministry of Power Industry has received an order from the Soviet Union to exclude the electric energy produced by the Ignalina nuclear power station from the balance sheet of the Lithuanian Republic and transfer it to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry of the Soviet Union.

This order came without any prior agreement with the Lithuanian Government.

Commenting on the order, (Solas Kutas), deputy minister of power industry, said that Lithuania has a right to use the electric energy produced by power stations located on its territory as it sees fit.

So far, Lithuania has been selling surplus electric energy to Latvia, Estonia, Belorussia, and the Kaliningrad region. If this order is to be implemented next year, Lithuania will have to [word indistinct] 3.4 thousand million KW of electric energy. That means, (Solas Kutas) said, that Lithuania will be deprived of surplus energy and will experience a great deficit of energy.

The order has clearly been designed to wreck the Lithuanian system of energy production. Therefore, the Republic of Lithuania protests against the order of certain Soviet agencies. In this protest she is joined by the leaders of the power systems of Kursk, Leningrad, [word indistinct], and other regions. Therefore it is to be hoped that the battle of the right to use electric energy generated in atomic power stations is not yet over.

Military Returns 'Stolen' Firefighting Equipment

LD1608005591 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2130 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] The Soviet military have returned part of the stolen firefighting hardware, but its condition is deplorable, reports the government's information bureau.

As is known, on 23 July armed soldiers broke into the warehouses of a state farm in the Vilnius district, and took away the fire engines and other firefighting hardware of the Fire Prevention Department that were kept there. The military justified their actions at the time, referring to their leadership's orders concerning their retrieval of all property which belonged to the Soviet paramilitary organization DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy].

When the Lithuanian officials produced documents proving their right or ownership, and following the intervention of the Soviet Military Procurator's office, the military were forced to give back part of the hardware seized. Its condition, however, turned out to be deplorable. Several cars are still held by the military.

Representatives of the Fire Prevention Department are now in contact with the military leadership, and expect to retrieve the stolen property tomorrow.

Statement Issued on Yeltsin-Kuptsov Meeting

LD1508115991 Moscow TASS in English 1108 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—A Russian Federation presidential spokesman released a statement on the meeting between President Boris Yeltsin and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party Valentin Kuptsov, which reportedly took place on August 13 on the initiative of the latter.

The statement says that the conversation focused on a wide range of issues, but main attention was paid to three issues.

First. The attitude of the Russian Federation Communist Party to the constitutionally elected bodies of state power of the Russian Federation. Yeltsin expressed the view that the former leadership of the Russian Communist Party, while constantly declaring its desire for dialogue and accord, in actual fact laid main emphasis in its political activity on opposition to the state power of the republic.

Having recognized the abnormal situation, Kuptsov assured the president that he, as leader of the Party, will take measures to rectify the situation.

Second. The activity of the deputy bloc "The Communists of Russia". The president said it was unconstructive on several issues that have major significance for the revival of Russia. According to him, this manifested itself primarily at the latest Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation. The president, having reaffirmed readiness to cooperate with all parliamentary groups and factions, asked the first secretary of the Communist Party of Russia to pay attention to the activity of the bloc "The Communists of Russia" and received assurances.

Third. The Decree of the Russian Federation president on de- partyization. The first secretary asked the president not to fix a rigid timeframe for fulfillment of the decree, after which measures of administrative punishment will follow. The president reaffirmed his position: A specific deadline for the decree has not been set, but it must be gradually implemented in full before the end of the year. Yeltsin drew Kuptsov's attention to the need for cooperation in finding employment for people laid off as a result of the decree and assured that he would take all necessary measures.

Aide Comments on Meeting

OW1508144591 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1415 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian President's press-secretary Pavel Voschanov commented on the results of the meeting of Boris Yeltsin with the new First Secretary of the Russian Communist Party [RCP] Central Committee Valentin Kuptsov at the mass media's request. It was held on August 13.

The press-secretary pointed out that the three main problems were focused:

1. The Russian Communist Party's attitude to the constitutionally elected bodies. Yeltsin said that the former communists' leadership was deliberately opposed to the republican authorities in fact in spite of its statements declaring their intentions to agreement and dialogue. Valentin Kuptsov described such a situation as abnormal and he said that he will take all the measures to change it.

2. The president described the activities of the "Russian communists" deputies' bloc as "non-constructive" in solving several problems of great importance for the Russia's revival. And according to Voschanov, Kuptsov promised the President to consider the problem.

3. The Decree on departyization. The First Secretary of the RCP Central Committee asked the President not to fix strict terms of this Decree's implementation. Yeltsin answered that a concrete term was not fixed, but the Decree must be completely implemented till the end of the year. The both sides agreed to cooperate in placing in a job of former party officials.

Kuptsov Discusses Russian Communist Party

LD1508211191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1855 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Interview with Valentin Kuptsov, first secretary of the Russian Communist Party, by commentator Ivan Pankov; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Pankov] Does the leadership change in the Russian Communist Party mean that it has simultaneously determined new points of reference in its activity? Valentin Kuptsov, the new first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia, is 53 years old. He is a metallurgical engineer by training and began his working life as a rolling-mill operator at the Cherepovets iron and steel works. He has been a party member for almost 25 years.

You were elected to the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party [RCP] at the plenum. Were there any other candidates for the position?

[Kuptsov] Yes, three candidacies were considered at the plenum: Yuriy Anatoliyevich Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow city Party Committee; Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov; and me. Both Comrade Prokofyev and Comrade Zyuganov withdrew their candidacies, giving different reasons for doing so. The plenum took the view that the grounds given by both were convincing. I was left alone on the secret ballot

paper. The procedure went ahead, and out of 185 members of the RCP Central Committee, 150 voted for me and 35 against.

[Pankov] Now that you have taken on the post, are you concerned principally with problems within the party or with the position that the party ought to occupy in society?

[Kuptsov] My principal interest, of course, is in the problem of the party in society and the position of society itself, although the problems of life inside the party also worry every party worker today. That is perfectly natural, since complex processes are going on, we are approaching the next congress, and the draft party program is under discussion.

[Pankov] What priorities does the party single out in society today?

[Kuptsov] I would put the subject of the economy first, of course. The situation in various sectors of the national economy and on the consumer market, the financial position and the state of affairs in the agro-industrial complex, and the social sphere are an important problem today, since people's prosperity, their standard of living and social needs today are linked with this very issue. In the list of problems this is, of course, the most important task on which the RCP is working and must work.

Other problems worrying us today are the state of public order, crime, the development of the shadow economy, speculation, and the fragmentation of society. That is a negative problem, which is causing significant anxiety to society today.

The third problem is, of course, political stability, the attainment of both civil peace and ethnic accord, since the crisis in itself is so deep and has virtually saturated all areas of our human activity so much that we have to seek an opportunity to stabilize the political climate and to settle ethnic and interethnic conflicts.

[Pankov] It would be interesting to hear you explain your view of the party's place today in relation to the Russian leadership. What place, in your opinion, should it occupy or is it actually occupying: one closer to opposition, or, nonetheless, one that is seeking some kind of contact with the leadership?

[Kuptsov] I think that any political force—in any state and in any system—is always looking for an opportunity to take its place in the spectrum of political forces and in interaction with various structures. Therefore, when we in the RCP are, so to speak, all the time being confronted with this question this looks like attempts to predetermine some special position for us in relation to the leadership of the republic. Maybe there are real reasons for this here because the elections have just taken place. We admit that the RCP has lost them—our candidates have lost. But at the same time Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin has been elected by the people—he got the majority of votes. We take this into consideration and simply see this as objective reality.

Therefore, we set our tasks on the basis of the existing reality without creating any illusions here. How do we see our task? Interaction with the state structures and searching for our own place in those democratic social transformations that are occuring in Russia in order that we solve our mutual task. The state structures as well as parties should get the republic out of the crisis and to improve the people's lives.

I have already met Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. This was on my own initiative. The Russia president has responded to it with sufficient goodwill. I was very pleased with this conversation. As Boris Nikolayevich said to me, he too was pleased. We have examined questions of the RCP's direct participation in solving a whole range of today's problems worrying our society including the Russian leadership. This also concerns participation of the Communist Party in dealing with social and economic programs, easing the confrontation and tension that exists in society.

Naturally, we discussed a number of questions that were put to Boris Nikolayevich purely at my request. In particular, questions of the parties functioning under the new conditions. Actually, I have again raised the question about suspension of the decree on departyization. For the present, Boris Nikolayevich and I have agreed that by issuing the decree he did not aim to apply pressure on or carry out any repressive actions against the Communists. On the contrary, he has again assured me that he appreciates that this decree cannot be implemented in two weeks, as it was envisaged. And not in a month or two either. We have agreed that if the Committee for Compliance with the Constitution will not solve the problem and if USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev will not interfere and the decree will remain in force then the period for its implementation will be considerably extended up to approximately a year.

I would like to note that we, the CPSU as a whole, and the Central Committee, are setting ourselves the task of reorienting the work of party organizations toward geographical areas by stepping up work at people's places of residence. The draft program sets out the party's social base and expresses our viewpoint on different sections of society. We will... this is my view, and I will be defending it: I think that our party, the Communist Party, ought to defend and initially express the interests of people of labor. It ought to defend their interests. That comes first and foremost. By that I mean the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and all who make a living through their own work.

[Pankov] What goals would the RCP be purusing in agreeing to cooperate with other parties and movements?

[Kuptsov] We cooperate broadly with parties that accept the socialist choice. They are our allies and we are

prepared to cooperate with them on all issues. We are prepared to cooperate with parties and movements that back democratization as a whole and accept the processes of perestroyka. I repeat: We now have so many problems that we should abandon all squabbles and all the political forces in our republic, as well as in the Union, should get down to tackling the urgent problems that concern people most of all. To our great regret, parties that simply do not accept us on the ground that we are the Communist Party can be quite clearly discerned in the political spectrum today. I think this is a transitional period in our life. It does not correspond with the genuine aspirations of the members of the political organizations themselves. I think we will work out mechanisms of cooperation and rules for the conduct of political work in a proper multiparty system based on the accumulated fruits of world experience.

[Pankov] I have here the Communist Party's theses on the political situation. They were drafted for disucssion by the Politburo of the RCP Central Committee. They say that the party has failed at this stage to find sufficient strength to maintain effective supervision of its leaders, who are today openly breaking with the party and its ideals. What process is being noted here?

[Kuptsov] Well, I think that this refers above all to the position of former members of the Politburo, Comrade Shevardnadze and Comrade Yakovlev, over setting up the Movement for Democratic Reforms and their position concerning establishing a party in opposition to the CPSU. As far as the personal position of former Politburo members is concerned, in society and in the party we have a particular approach to, and a particular view of, Politburo members new and old, so this cannot be stifled and people will be constantly giving their views, bearing in mind above all the key role of these comrades, including Comrades Yakovlev and Shevardnadze.

[Pankov] Are you an optimist or pessimist by nature, or a centrist, as it were?

[Kuptsov] No, I am an optimist in life. It is just that my analysis is based on a real knowledge of life. I always look ahead with optimism. What is it based on? My optimism is above all based on a deep faith in people. Our Russian and Soviet people have a really vast potential that in difficult and hard times can always be used to overcome any crisis, and it has always given evidence of this. It has been shown by difficult moments in history.

That is why, first of all, I believe in people. Second, I simply believe in our historical experience. We have had so many difficulties but we have always found our way out. I think that we will pass this difficult stage. We have to go through it now. We just need to understand that colossal changes are taking shape in society and in the party, and we should not assess them just from today's point of view.

[Pankov] What do you think about the draft, the present draft program of the Communist Party that has been published?

[Kuptsov] I regard the draft program as an aspiration for the future. This is my assessment. One can argue about it. It will be criticized by the right and by the left. When we were adopting it at a sitting of the program commission, and when we were discussing it at the CPSU Central Committee plenum, we counted on the fact that it would be widely discussed. This is a basis for our work. We will get quite a few interesting suggestions coming out of this discussion. All this will enrich the party itself. It will help us to get a clearer, long-term idea of the headway we must make. In any case, my great hopes lie with it, and I even regard it as a basis for consolidation inside the party and even inside society.

Yeltsin, Pavlov 'Sharp Differences' on Treaty

LD1408122591 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 14 Aug 91

[Text] Sharp differences have arisen between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the USSR Government on the subject of interpreting the Union treaty. According to Pavlov, the country's prime minister, the Kremlin will continue to control the key sectors of economy, in particular, the extraction of coal, oil, and gas, despite Yeltsin's statement that after the signing of the Union treaty most of the Union ministries will lose all power on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Chechen-Ingush Delays Signing Union Treaty

LD1508202691 Moscow TASS in English 2014 GMT 15 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[Text] Groqny August 15 TASS—A delegation of the Chechen-Ingush Republic in the northern Caucases (which was an autonomous republic until last autumn) will be present at the ceremony of the union treaty on August 20 but will not be signing the treaty yet.

After stormy debates at the extraordinary session of the republic's Supreme Soviet the deputies decided, with two votes against and two abstentions, to resume the matter of the signing of the treaty of a union of sovereign states in six weeks.

The lands that went to North Ossetia in the years of Stalinist reprisals against whole ethnic groups became the stumbling-block again. The matter is that the draft union treaty suggests that borders between states forming a union can only be altered on the basis of their agreement.

Negotiations on the disputed question now begin between the Chechen-Ingush Republic and North Ossetia with the participation of a special commission of the Russian government. There is hope that mutually acceptable solution will be achieved within six weeks, and then the Chechen-Ingush Republic will sign the union treaty.

Developments Point to Demise of Communist Party

PM1508145191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Aug 91 Union Edition p 1

["Political Diary" commentary by Valeriy Vyzhutovich: "Hostages to Principle. Subjective Prognosis on Future of RSFSR Communist Party After its Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] "According to Rutskoy, there are going to be 'hysterics' at this plenum. I do not think we will give them that satisfaction." These were virtually the opening words of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party First Secretary I. Polozkov's speech to the recent Russian Central Committee plenum. Unfortunately, although "they"—independence from whom the main speaker immediately emphasized—were punished by being deprived of their anticipated "satisfaction," it was not for long. Ivan Kuzmich himself was the first to break the promise—given from the rostrum—of refraining from extremes, and, as if at some command, was followed by many others. "Anticommunist baying," a "shabby spectacle," "crude tyranny," a "riotous orgy of anticommunism"—thus the RSFSR Communist Party leader and speakers ideologically close to him, who are very anxious to "restore the spirit of party comradeship," assessed the activity of their opponents.

In fact, a great deal was said about party comradeship. "Comradeship is the supreme manifestation of mutual respect and trust. It is a feeling of fellowship, mutual help, and insurance in difficult situations. It is decency and honesty. It is, if you like, nobility to the highest degree." So you could say that the Russian Central Committee plenum was a "comrades' court" for the apostates who have dared to propose their own program of party reform. A program, we should point out, that is fully consonant with the draft of the new CPSU Program. A program free of layers of ossified dogma in the form of the class struggle, sworn allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, monolithic unity of ranks, and belief in the advent of communism.

Strictly speaking, nothing unexpected happened. Excited tones, enthusiastic denunciations—how familiar it all is! However, the guardians of ideological chastity are hardly likely to deceive anyone in their attempts to prove that the "eternal, all-conquering doctrine" is indisputable and uniquely right. Most people have long fathomed that adherents of the "Communist future" are motivated by self-interest rather than ideals. Claims to truth in one's understanding of how to live, what to believe in, and what to strive for are claims to power. The only possible explanation—for the most part, at least—for the aggressive solidarity with which the plenum participants assessed the appearance of the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia [DPCR] led by A. Rutskoy in the very heart of the RSFSR Communist Party is a loss of ability to make any serious impact on politics and panic when confronted with life and its urgent demands.

"They are trying to fundamentally change our social system and destroy our social achievements. By pushing Russia toward the West, they are trampling on our people's humanist traditions, which have accumulated over our state's 1,000-year history.... They are the real reactionaries...." This was said of those who have left the RSFSR Communist Party to form their own party—a parliamentary party of the social democratic persuasion—and have thereby modified the image of the Russian Central Committee to some extent at least, by showing that not everyone in it is stubbornly orthodox.

The plenum expelled A. Rutskoy, V. Lipetskiy, and Yu. Protasenko from the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee. Lipetskiy and Rutskoy were also expelled from the CPSU "for actions conflicting with the CPSU Statutes and designed to split the party." N. Stolyarov, chairman of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Control Committee, was subjected to ideological criticism for taking part in the founding conference of the DPCR.

So, the split so feared by the leaders of the RSFSR Communist Party and their associates has happened. The DPCR, torn from the RSFSR Communist Party, has more than 7,000 members and, according to Rutskoy, the sympathies of 5 million Communists. Even if you take a very cautious view of these figures, they do not deceive you on the main issue: A very great many people are seized with the desire to dissociate themselves from the suicidal policy of Bolshevism. Those who—for various reasons—cannot leave the CPSU at present or at all will probably find political refuge under the banners of the new party, however it may be viewed by its opponents on right and left.

"The new party obviously intends to become the legal successor of the RSFSR Communist Party and has stated its right to part of CPSU property," it was said in a statement by the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, which has refused to recognize the "dissident" Communists. Claims to the role of a "party within a party" are thereby being suppressed, although the existence of the RSFSR Communist Party (yet to be officially registered, incidentally) within the CPSU does not appear to trouble the Union Central Committee. That is probably because the RSFSR Communist Party has not yet encroached on party property. The party nomenklatura is categorically opposed to the division of this property, whereas the bulk of ordinary Communists would not object to a substantial proportion of party resources being used to meet the people's needs. So it is not hard to guess what Polozkov primarily had in mind when he said from the plenum rostrum: "It is extremely important that we preserve and strengthen the party and its unity." There is no point discussing ideological unity: There is none and none is foreseen. But the fact that the split is moving rapidly and surely toward the official registration of a separate organization, with all the ensuing legal and material consequences, is the main object of the "concern for the party's future" being shown by people well familiar with how much everything costs on the market of nomenklatura privileges.

Whereas the DPCR is concerned with "building a society in which everyone will become an individual," its conservative forefather "must primarily preserve primary party organizations." Whereas Rutskoy's party has set itself the aim of "transforming the USSR into a democratic union of sovereign states, winning a majority in soviets at all levels by recourse to democratic forces and constitutional means, and developing a multiparty system in every possible way," the RSFSR Communist Party leadership is convinced that "many Russian Communists will not follow this dubious trend." Such is the polarity of their positions, which leaves no possible bridge for unity—even imaginary. Moreover, this coming out of the trenches is no longer simply in order to repel attacks by "so-called democrats:" It also has the purpose of doing battle with "reactionaries" who just yesterday were party comrades.

Whether the RSFSR Communist Party leaders like it or not, this plenum was a kind of review: The RSFSR Communist Party was founded exactly a year ago. To sober-minded people not inclined to erect class barriers, its appearance on the political scene was shocking and seemed dangerous, but it very soon became clear that this party had made no serious impact on the political process and was unlikely to do so.

As far as I am concerned, the RSFSR Communist Party's main "services to history" in the period under review are as follows: It has compromised its mother party, the CPSU, to an unprecedented degree; done its utmost to hold back economic and political transformations; and remained firmly committed to outmoded theories....

The question now is this: In recognizing the RSFSR Communist Party as its republic detachment, will the CPSU want to recognize Rutskoy's party as the same? The statement issued by the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat would suggest that the answer at present is No.

Meanwhile, there has been a change of leadership in the RSFSR Communist Party. Polozkov resigned at the plenum. V. Kuptsov is the newly elected first secretary of the Central Committee. However, this lateral movement was probably dictated by tactical rather than strategic considerations (concern to increase the RSFSR Communist Party's authority and political longevity, for example): The ideological positions of the Russian Central Committee and the party center must be brought as close together as possible in the next four or five months, before the forthcoming congress, if an even greater split is to be avoided. That will not be easy, because the center is also on the move, shifting steadily—if not too swiftly—to the left.

But whatever moves and maneuvers the RSFSR Communist Party may make in its own political domain—carefully protected against incursion by fresh, reformist ideas—it is not likely to catch up with the times. This party has had its day.

Rutskoy on Russian Communist Party Expulsions

LD1508145991 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1350 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] Everybody knows, perhaps, about the Russian vice president's expulsion from the CPSU. It seems those who expelled him must draw conclusions. Alas, this is not the case. Today the same is happening with Yakovlev, another leader of democratic reforms. Meanwhile, I would like to offer you a recording made by our correspondent Yevgeniy Zherebenkov during his meeting with Aleksandr Rutskoy this morning.

[Begin Rutskoy recording] I have information today that the deputy chairman of the Russian Communist Party Central Control Commission is looking for lists of participants in the constituent conference of the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia. They are already looking for lists! That is, they recourse to the old methods.

Everywhere in the press they claim that from now on they are democrats, they support the president and Silayev's government, that they already support the Supreme Soviet. Whereas, in fact, what are they doing? They are looking for lists of participants in the conference of the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia. What for? In order to expel from the party; to send directives down there, to primary party organizations, to expel these people. You see, the thing is, if the party continues along the same path, it can meet the fate of East European communist parties. This is inevitable; and the worst option may be that we arrive at the Romanian version, too. [end recording]

Claims Party 'Unable' To Lead

OW1508122891 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1055 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Receiving a group of young Commuists on Wednesday the Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy said: "The party that led the nation into a blind alley is unable to take it anywhere else." The group informed him that their task is to organize a movement of supporters of the Democratic party of Communists of Russia [DPCR] within the CPSU and concentrate on Party work till the CPSU congress.

Rutskoy agreed that the youth organization should be integrated in the party and defend youth interests in it.

On the situation Rutskoy said that the change of secretaries in the Russian CP is nothing but an attempt to change colors, as the Politbureau largely remains the same. "I have been informed," Rutskoy said, "that the deputy chairman of the Central Control Committee of the RCP [Russian Communist Party] is looking for the lists of participants in the founding conference of the CPCR. This is evidently done in order to expel them from the CPSU. The fact that I have been expelled has

one purpose—to demonstrate that if even the vice-president can be expelled, there will be no problems with the others."

Rutskoy also stressed that the main objective of any party is to organize mass support for the solution of key social, economic and political tasks, not struggle for power which the RCP is now doing. "Power struggle," Rutskoy said, "is only a means of reaching the above-mentioned objective."

KGB Denies Blocking Visas for Delegates

LD1508221791 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 15 Aug 91

[From the "Vesti" program]

[Text] We are continuing to prepare for the congress of our fellow country-men in Moscow. Today the administration of the Moscow group of the International Human Rights Society refuted the statement by the USSR Foreign Ministry's consulate administration which reported that on 14 August our embassy in Germany was ready to issue entry visas to Johan Friesan and Andrey Okulov, both invited to the congress.

According to a Human Rights Society spokesman, he phoned Bonn today and found out for himself that the names of those invited are not on the lists. On 13 August "Vesti" showed an interview with congress organiser Mikhail Tolstoy in which he spoke about the problems of visas for those invited to the meeting. Tolstoy blamed the KGB for the bureaucratic obstacles which have appeared in our consulates. Yesterday a KGB statement was issued. Today we return to this topic.

[V. Bakhmin, head of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, Foreign Ministry's humanitarian cooperation section] There are special lists of people whose entry to the USSR is undesirable, and among these people are many emigrees, that is former Russian citizens. Our officials say very little openly about these lists. They are in the USSR KGB and our task just now is to make these lists open.

[Correspondent Z.Guretskaya] What is the role of the RSFSR KGB in solving all these problems?

[Bakhmin] The structure of the Russian KGB has not yet been formed and their functions have also not yet been finally determined.

[Guretskaya] In this case we turn to the USSR KGB which has delegated to the Russian KGB the functions of public relations. Has the KGB blocked the entry of people wanting to take part in the conference of our fellow-countrymen?

[A. Karbainov, identified by caption as head of the USSR KGB public relatins center] I would like to say completely officially that this does not correspond to reality. I stress this officially and state that the KGB is taking measures which will ease the solution of organizsational issues connected to the entry of guests and delegates to the congress. I say this officially as well.

[Guretskaya] Well, there was a problem and now it is as if there is no problem. But whatever is stated, whatever slogans are proclaimed, world civilization judges us and the internal political situation in the country on our actual deeds and actions. [video shows correspondent's interviews with officials]

Grass-Roots Support for DPCR Questioned

PM1508155491 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Aug 91 Second Edition p 4

[V. Nikiforova article as part of "Discussion Sheet No. 104" feature: "Forestalling... Unity?"]

[Text] As you know, Moscow's Cinema House was the venue, 2-3 August, for the founding conference of the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia (DPCR), whose participants decided to form a new party within the CPSU. The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat has expressed its view of the conference—it condemned this action, which violates the Statutes. A plenum of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee expelled DPCR organizers A. Rutskoy and V. Lipitskiy from the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee. That all seems clear. Nonetheless questions remain: Who needed this conference, which founded a new party (within the CPSU) literally on the eve of the publication of the draft new CPSU Program, and where is the dividing line between differing views of the renewal of the Communists' party and actions leading to a split in the party? These questions, in my view, will be of key importance in the partywide discussion that has begun.

You may make jokes about the name of the newly formed party, as the conference's guest of honor N. Travkin, chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia, was in his speech. You may be surprised at the unexpected aggressiveness of some of the participants: "Now we'll show them!.." ("Them" being the RSFSR Communist Party and everyone who does not share the DPCR's views, up to and including the general secretary.) You may be staggered at the fabulously rapid growth in its ranks—all the conference participants who filled out a form were enrolled as DPCR members, and anyone who wants to can join, from the age of 16, moreover. And that includes those who for various reasons have left the CPSU or been expelled from its ranks.

They even promised to resolve the question of crediting them with their years of party membership—could this have been for the benefit of G. Popov, S. Shatalin, E. Shevardnadze, and other lesser party figures who have turned their backs on the CPSU, who were present at this event?

And the political observer from the weekly GOLOS stated, to tumultuous applause, that the entire editorial

office asks to be admitted to the new party family. So on the morning of 4 August all the newspaper's staffers woke up to find themselves members of the DPCR!

A real triumphal progress. Maybe they should have asked people first? But an engineer from Orenburg who was delegated by 30 people cut short the doubts and declared confidently: "The grass roots will support us!" However, when I asked B.P. Guseletov, a CPSU member who took part in the conference, how he feels about being in the new party, he was amazed: "I didn't fill out an application!"

At first it seemed that it was incredibly easy not only to enlist everyone in "the party's ranks"—the application forms that were filled in on the spot and the guests' invitation cards were immediately exchanged for credentials, which then became inserts in the party cards of the new party members. It even proved to be quite easy to get onto the leadership organs. The conference participants, for instance, were given every opportunity voluntarily to "elect" themselves to the provisional DPCR Council, which will lead the party until its first congress and make preparations for the congress. A. Rutskoy's report and many speeches by members of the organizing committee of the "Communists for Democracy" movement vigorously pushed the idea that the party is being set up by the "grass roots," the ordinary democratic members of the CPSU. But why were people wearing RSFSR people's deputies' badges more or less in a majority in the auditorium? I. Vinogradova, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, who was elected chairman of the DPCR Control and Auditing Commission at the conference, explained from the presidium and in conversations that the party will give preference to members of the organizing committee of the "Communists for Democracy" movement and to people's deputies.

It is not hard to see that the talk of "grass roots" is nothing but a calculated move intended to win over as quickly as possible to their ranks the largest possible number of supporters, in order to win registration quickly. This could also be seen in the haste with which the conference was held. It was planned to last three days, but was cut to a day and a half. The party statutes were adopted as a basis so fast that not everyone even realized what they were voting for. When they started discussing the provision of these statutes and some people had serious questions and proposals to put forward, Vinogradova, who was in the chair, either reminded them that "they have already been adopted as a basis," or reassured them: These are provisional statutes: Let us register the party, then we can rewrite everything from scratch! And that is why they managed in such a short space of time to discuss and adopt the statutes, a resolution, and appeals to young people and Communists of the Soviet Army and Navy and KGB and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] organs, and to set up the leadership organs—the provisional council and the Control and Auditing Commission, as well as setting the date for the convocation of the first congress: in October-November of this year—but without fail before the 29th CPSU Congress!

But the conference participants hardly concealed their intentions: to register the party, and hastily and without too much formality to enlist as many CPSU members as possible, including those who have left the party or been expelled. To this end A. Rutskoy repeated several times that not the CPSU, but the DPCR was the first of all the parties, old and new, to repent here, at the conference, before the people. The next step is to demand part of the party property and resources accumulated by the CPSU in past years. "We have no use for dachas at the moment," the new leader said. "But the party gorkom [city committee], raykom [rayon committee], and obkom [oblast committee] buildings would be useful. The party apparatchiks who work there who do not share our views can go and find other buildings." And after that, you can declare your secession from the CPSU and... change the name—in the party statutes, in the program guidelines, and at the conference itself it was stressed repeatedly that the reference to Communists in the party's name only shows where it originated.

The DPCR's founders also make no secret of their ultimate goals: support for the RSFSR president and his supporters in the Russian parliament, the winning of power in the forthcoming elections. In connection with Rutskoy's election as chairman of the party's provisional council, some of the conference participants called the new party the vice presidential party. That offended the DPCR leader. And rightly: It is not at all vice presidential, it is really a presidential party.

Rutskoy's report claims that the Russian Communist Party leadership, headed by I. Polozkov, is "instilling a confrontational attitude" and has "basically declared a policy of blatant, intransigent sabotage (?!) against the laws, the Supreme Soviet leadership, the government, and President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, who are creating and supporting a strategy of introducing market relations...."

I am not going to defend the RSFSR Communist Party leadership, especially since it has now been renewed and must prove through its actions how far this renewal of the "top" will help promote the renewal of the entire party. But Rutskoy himself leaves no doubt about his own intransigence, his reluctance to seek ways and means of formulating a mutually acceptable strategy and tactics. Nor can one fail to notice that the accusations against the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee leaders are promptly redirected to the entire Russian Communist Party: "Anyone who has been following the RSFSR Communist Party's recent activity will notice how drastically its intellectual level has degenerated. It has gone almost unaffected by the powerful torrent of fresh ideas in social sciences and humanitarian, philosophical, and economic science. It still regards science as the wayward daughter of theoretical

thinking, requiring constant supervision and correction from the practical apparatchik."

Nor did the speaker spare the CPSU as a whole: "The CPSU, after waging war on its own best theorists for decades, has gradually become intellectually infertile. It has become very mature (!), but old. Everyone knows that revolutionary transformations pursued by peaceful evolutionary methods require youth."

And although the speaker's own language was not notable for its stylistic precision, he ventured boldly into a sphere far removed from his main preparliamentary sphere of activity. "Party language, not enriched by the latest achievements of the humanitarian sciences, has gradually turned into a jargon incomprehensible to the ordinary person," Rutskoy stated. "The language of official Communist Party organs is as clumsy and crude as it was many years ago. It is the language of a machine accustomed to punishing, not to conducting dialogue."

True, many Communists do not like the pace of party renewal today. They would like the democratization processes within it to be speeded up. But instead of a serious analysis of what is happening in the CPSU, Rutskoy only repeated the tired old accusations: "It is high time to realize that ideology—having changed, in the hands of the apparatus, from the power of the spirit into the knout of power—is a spent force as a means of coercion for driving millions of people to realize an ideal in a historically short space of time—from Saturday to Monday.

"By exercising direct economic leadership for decades, the party turned ideology as a system of views on a philosophical and theoretical level into a pitiful collection of lumpen slogans and commandments. Science and culture diverged entirely from what had become a crude and illiterate shamanistic gobbledygook employed mainly by apparatchiks expounding, in their arcane party tongue, texts for speeches to be delivered in the slurred voices of their party bosses...."

Hence the conclusion: The basic—democratic—nucleus of Russia's Communists should dissociate itself from the antidemocratic, intellectually hidebound party clique.

How's that for vocabulary.... It seems to have gone unnoticed by the DPCR organizing committee that people are tired of ideas fit only for rallies, and that what they most want is for the reforms to be put into practice quickly. Where this is done without a fuss, things get moving more quickly and people do not degrade themselves with labels like "reformers" and "conservatives." Not for nothing did only one-third of Russia's oblasts respond to the organizing committee's call to attend the conference.

Characteristically, even before the decision to form a party had been adopted, the speaker was talking about the DPCR as a fait accompli: "We are first and foremost a party of the parliamentary type. We are not frightened, we are really inspired by the prospect of working directly with people, with the future voters. We will seek to convey our views to them, to show them our work, and to propose our own representatives for the organs of people's power."

It is easy to proclaim a program when you are going into battle, easy to talk about the activity of a party that does not exist yet. But does the aforesaid constitute a characterization of a positive program, views, a stance? What idea do the DPCR leaders profess, what will their social and economic policy be? All this is derived from opposites, through criticism of the CPSU and the Russian Communist Party.

"What are we repudiating?" Rutskoy poses the question point-blank. "In recent years the CPSU has repudiated many of its dogmas and the habits of totalitarian and historically irresponsible action. But the Russian Communist Party is reviving both dogmas and old habits. And the first thing we repudiate is the Russian Communist Party...." But, while repudiating the Russian Communist Party, the DPCR people are not linking their future with the CPSU.

The DPCR is breaking away from the CPSU at a time when a consolidation of party forces is taking shape. The party Central Committee July Plenum, which discussed the draft new CPSU Program, confirmed this. Communists succeeded with dignity in overcoming mutual hostility, distrust, and strife, and concentrated their efforts on the draft Program—maybe the reason why the criticism was so sharp and harsh was that the CPSU Central Committee Plenum participants accepted the document as their own. Presumably the new Program will be capable of reviving the party for people and for the cause. And, to be honest, the energy and drive of Rutskoy himself would not have gone amiss. But he himself crossed the line beyond which pluralism becomes division. And the tragedy of the situation is not only that a party (within the CPSU) has been proclaimed, and its leader expelled from the CPSU. The trouble is that the DPCR's supporters, spurred on by the "Communists for Democracy" organizing committee, will find themselves forced, like it or not, into opposition to the CPSU. Are the organizers aware of their moral responsibility to those who attended the conference, who put their faith in them, and whom they have already enlisted into the DPCR?

And one last detail. One of the conference participants, during the break, tried quite reasonably to steer the new party members back to an understanding of the original sense of the word "democracy." "Democratic power does not differ from authoritarian power by much," he said. "If the governor leads the governed, that is authoritarian power. But if feedback is established and the voice and will of the governed is heard and taken into account—then the signs of democracy appear. Among

the new Communists, as yet, alas...."—and you know, many people listened to these "seditious" thoughts without objecting.

But here is the striking thing: From the rostrum, they "anathematized" (unjustly!) the speeches of I. Antonovich, secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, and A. Maltsev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat. But during the break, Maltsev was surrounded by quite a large group—and they listened, and argued, and... agreed. Maybe the "grass roots" whose side the DPRK "top strata" take, have already decided everything.

Yeltsin Puts Companies Under Russian Jurisdiction

OW1508121191 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1055 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Wednesday the Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed orders on the transition of the Cherepovetsk steel works, the West Siberian steel works and the Urals engineering plant under Russian jurisdiction. He gave instructions to the government to decide with the Russian Central Bank the question of giving the Urals plant a long term credit of 127 million roubles.

Belorussia

Dementey Supports New Union Treaty

LD1508212191 Moscow TASS in English 2015 GMT 15 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Glod]

[Text] Minsk August 15 TASS—Vladimir Dementei, chairman of the Belorussian parliament, has called a new Union treaty an act of goodwill and accord.

He told TASS that the treaty lays a firm foundation for a democratic federative state, all members of which will have much more rights to their independent development.

He noted that "for the first time each republic has the right to choose forms of ownership, management techniques and ways to ensure social justice. This opens up promising prospects for the development of each republic and the Soviet Union as a whole".

This independence has already produced some results in the republic. Its parliament has adopted a number of laws, which provide a constitutional basis of statehood and aim at building a law-governed state.

"Calling for signing the treaty, we will not mechanically transfer ourselves under the centre's control. We rather strengthen our cooperation on a mutually advantageous basis," Dementei said.

Workers Prevent Strike Leader Going to Court

OW1508123791 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1055 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Thursday some 30 militiamen arrived on Orsha under a decision of the Mogilev regional court to take Nikolai Razumov to court. Razumov is charged with blocking the railway last April.

Workers from the Orsha machine-tool plant did not let the militia to the territory of the plant where Razumov and 30 other persons barricaded themselves inside the trade union committee room. The plant is actually paralyzed.

A spokesman for the Minsk strike committee Victor Rossoshnykh has told IF [INTERFAX] that the situation in Orsha is tense and the question of a railway blockade is debated to protest against the militia action. Delegates from other plants are heading to the machine-tool works.

On Wednesday the strike committee of Minsk issued an appeal to workers denouncing the trial on Nikolai Razumov by "the party mafia". "The strikes last April and May made the well-fed functionaries tremble, the message said, but they have recoverd from the first shock and are trying to crush the strikers one by one."

The Minsk strike committee urged labor staffs in Belorussia to hold actions in support of Razumov.

On Thursday Razumov sent a message to the presidents of the USSR and Russia, the UN and the chairman oft he Belorussian parliament attacking "political criminals representing the KGB-CPSU clique" who have "artificially driven the people to despair hoping to provoke a railway blockade, cause bloodshed and introduce a state of emergency in the USSR".

The message requests the UN to look into the requirements of the chairman of the Orsha strike committee on the formation of an international commission to investigate the causes of the railway blockade in April 1991.

Ukraine

Officials Discuss Departyization Decree

OW1608010891 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1850 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] All reasonable people in the Ukraine support the decree by the Russian president banning party activity in factories and institutions, the Mayor of Kharkov, Mr Yevgeni Kushnarev told IF [INTERFAX]. This step has been long overdue, especially for the law-enforcement bodies, he added.

However, at present it would be unrealistic to expect a similar step to be taken in the Ukraine since the current Supreme Soviet, according to Mr Kushnarev, is unprepared for such a decision which appears likely to be made only after presidential elections in the republic scheduled for December 1.

Mr Yevgeni Kushnarev is of the opinion that the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Mr Leonid Kravchuk, has the best chances of being elected head of the Ukraine's executive branch. "Once elected, he will evidently have to take into account the opinion of the majority of the republic's population and agree to departise state institutions of the Ukraine", the Mayor of Kharkov believes.

Mr. Kushnarev himself, formerly the secretary of Kharkov's Communist party committee, quit the party about a year ago.

Opposition Members Tried, Convicted

LD1508175691 Kiev Radio Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 14 Aug 91

[Text] A trial has ended in Kirovograd. In the dock were members of the Ukrainian Republican Party [URP] and Rukh [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroyka] who collected signatures in the city center for a petition to the local authorities. Among their demands was that the blue-yellow flag be flown at the monument to T. Shevchenko; that premises be provided for the URP,

Democratic Party of Ukraine, and Rukh; and that the oblast Communist Party committee return the paper, KIROVOGRADSKA PRAVDA, to the local governing bodies.

They were all detained by militiamen. Their case was brought to court. The defendants were charged with malicious disobedience to the militia and organization of mass actions.

The court sentenced Viktor Poltavets, one of the organizers of the collection of signatures, to two-months corrective labor with a 20-percent deduction of his earnings.

Government To Discuss Wage Rates

LD1508214291 Kiev Radio Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] In connection with the republic's transition to the market economy, and in accordance with the agreement between Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Government and the Federation Council of Independent Trade Unions of Ukraine for 1991, the Cabinet of Ministers has instructed ministries and departments of the republic, state corporations and concerns, and interindustry production combines and associations to create trilateral commissions in August 1991 for holding negotiations on concluding agreements on wage rates in various industries. Leaders of the Ukrainian SSR ministries and departments, state corporations and concerns, interindustry production combines and associations represent interests of owners of means of production at the negotiations. Interests of working people will be represented by central, republican and oblasts committees of trade unions of various industries, and in certain cases by oblast interindustry associations of trade unions or other bodies empowered by work collectives. State interests will be represented by representatives of the republican economic bodies.

It is foreseen that work on concluding the agreements on wage rates in various industries for 1992 will be completed by December 1991. The proposals by trilateral commissions in various industries will be taken into account during the elaboration of a general agreement on wage rates for 1992 between the Ukrainian SSR Cabinet of Ministers, representatives of the republican trade union associations, and owners.

Cabinet Bans Exports of More Goods

OW1408012691 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1420 GMT 13 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has made additions to the list of goods forbidden to take out of the republic. The additions include butter, sugar, all kinds of alcoholic beverages and tobacco.

Previously the list included some electric goods, building materials, and such foodstuffs as meat, tinned meat and milk products, flour, cereals, pasta, sunflower oil and cheese.

At the same time, the cabinet has lifted its former restrictions on the export of bread, margarine, eggs, sweets, tea and coffee, since the new rationing system introduced in the Ukraine on August 1 does not allow visitors to the republic to buy a quantity of any of these products to a sum exceeding one ruble.

The Cabinet has also decided to allow the export of foodstuffs and other goods in accordance with a special quota or on a license. The cost of each license is 150 rubles.

Whenever violations of the restrictions are discovered, the confiscated goods will be put on sale in local shops, to be sold at state prices.

Moldova

Romanians, Moldovans Favor Separate States

OW1408152691 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1030 GMT 14 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] 71 percent of Moldovans and 55 percent of Romanians agree that in future their two states should remain separate, but expand economic, cultural and humanitarian ties. This is one of the discoveries of a public opinion poll conducted jointly by the Romanian Public Opinion Institute and the Moldovan Institute for Sociological Studies.

The poll was dominated by questions about attitudes to neighbouring and other ethnic groups, incomes and needs.

The greatest difference was registered in answers to the question with what countries the two states should establish closer ties. 20 percent of Romanians pointed out to France, while in Moldova priority was given to the USSR—21 percent. Both Moldovans and Romanians said the living standards of their countries and their families were low and expected them to worsen even more during the next 12 months.

Snegur Meets Romanian Trade Unionists

OW1508035491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1900 GMT 14 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "We will not sign the Union Treaty but, being realists, we favour the maintenance and enhancing of relations between Moldova and the other republics," said Moldova's President Mircea Snegur at a meeting with a delegation of Romania's Confederation of Free Trade Unions on a visit to the republic at the invitation of Moldova's Federation of Independent Trade Unions. Snegur pointed at the RSFSR-Moldova intergovernmental agreement for 1992 that lays down the principles of trade and economic cooperation signed last week as a good example of good neighbourhood and understanding.

Georgia

Presidential Election Results Publicized

PM1508134791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Aug 91 p 1

[Letter from V. Khmaladze, deputy chairman of the Georgian Central Electoral Commission, under the general heading "What People Write to Us from Georgia"]

[Text] In view of the fact that your newspaper published an interview with Mr. G. Chanturiya, in which it was said that the presidential elections in the Georgian Republic were rigged, I am asking you to publish the official election results...

Total number of voters—3,594,810

Number of voters participating in the elections [v vyborakh]—2,978,247

Number of voters participating in the ballot [v golosovanii]—2,968,945

Number of votes received by each candidate for the Georgian Republic Presidency:

Z. Gamsakhurdia—2,565,362; I. Shengelia—26,886; D. Mikeladze—51,717; V. Advadze—240,243; T. Kvachantiradze—8,553; N. Natadze—36,266

[signed] V. Khmaladze, deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission.

Ossetian 'Bandits' Kidnap New Militia Chief

AU1508101191 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0700 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Announcement by the press center of the Republic of Georgia Ministry of Internal Affairs; place and date not given]

[Text] The wave of violence committed by armed bands has been continuing for a long time in Samachablo [South Ossetia]. They are, for the most part, attacking and robbing the Georgian population but, in (?certain) cases, Ossetian citizens are also not being spared. They are sowing the seeds of hatred and chaos in the region and are preventing a stabilization of the situation and reconciliation between the Georgian and Ossetian peoples.

[Name indistinct], the former head of the Tskhinvali internal affairs department, and the department's employees are supporting the wave of violence committed by these bands and other criminal elements by their complete inaction. To all intents and purposes, they have been doing nothing to arrest and disarm these criminal elements. Furthermore, criminals from the internal affairs department have stolen up to 100 [word indistinct] and [words indistinct] firearms that had been confiscated from various organizations that were later used against the Georgian militia.

In accordance with an order issued by the Republic of Georgia Ministry of Internal Affairs, [name indistinct], head of the Tskhinvali internal affairs department, has been released from his post. Valeriy Gazzayev, a resident of Tskhinvali who has completed his higher education, director of the 11th Ossetian secondary school, has been appointed head of the town's internal affairs department.

On 9 August, he was presented to the department's personnel by Tengis Epitashvili, Republic of Georgia deputy minister of internal affairs. However, the same evening, he was kidnapped from his home by armed bandits who led him away in an unknown direction.

The next day, 10 August, representatives of the town's self-proclaimed authorities gathered in Tskhinvali and again declared [name indistinct] as head of the town's militia department. The declaration of [name indistinct] as head of the militia department instead of Valeriy Gazzayev is unacceptable as it is an unlawful (?act). At the same time, this again shows that the (?leaders) of these wild bands and the self-proclaimed authorities are in close contact with each other.

Despite the fact that everyone knows that Valeriy Gazzayev is not a friend of the Georgian Government but a political opponent—he is one of the leaders of Adamon Nykhas [name of the South Ossetian People's Front]—even he has not been forgiven for speaking out against the criminal elements; he has been kidnapped and possibly physically abused. This fact again confirms a truth that is well known to everyone: Separatists and extremists are motivated not by the interests of the Ossetian people but by criminal aims and personal gain.

More on Militia Chief's Kidnapping

OW1508140791 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1055 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to the press center of the Georgian Interior Ministry, the newly appointed chief of the Tskhinvali militia Valery Gazzaev was kidnapped in the capital of South Ossetia on August 9. This happened after Gazzaev visited Tbilisi where he was introduced to the Georgian Interior Minister Tengiz Epitashvili.

The report of the press center claims that on the evening of August 9 Gazzaev's family was attacked and the man himself kidnapped by Ossetian extremists.

On August 10 the city council invalidated the decision of the Georgian authorities on the appointment of Gazzaev and put Kazbek Tedeev at the head of the militia.

The press center says the kidnapping must be connected with Gazzaev's recent statement that one of his first tasks as militia chief is to fight against criminal groups of Ossetians operating in the area.

Further Details on Kidnapping

LD1608122891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1150 GMT 16 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi, 16 Aug (TASS)—V. Gazzayev, the town chief of the militia in Tskhinvali, Georgia, has been kidnapped. As was reported today by the press service of the president of the republic, this occurred on 9 August, a few hours after he was appointed to the post by order of the Georgian minister of internal affairs.

According to official reports, he was seized by a large group of armed Ossetians and driven away in an unknown direction. Serious fears are expressed about the possibility that he has been physically abused.

The presidential press service presented V. Gazzayev as one of the leaders of the Ossetian nationalists, an active figure in the "Adamon Nykhas" movement, and a well known opponent of the political course of the Georgian Government. His appointment as chief of the militia, according to the authorities, is thanks to the readiness of the republic's government "to opt for any sensible compromises in order to curtail the robbery and violence being perpetrated by gangs of Ossetian guerrillas". The new chief of the town militia, the press service report says, had promised to wage a resolute fight against them.

Georgian, South Ossetian Delegates Meet in Odessa

OW1608011191 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1850 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A round table meeting in Odessa Thursday gathered representatives of opposing organizations, movements, political parties, ruling bodies and mass media of Georgia and South Ossetia trying to settle the bloody conflict.

The meeting was organized by the Odessa-based "Soglasiye" ("Concord") public organization which unites Georgians and Ossetians living in Odessa. They have spent three weeks in the Caucasus arranging for the round table meeting.

Further on Delegates' Talks in Odessa

LD1608103991 Moscow TASS in English 1030 GMT 16 aug 91

[Text] Moscow August 16 TASS—Warring parties to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict have gathered for a round-table meeting in the Black Sea port city of Odessa.

Representatives of various organisations and movements, political parties, authorities, mass media and scientific communities of Georgia and Ossetia will undertake an attempt to resolve the problem on the "neutral" territory.

Delegates Condemn Confrontation

LD1608142391 Moscow TASS in English 1411 GMT 16 Aug 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Yefim Shvartsman]

[Text] Odessa August 16 TASS—The feuding sides in the conflict between Georgians and Ossetians have spent two weeks at the "round table of accord" to discuss ways out of the protracted bloody fighting.

The meeting involving representatives of different political parties and movements, journalists and writers from Georgia and Ossetia was made possible by the efforts of the Georgian-Ossetian Public Council Soglasiye (Concord), recently set up in Odessa under the aegis of the Regional Peace Committee.

The Council members spent nearly three weeks in July in the Caucasus seeking to convince participants in the conflict that they needed a dialogue on neutral territory.

Representatives of the Georgian, South and North Ossetian communities signed two documents. The first one—a joint statement—resolutely condemns armed confrontation of the sides, their desire to seek the solution to inter-ethnic disputes and problems by force and stresses the priority of human rights.

The sides appealed to all Georgians and Ossetians, irrespective of the place of their residence, to set up joint councils of elders and mothers in localities where Georgians and Ossetians live together and concord councils of the Odessa kind in other localities.

They consider it necessary to create a conciliation commission attached to the USSR Supreme Soviet and including deputies from all sovereign republics, as well as to set up special governmental institutes to facilitate the return of refugees to their homes.

Aware of the role and responsibility of the mass media in shaping public opinion and conditions for settling the dispute, roundtable participants agreed to establish a united journalist movement consisting of press representatives from Georgia, South and North Ossetia. This decision was recorded in a separate document approved by participants in the meeting.

Republic, Turkish Foreign Ministers To Meet

OW1508204591 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1700 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A meeting between the Georgian and Turkish foreign ministers will be held on November 18, the press-service of Georgia's Foreign Ministry reports. An agreement has also been achieved that the republic's president, Mr. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, will meet President Turgut Ozal of Turkey.

Republic Nationalizes Soviet State Banks

LD1508194891 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1900 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] The Georgian Parliament has declared all subsidiaries in branches of Soviet state banks on the territory of the republic to be Georgian property. The National Bank of Georgia is being set up on the basis of the local branch of the USSR State Bank. The subsidiaries of other Soviet banks are transformed into Georgian government-owned and joint stock commercial banks.

President Issues Decree on Military Commissariats

OW1508224491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1700 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President Zviad Gamsakhurdia of Georgia has issued a decree on military commissariats, subordinated to the Soviet Defense Ministry, which function in the republic's territory.

The decree says that the military commissariats, according to the legislation presently in force, stay outside Georgia's jurisdiction. Given that situation, the Georgian Government has been ordered to consider within a month halting allocations of technological and financial resources to them.

State Control Office for Taxation Set Up

LD1608043491 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0130 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] At the decision of the Government of Georgia, the Department of State Control [department gosudarstvennogo kontrolya] has been set up in the republic. It will assume the functions of the Committee of People's Control, which was earlier abolished in the republic. In particular, it is to perfect the control and auditing [kontrolno-revizionnyy] and taxation systems.

At the same time the government has set aside a certain percentage of the sums concealed from taxation—the auditors of the Ministry of Finance and the taxation inspectorate who brought to light the bookkeeping violations will receive it as a bonus.

Abkhazia Rejects Formation of Georgian Militia

OW1408182391 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1600 GMT 14 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Abkhazia's Supreme Soviet Presidium ruled to declare Georgia's law "On the Formation of Interior Troops, the Republic of Georgia's National Guard" null and void on Abkhazia's territory. The ruling by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in Sukhumi says that the Georgian law is in contravention of the USSR president's decree banning the creation of armed formation not provided for in Union law.

Abkhazia's Parliament demanded that the republican structures—the Council of Ministers, the Interior Ministry, the KGB, the Procurator's Office and the Military Commissariat—take every effort to enforce the Soviet president's decree.

Armenia

Yerevan Reports Nagorno-Karabakh Hostage Situation

NC1508123691 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network in Armenian 1730 GMT 14 Aug 91

["Self-Defense Forces Are Launching Counter-Strikes"—radio headline]

[Text] In the morning of 14 August, armored personnel carriers opened fire on a Zhiguli automobile travelling between Aterk and Zaglik villages in Mardakertskiy Rayon of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. One man died and another was injured. The Armenian self-defense detachments which arrived at the scene counterattacked the servicemen and seized eight armored personnel carriers, 31 automatic weapons, one sniper rifle and more than 3,000 bullets. There are officers and (?ensigns) among the 34 servicemen who were taken prisoner during the operation. They are being held in Aterk village. The self-defense forces want to exchange them for the Armenians being held in Shusha prison.

It is reported from Mardakertskiy Rayon that none of the servicemen has been harmed and force is not being used against them.

After the incident the Aterk and (?Brunkum) villages in the region were encircled by the troops, who are demanding the return of the prisoners.

The military commandant's office and the rayon and oblast leadership are conducting negotiations with the self-defense detachments on the exchange of hostages.

Vazgen Sargsyan, chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense and Internal Affairs, has left Yerevan for Aterk.

[Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian at 1215 GMT on 14 August quotes RESPUBLIKA ARMENII as reporting that "the people in Stepanakert are talking about the Armenian partisan detachment's attack on Khandzadzor Armenian village in Gadrutskiy Rayon, which was previously occupied by the Azerbaijanis. The members of the Azerbaijani Special Purpose Militia Detachment, OMON, have been thrown out of the village. The OMON left behind an armored car."

ARMENPRES adds that the head of the administrative department of NKAO oblast party committee, Valeriy

Grigoryan, who was assassinated on 10 August, was buried yesterday in Stepanakert.]

Eight More Interior Troops Kidnapped

OW1508151291 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1415 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] As an "IF" [INTERFAX] correspondent was informed in the Soviet Interior Ministry's Centre of Public Relations another 8 military men have been taken hostage by Armenian terrorists in Mardakertskiy areas in Nagorno-Karabakh.

32 military men of the Soviet Interior Ministry were taken hostage in the same area earlier on August 13. This action was followed by the detention of an armed Armenian terrorist by the military men in the village of Aterk in the same area. The military men would be released on condition that not only the detained terrorist but also 4 men imprisoned in the town of Shusha are released.

According to the Armenian press-agency "SNARK", the list of the Armenian "hostages" who are supposed to be exchanged for the detained military men has been handed in by the Armenian side to the Commandant's Headquarters of the Nagorno-Karabakh's area where the state of emergency was imposed. Referring to non-official sources "SNARK" also reports that for the previous day the Soviet Interior Minister Boris Pugo and the KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov have phoned to the Armenian leadership for several times demanding to hand over the hostages otherwise menacing with "punitive measures".

Military Reportedy Issues Ultimatum

OW1508175091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1700 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The situation in the Armenian village of Aterk (Mardakert district of Nagorno-Karabakh) has been aggravating after several more servicemen of the Soviet Interior Ministry troops were taken hostage on August 14 and 15. It brings the total of Soviet servicemen taken hostage closer to 50, unofficial Armenian reports say.

NORUTYUN SERVICE, an Armenian news agency reports that the military have demanded that all hostages be released by 24:00 [2000 GMT] on Thursday, promising to level Aterk to the ground in case their demand was not satisfied.

Local residents, in their turn, are demanding the release of their fellow-villagers and other Armenians held in captivity in Azerbaijan who had been taken hostage earlier.

An IF [INTERFAX] correspondent has been told in the press centre of the Armenian Interior Ministry that 34 servicemen were captured by women from village Aterk of Mardakert district. The women said they would blow up themselves and the soldiers taken hostage if their demands that Armenian hostages be freed are not met.

The villagers have been conducting talks with the military, but so far they have proved fruitless. Armenia's interior ministry said that the chairman of the defense and internal affais commission of the Armenian Parliament left for Aterk.

Internal Troops Prepared To 'Storm' Village

LD1508175791 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 15 Aug 91

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The situation in Mardakert Rayon, NKAO [Nagorno- Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], is worsening to the extreme. According to reports from various agencies the number of captured internal troops has reached 41. According to TASS, they have been seized by Armenian fighters who are demanding the release of all Armenians detained over three months. This information is rejected by a STUDIFORM correspondent who claims that the prisoners are merely a preventive measure by Aterk's self-defense detachment in order to stop the deportation of Armenians.

The only thing on which the information agencies agree is that internal troops are preparing to storm the village and this will lead to bloodshed.

In confirmation of this there is a telegram handed over to the Lur information center addressed to Gorbachev and Yeltsin from the Committee of Soldier's Mothers in the village of Aterk. If the troops use force a group of women will blow themselves up together with the hostages.

Hostage Release Talks To Continue

LD1508185891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1716 GMT 15 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Stepanakert, 15 Aug (TASS)—In the village of Artek, Mardakertskiy Rayon, NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] near which an armed formation of Armenians took 41 servicemen of the internal forces of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] hostage, talks continued today about their release. The TASS correspondent was informed by the commandant's office of the state of emergency region in the NKAO and the neighboring rayons of the Republic of Azerbaijan that the talks have produced no concrete results and that they have been carried over to tomorrow morning. The leadership of the USSR MVD internal forces and the commandant's office are undertaking every measure to ensure a peaceful settlement to the problem that has arisen and to prevent it from developing into something more serious.

Armenians Reportedly Free Four Hostages

OW1508192991 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1850 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Four members of the Soviet Interior Ministry troops captured two days ago along with 28 fellow-servicemen by the self-defense forces of Aterk village in Mardakert district of Nagorno-Karabakh were freed on Thursday following negotiations between the two sides, NORUYUN SERVICE, an Armenian news agency reports.

Those released are supposed to describe conditions in which the other hostages continue to be held in Aterk.

Friday morning the talks on hostages will resume. According to NORUTYUN SERVICE, in the end the hostages will reportedly be freed since representatives of the Interior Ministry troops have indicated their willingness to make some concessions.

The public relations centre of the Soviet Foreign Ministry has told IF [INTERFAX] it has not yet received any reports of the four hostages' release.

Hostages Captured by Women

LD1508221891 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2045 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] Another no less topical report on the situation in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], has come from Yerevan. Here is Karyun Khumaryan.

[Khumaryan] A significant, and I would even say, a poignant detail concerning the report, carried by the country's media yesterday, on 34 servicemen being taken hostage near the villages of Zaglik and Aterk in Mardakertskiy Rayon of the NKAO, was specified today at the press center of the Armenian Interior Ministry. It turns out that all eight armored personnel carriers, 31 submachine guns, a sniper rifle, and 34 Crimson Beret servicemen were captured by none other than the women of the village. And it is the women who demand the freeing of the Armenians who are being held in the Shusha prison and other places of confinement in Azerbaijan, as the sole condition of the release of the hostages.

According to the Armenian Interior Ministry, they have no new information concerning the talks between the residents of Zaglik and the military authorities, because no communications with Mardakertskiy rayon are currently operating. It is known that Vazgen Sarkisyan, Chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet commission on defense and internal affairs flew there.

Three Hostages Released in Nagorno-Karabakh

LD1608090491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0822 GMT 16 Aug 91

[Text] Stepanakert, 16 Aug (TASS)—Three servicemen of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] internal troops were released this morning from the number of those seized by an Armenian armed group near the village of Aterk in Mardakertskiy Rayon in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast].

On Thursday, under the mediation of Vazgen Sarkisyan, chairman of the defense council of the Republic of Armenia, talks were held here with the leaders of armed groups who are demanding the release of Armenians detained earlier. Taking part in the talks were Major-General Valeriy Starikov, deputy chief of staff of the USSR MVD internal troops, and Colonel Valentin Zhukov, commandant of the area under the state of emergency. At times passions were heated to the point of reducing the talks to the language of ultimatums and harsh statements on both sides. The release of three servicemen, however, has shown that the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problem has produced some results.

The Armenian side has reaffirmed that no violence against the seized soldiers will be permitted. The talks on freeing the remaining servicemen of the USSR MVD internal troops are to be continued today.

Further Report on Hostage Seizure

OW1608113491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1030 GMT 16 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The latest reports confirm that 43 servicemen of the Soviet Interior Ministry troops have been taken hostage in Mardakert district of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Negotiations on hostages continue. However, no agreement on this issue was reached on Thursday.

The military have become only the latest target of the hostage-takers. Abductions continue to be an every-day reality in the conflict area. In the afternoon of August 15 a truck on the way to Stepanakert was stopped by a group of seven people in militia uniforms, armed with automatic rifles, outside the village of Krasny in Askeran district of Nagorno-Karabakh. The driver and one of the passengers were taken away.

The same day, in the Gadrut district, the village of Agajakent, having been left by the Soviet Interior Ministry troops, was set ablaze by the remaining 10 members of the Azerbaijani OMON. [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] Only 4 houses out of 80 were left intact.

In Azerbaijan, about 50 people blocked the railway station of Agband in the Zangelan district, protesting against the deportation of Azerbaijanis from Nyuvadi, a village in the territory.

State of Emergency To Be Abolished 16 Aug

OW1508145091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1415 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Armenian Supreme Soviet issued a decree abolishing state of emergency in all the territory of Armenia since August 16 at 00:00. The information agency "SNARK" reports that the Parliament adopted such a decision because the situation in Armenia has become stable and "to provide normal conditions for the citizens to express their will in the course of the referendum scheduled for September 21 and the elections of the president of the republic."

More on State of Emergency Lifting

NC1608082691 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network in Armenian 1730 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Excerpts] The Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium met today, 15 August, under Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Ter-Petrosyan noted that just a year ago, shortly after the Parliament had been formed, the republic's administrative system and law enforcement organs were not functioning properly as a result of the prevailing instability. The Supreme Soviet was thus forced to declare a state of emergency and introduce a curfew to bring the situation under control.

Ter-Petrosyan then made the following proposal: That, in view of the relative stabilization of the overall situation in the republic, the positive trends in the work of the law enforcement organs to strengthen law and order, and the need to create conditions conducive to the free expression of democracy and individual opinion during the 21 September referendum and the republican presidential election, the state of emergency and the curfew be lifted throughout the republic.

He presented a draft resolution on this issue for the Presidium's examination.

The Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium decided to lift the state of emergency and curfew introduced by the Armenian Supreme Soviet decision of 29 August 1990 throughout the republic as of 16 August. [passage omitted]

Following a heated debate, the Presidium also decided to draw the Armenian Council of Ministers' attention to the shortcomings existing in the work of the State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting and to ask it to take measures to eliminate them.

At its evening session, the Presidium discussed a proposal from the Presidium's Amnesty Commission on an amnesty decree.

The Presidium also acceded to Khrachik Khachaturovich Bagdasaryan's request to be relieved of his post as deputy procurator general of the Armenian Republic in connection with his retirement.

Republic Premier on Presidential Program

LD1508220191 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] The nomination of candidates for Armenia's presidency is continuing.

[Unidentified correspondent] This press conference, given by Armenian Prime Minister Vazgen Manukyan, was not completely ordinary since it took place on the eve of his nomination as Armenian president. [video shows press conference] In an interview for Russian "Vesti" the premier was brief and laconic in the spirit of his program.

[Manukyan] We want to sign economic and political treaties with all the republics.

[Correspondent] As regards Russia specifically, what will be the main points in this treaty?

[Manukyan] In these links we are trying to preserve at least what we had. I hope that in the future these links will deepen.

[Correspondent] There is an opinion that says that you will be nominated for the post of Armenian president.

[Manukyan] There is such an opinion.

Two Badly Wounded By Grenade in Stepanakert

LD1508215891 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2045 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] A report has just arrived from Stepanakert that a grenade was thrown through the side window of a car belonging to the republican organizational committee [as heard]. This happened in the city center. The grenade exploded inside the car; the driver and a passenger were badly wounded and are now in the hospital.

Republic Defense Committee Appeals for Donations

NC1508091491 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network in Armenian 1730 GMT 14 Aug 91

["For the Defense Committee Fund"—radio headline]

[Text] The Defense Committee of the Armenian Council of Ministers is acting to reinforce our borders and strengthen defenses near the border zones. The farmers' peaceful work is being disrupted all along the border with Azerbaijan. There are continuous attacks on the farms, and armed robberies and theft of livestock are common.

Our Defense Committee must be given financial aid to reinforce the borders. The bank account is: Operations Department at the Armenian Republican Bank, account No. 141809.

Two-Week Deadline Set for Weapons Registration

PM1508105591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Aug 91 p 1

[V. Aloyan report under general heading "Weapons Are Better Kept Only in Museums"]

[Text] The Armenian Council of Ministers Defense Committee has called on anyone holding combat weapons and willing, if need be, to participate in the defense of the Armenian population, to register. The deadline is two weeks. After that, all weapons held illegally will be confiscated by Internal Affairs Ministry organs and their owners will face all the ensuing consequences.

Republic Communist Party Officially Registered

NC1508080091 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network in Armenian 1000 GMT 13 Aug 91

[Text] The Armenian Communist Party registered itself today at the republic's Justice Ministry. It became the 11th legalized party. After receiving the registration document, Aram Sargsyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, expressed his thanks for the party's registration and promised that the party, led by him, will conduct an independent policy advantageous to the nation.

Kurdish Writers Urge 'Yes' Vote in Referendum

NC1508120791 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 14 Aug 91

[Text] Yerevan, 14 Aug (ARMENPRES)—The Kurdish Writers Branch at the Writers Union of Armenia issued a call to the Kurdish population on the forthcoming referendum to be held in the Armenian Republic.

It appealed to the Kurds to take part in the referendum in unison to defend the Armenian people's struggle for existence, moved by the awareness that in doing so the interests of the Armenian people will be protected and everything done for the Kurdish people's development and growth in Armenia will be appreciated. It appealed to the Kurds to vote yes and to consider such votes as oaths to further act as participants in and defenders and soldiers of the statehood and independence process.

Cuts in Republic Energy, Grain Resources Viewed

NC1608093291 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] Yerevan, 15 Aug (ARMENPRES)—At a meeting on 13 August under Vazgen Manukyan, chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Armenian Council of Ministers Presidium was briefed on the meeting of the USSR Council of Ministers which had discussed the preparations for signing the economic agreements for 1992.

The Presidium noted that the center no longer hides the unsatisfactory situation in the procurement of energy resources, particularly coal production and procurement. To this we must now add the failures in the state purchases of grain products.

It is once again being observed that the larger republics are maintaining and consolidating the policy of economic pressure.

Moscow Stock Exchange Delegation Visit Reported

NC1608102591 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network in Armenian 0600 GMT 16 Aug 91

[From the review of HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN]

[Text] Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, yesterday received a delegation consisting of representatives of the Moscow Stock Exchange and the Interregional Union of Stock Exchanges as well as leaders of USSR enterprises. The delegation is in Armenia at the invitation of the Yerevan Stock Exchange.

A statement issued after the meeting noted that Konstantin (?Zagulin), president of the Interreginal Union of Stock Exchanges, introduced the members of the delegation to Ter-Petrosyan and said: Despite the fact that the organizations represented by the delegation do not come within the state structures, they nevertheless intend to create a favorable stock exchange [word indistinct] between Russian and Armenian trade organizations.

In reply, Ter-Petrosyan confirmed the favorable political climate existing between Armenia and Russia, which he said is confirmed by the fact that the final version of the interstate treaty between the Armenian Republic and the Russian Federation has already been prepared and will probably be signed sometime in the next month.

The paper notes that Vazgen Manukyan, chairman of the Armenian Council of Ministers, also received the delegation. A protocol on establishing stock exchange relations was signed during the meeting.

Temporary TV Relay Station Set Up in Rayon

NC1608094991 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] Goris [dateline as received]—Television broadcasts have resumed in Gorisskiy Rayon following a two-and-one-half month interruption caused by the destruction of the relay station by the Azerbaijani Special Purpose Militia Detachment. Until the work now under way to build a new relay station is completed, a temporary station has been set up to allow the rayon to receive the first programs of the republican and union televisions.

TV Association Sets Up Link With Diaspora

NC1608114091 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 14 Aug 91

[Text] Yerevan, 14 Aug (ARMENPRES)—An "External Diaspora" Television Creative Association has been created to bring news from Armenia's political, social and cultural life to diaspora Armenians and to acquaint Armenian viewers with daily life in the diaspora.

Commenting on the association's plans, Margarit Takhtadzhyan, chief editor of the "External Diaspora" program, said: There is an enormous demand for good-quality information on these subjects. Special attention will be given to the "Diaspora Today" program. Work in this direction will be coordinated with the Committee for Cultural Ties With Diaspora Armenians. We have already been broadcasting the "Armenian Republic" program since 1 May, and it is being watched in Bulgaria, Lebanon, and Sweden.

Channel 18 in Los Angeles now carries two Armenian programs, and we will soon sign an agreement with it on adding the "External Diaspora" program.

I ask all our diaspora compatriots who can produce videotapes, preferably of professional quality, about diaspora cultural and social life to send them to our Creative Association's "Diaspora Today" program. This will help us to bring news from the diaspora to our viewers. Our address is Yerevan-25, Mravyan-5, Radiohouse, "External Diaspora" Creative Association.

Azerbaijan

Party Official Comments on Talks With Armenia

NC1608104491 Yerevan Radio Yerevan Network in Armenian 0600 GMT 16 Aug 91

[From the review of HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN]

[Text] Reporter Laura Bagdasaryan has had a telephone conversation with Arif Yunusov, spokesman for the press center of the Azerbaijani Social Democratic Party [SDP], which the paper publishes under the headline "We Are Democrats, but Not in Interethnic Relations."

Asked to comment on the fact that tension has not subsided in Shaumyanovskiy Rayon even after 16 July Armenian Supreme Soviet declaration emphasizing the need to resolve the problem through political means, Yunusov said: One can only welcome this declaration. No one wants war. I think some movement here is already being felt. Although the first round of talks between the Nagorno-Karabakh delegation led by Ter-Petrosyan [as heard] and Azerbaijan's President Mutalibov produced no tangible results, efforts are now being made to hold a second round. I regard the very fact that the first meeting was held as a sign of progress.

People's Front To Boycott Presidential Elections

OW1508150491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1415 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] As "INTERFAX" found out, an initiative group for boycotting the presidential elections in the republic has been set up on the initiative of the Baku Department of the Azerbaijan People's Front [APF]. The group is composed of representatives from 6 of 11 districts of the capital.

There is no information yet on how the APF's central bodies reacted to the initiative of the APF's Nasiminskiy District Department.

There was a picket demanding to release Azerbaijan People's Front members from custody in front of the building of the Regional Communist Party Committee in Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan) on Wednesday. They took part in the meeting against the presidential election in the autonomy on August 5 and they were arrested on August 13.

The picketers' demands are implemented.

More on People's Front Boycott

NC1508121691 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 14 Aug 91

[Text] Yerevan, 14 Aug (ARMENPRES) Baku—The presidential elections will be held in Azerbaijan next month. A rally took place in the capital of Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic in which thousands of people took part. The rally participants called for boycotting the election campaign. An organizational committee was set up to disrupt the 8 September elections.

The Azerbaijani Popular Front, other social and political organizations, and the representatives of the movements outside the CPSU consider the upcoming presidential elections undemocratic. In their opinion, the elections will be held under conditions of a state of emergency. They believe the propaganda machine is working only in favor of Ayaz Mutalibov, the present president of Azerbaijan and first secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee.

Mutalibov Cited on Upcoming Visit to Iran

LD1508182591 Moscow TASS in English 1809 GMT 15 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Khalic Imanov]

[Text] Baku August 15 TASS—Meetings in Iran will promote further development of goodneighbouring relations between Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayaz Mutalibov, Azerbaijan's president, told TASS on the eve of his official visit to Iran. He leaves for

Tehran tomorrow at the invitation of the Iranian President 'Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

Widening of cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran will be discussed during the visit, the Azerbaijanian president said. There are plans to sign a joint communique which will reflect mutual interest of the sides in the political and economic areas.

"Other documents may be signed as a result of the visit", said Vafa Gulizade, the Azerbaijanian president's adviser for international affairs.

The Azerbaijanian president will visit Tehran, Tabriz, Ardebil and other Iranian cities.

Turkish Consulate General Opens in Baku

LD1608042691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0030 GMT 16 Aug 91

[Summary] The consulate general of Turkey has opened in Baku. At its first ceremony, Mr. (Altan Karamanoglu), Turkey's consul general in Baku, presented an Azerbaijani artist with a personal gift from Turkish President Turgut Ozal.

Baku on Killing of NKAO's Valeriy Grigoryan

NC1508080991 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 12 Aug 91

[Text] The central television network was informed on 11 August that Valeriy Grigoryan, former chairman of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] Pary Committee in Stepanakert, was shot and killed by unidentified persons on 10 August. An AZERINFORM correspondent has asked the Azerbaijan Committee for State Security to confirm this information. The committee disclosed that the matter (?is being investigated).

But what has drawn attention is this: Grigoryan recently became one of the most active supporters of the effort to find a political settlement to the NKAO problem. In fact, he was among the members of the NKAO delegation recently received by President Ayaz Mutalibov.

The criminals have not yet been captured. Measures are being put into effect to have them arrested.

'Political Reasons' Cited in Case

PM1508152991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 91 First Edition p 6

["Own Information" report under the "Ticker Tape" rubric: "Terrorist Acts"]

[Excerpt] A tense atmosphere reigns in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. Certain forces are trying to sabotage the activity of the Azerbaijan Republic Committee for Stabilizing the Situation in the Autonomous Oblast.

Many people here were stunned by the murder of Valeriy Grigoryan, former chief of department in the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast Party Committee. As already reported in the press, he was shot point-blank (14 bullets were fired) in broad daylight on one of Stepanakert's main streets, just 500 meters from the military commandant's office.

According to some stories, this killing was done for political reasons. V. Grigoryan participated in a meeting with Azerbaijan Republic President A. Mutalibov and frequently attended conferences held by the Republic Committee on the NKAO.

Unfortunately, this is by no means the only terrorist act against people seeking peaceful ways of settling the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Recently, two close relatives of Leonard Petrosyan, who advocates conciliatory action in the Armenian community of Karabakh, disappeared without trace. [passage omitted]

Militia Vehicle Hits Mine; One Reported Killed

LD1508135891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1310 GMT 15 Aug 91

["Clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh"—by TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Stepanakert, 15 Aug (TASS)—Actions reminiscent of a partisan war have been taking place in the last few days in Gadrutskiy Rayon. Former Armenian villages from which the local populace was transported in May of this year, and which today are being populated by Azerbaijanis, became in the first half of August subjects of attacks by armed formations. On Wednesday [14 August] near the village of Shagakh in Gadrutskiy Rayon a vehicle with six Azerbaijani militiamen in it was blown up by a mine. According to a report from the commandant's office of the rayon, one of them died and two were wounded. The militiaman who died is the fifth Azerbaijani who has died since the beginning of August near the villages that were abandoned by Armenians.

Amoco To Help Develop Republic Oil Deposit

LD1508094791 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] The Government of Azerbaijan has decided to use foreign investment to develop an oil deposit recently found in the vicinity of the republic's shores on the Caspian Sea. For this an international contest was held. After a thorough study of the submitted projects, a commission of experts gave its preference to the U.S. company Amoco. It will help set up a joint venture for the development of the sea deposit.

More on Fire Damage at Military Camp in Republic

NC1508080391 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 14 Aug 91

[Text] Yerevan, 14 Aug (ARMENPRES) Baku—A fire broke out on 10 August at a camp of the Defense Ministry's military unit stationed in Azerbaijan. The ammunition depot blew up and nearly 40 buildings in the military settlement caught fire and were destroyed. The force of the explosion damaged 220 houses in nearby Sadakhly village in Akstafa Rayon. According to preliminary reports, nearly 10 servicemen were injured, two of which were taken to a hospital. The military procurator is investigating the incident.

Kazakhstan

Festivities To Mark Closure of Semipalatinsk

LD1208213991 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1400 GMT 12 Aug 91

[Text] A peace march has begun in Kazakhstan. The resolutions of meetings and the placards of people setting out for Semipalatinsk, a Novosti Agency correspondent reports, express support for the nation-wide actions for the elimination of the nuclear testing ground and mark a date—29 August this year—as the last day of its existence—the testing ground, that is. On 25 August at Semipalatinsk there will be a general gathering of the participants in the peace march. Among those invited to it are U.S. President George Bush, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, and also foreign correspondents. On 30 August, ceremonial Friday Prayers will be held, during which Muslim dignitaries will celebrate the closure of the nuclear testing ground by the people.

Kyrgyzstan

President Akayev Comments on Harvard Program

PM1608110791 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 30, 28 Jul 91 p 10

[Comment by Republic of Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akayev; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "On the Agreement of Possibilities"]

[Text] After publication of the special MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI supplement carrying the full text of the "Window of Opportunity" program produced by Soviet and U.S. specialists, the editors asked leaders of the republics to give their assessment of the published program. One of the first to respond to MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI's proposal was Republic of Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akayev.

[Akayev] The program contains well-known principles of transition to the market economy and takes stock of the current crisis in the country and the existing contradictions. On the basis of analysis of the situation the program draws the conclusion that economic and political transformations are obligatory, and must be supported by the West, and proposes clear and systematic steps for carrying out the stages of economic reform.

However, there are some grounds for believing that this program has not a "USSR-West" but a "Center-West" character.

The authors of the program suggest that with the signing of an agreement on economic union contradictions between the republics would be eliminated and their interests would automatically coincide. It is implied that economic reform would be implemented simultaneously and throughout USSR territory. However, it is obvious that the republics' starting conditions and levels of preparedness (economic, ideological, political, cultural, and so forth) for the implementation of individual stages of market transformations differ. It was a mistake in the past "to go simultaneously and all together toward socialism."

In the same way it would be a mistake now to go simultaneously toward the market economy, artificially and without creating in the economic and political spheres of individual regions the objective conditions for transition to the next stage of transformations.

It can already be stated that some stages of reform in the republics will not take place simultaneously. However, if steps were taken in synchronicity, and Western aid were strictly dependent on fulfillment of a reform program, it would lead to a situation in which some regions would become hostages of others, and be unable to fulfill demands made of them.

The consequences of the stages of reforms being implemented in the various regions would differ. Suffice it to imagine how the freezing of social programs would affect the political and economic situation in the Central Asian region. A mechanism for removing the indicated contradictions is not touched on at all in the work.

While I approve of the provisions of this program in principle, it is obviously necessary during its finalization to allow for differentiation of the mechanism for transition to market relations at each stage for the main regions of the country.

Conflict Over Housing, Land Averted in Bishkek

PM1608102091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Aug 91 Second Edition p 2

["News for This Issue" article by Yu. Razgulyayev: "Conflict Can Be Averted"]

[Text] Bishkek—A report in one of the local newspapers to the effect that cases of unsanctioned seizure of lands for individual construction have been observed on the outskirts of Bishkek caused the republic capital's inhabitants much alarm. People here clearly remember how acutely interethnic relations deteriorated a couple of years ago when a group of students and young workers tried to resolve their housing problems this lawless way.

The republic leadership had to exert great efforts to settle the conflicts then, and emergency measures had to be taken to put right the social distortions that had been building up over the years. And the main thing is that these served as a good lesson, namely that it is better to resolve big problems earlier rather than having to dismantle the obstructions created by the consequences. That was how the government's initiative to grant real assistance to young families who decided to build their own houses was assessed at that time.

And now fresh attempts to seize land? It turned out that the newspapers were simply too hasty. In accordance with the spirit of the times, young people who do not

have any accommodation got together to form the "Bishkek" association, having quite rightly decided that it is easier to overcome any problem together. They held several noisy and heated meetings. This is what confused the journalists.

And then the new city soviet leadership found a simpler solution and hastily organized a meeting with the new youth association. Their plans were explained and brought in line with the realities of life. The question of allocating new plots for construction was quickly resolved with the assistance of the Cabinet of Ministers. But this time in strict accordance with the law and general plan of the city. Complete mutual understanding and accord were reached. The journalists had to apologize to readers for their haste.

Tajikistan

Landslide Has Negative Effect on Agriculture

LD1508204391 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Network in Russian 1530 GMT 15 Aug 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Here is a report about another natural disaster: A powerful landslide from a mountain in southern Tajikistan has inflicted great damage on the republic's economy.

[Correspondent M. Nikulin] It occurred at midnight. The inhabitants of the village of Pakhtakor, who were not yet asleep, heard an alarming rumble from the mountains and left their houses. This prevented any human casualties. In a matter of minutes the landslide of mud and rocks covered the village. According to preliminary estimates by specialists, as a result of erosion by underground waters afforested terrain in the foothills of Mount Khodzha-maston was set in motion. The mudflow of enormous volume and pressure thus formed and submerged 25 houses where over 200 people lived. Dwellings, farm buildings, household property, livestock and motor vehicles remain under a thick layer of mud.

This natural disaster has done enormous damage to local agricultural production. Cotton on 50 hectares and other crops on an area of about 20 hectares have been totally destroyed. An irrigation canal has been put out of action and as a result 7,000 hectares of fruit plantations in Kuybyshevskiy and Ilyichevskiy Rayons are now without water.

The persons affected have been given prompt assistance in the form of tents, medical supplies, food, and prime necessity goods. Today the scene of the disaster was visited by Makhkamov, president of Tajikistan. [video shows aerial pictures of aftermath of landslide with submerged buildings, and Makhkamov visiting scene]

Turkmenistan

Joint Enterprise Accords Signed With PRC

LD1508193091 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1400 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Text] The visit by a delegation from the People's Republic of China to the capital of Turkmenistan ended with the signing of a package of agreements on establishing joint enterprises. The multifaceted ties between the twin cities of Ashkhabad and Lanzhou, in Gansu Province, have been enriched by yet another important aspect—economic cooperation. Agreements were signed to set up joint enterprises to produce washing machines, thermos flasks, enamelled crockery, sports footwear and household detergents.

Uzbekistan

News Conference Following Tashkent Summit Noted

OW1508141591 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1055 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] There has been a news conference following the Tashkent meeting of the five presidents of Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. At the news conference Nursultan Nazarbayev criticised the decree of Mikhail Gorbachev on the Foundation for USSR State Property. According to Nazarbayev, the decree cannot be carried out in his republic because all its companies have been declared the property of Kazakhstan and privatization is in full swing. He was surprised by the appearance of the decree just before the signing of the Union Treaty.

At the news conference all the five presidents were asked about their attitude to Boris Yeltsin's decree on the closure of party cells at offices and in industry. Saparmurat Niyazov said that it is Russia's affair and Turkmenistan is not going to interfere in it. The President of Tajikistan Kakhar Makhkamov shared the viewpoint. According to Askar Akayev, the process of removing party cells is under way in Kyrgyzstan without any decree. The Interior and Justice Ministries are now politically neutral. The Uzbek president Islam Karimov said that his personal attitude to the decree is negative. Nazarbayev said that everything promoting the economic reform should be supported.

The presidents confirmed their positive attitude to the Union treaty and favored the formation of a common Union market as well as a regional one.

Leaders To Increase Economic Ties

PM1508195391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Aug 91 First Edition pp 1-2

[A. Kaipbergenov report: "Meeting Over"]

[Text] Tashkent—The meeting of the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan and the prime minister of Azerbaijan has ended in Tashkent. The republic leaders discussed specific problems linked with the fulfillment of the decisions of the previous meeting in Alma-Ata, with the Union treaty, and with tasks to stabilize the sociopolitical situation in the region.

The communique they adopted notes that the meeting, held on the eve of the signing of the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States, is in keeping with the spirit of the treaty and is not at variance with other republics' interests. The participants in the meeting—representatives of two-thirds of the republics which played a real part in preparing the new Union treaty—noted with concern that the deterioration in the country's situation, the exacerbation of crisis phenomena in practically all spheres of the national economy, increasing inflation, price increases, and the resultant continuing decline in living standards are exerting a negative influence on the social and interethnic situation. The situation in the region is aggravated by the exacerbation of the ecological situation. The peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan cannot be satisfied with the half-measures being taken in the country to avert the Aral Sea tragedy. Serious concern was expressed in connection with the rise in the level of the Caspian Sea.

The leaders of the Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan were compelled to state that, given the present unconstructive approach of individual republics to the formation of a unionwide stabilization fund, the region might resort to protective actions—raising prices for raw material resources—which ultimately would inevitably cause a chain reaction of galloping price rises throughout the country. An alarming situation is developing in terms of providing the population with supplies.

In order to preserve a unified economic space and equal cooperation aimed at the development of market relations, it is deemed expedient to form an interrepublic consultative council to elaborate unified approaches to the solution of common economic problems, including pricing problems and the coordinated protection of the interests of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan within the framework of the renewed Union. By mutual agreement the document on organizing a new working body was also signed by Azerbaijani Prime Minister G.A. Gasanov.

Advocating the signing of the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States, the participants in the meeting urged other republics to accede to the treaty.

The leaders of the five republics expressed profound concern that in the course of the transition to the market the region has found itself in an exceptionally difficult situation as a result of the predominant raw-material orientation of the economy and the population's low living standard and drew the attention of the USSR President and the country's government to the need to adopt exhaustive measures to create conditions for the equalization of socioeconomic development levels.

President Karimov To Visit India 17-19 Aug

OW1508132091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1055 GMT 15 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov is to go on an official friendly visit to India at the invitation of the Indian Government between August 17 and 19.

The Uzbek Cabinet has given order to the local news agency and press to cover the visit in the media. Uzbek papers are in a difficult situation because they do not have permanent correspondents in India.

Republic Celebrates Indian Independence Day

LD1508222991 Moscow TASS in English 2150 GMT 15 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Natlya Polyanskaya]

[Text] Tashkent 15 August TASS—The Uzbek public on Thursday held a meeting to celebrate India's independence day.

The meeting was attended by workers, employees, scientists, artists, the clergy and members of the Uzbekistan-India society.

"Independent India is a great power, which has been consistently promoting peace and justice during its entire history," Uzbek Minister of Construction Kudratilla Makhamadaliyev, a member of the Uzbekistan-India society, said.

"India's holiday is also a holiday for the Uzbek people, because they have firm spiritual ties with the Indian people, and similar ideals of peace, progress and freedom," Makhamadaliyev said.

Participants noted that political and economic changes in Uzbekistan have opened up new prospects for Soviet-Indian cooperation, which will receive powerful impetus during Uzbek President Islam Karimov's forthcoming official visit to India between August 17-19, 1991.

A Soviet-Indian friendship week, devoted to India's independence day and the 20th anniversary of the Soviet-Indian treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation, started with a colourful show in Tashkent's house of culture named after Indira Gandhi.

Artists clad in national costumes of all Indian states sang Indian songs and performed dances. The festival's programme envisages photo exhibitions and Indian film shows in various Uzbek cities. Uzbek artist Ruzy Charyev will exhibit his works devoted to India.